



**SINDH RURAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATION**

# **Study on the Approach and Impact of Community Investment Fund (CIF) of Peoples Poverty Reduction Programme (PPRP)**

By:



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Community Investment Fund (CIF) of  
Peoples Poverty Reduction Programme  
(PPRP)**



**SINDH RURAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATION (SRSO)**

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# ACRONYMS

<b>BOD</b>	Board of Directors
<b>CAPI</b>	Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing
<b>CEO</b>	Chief Executive Officer
<b>CIF</b>	Community Investment Fund
<b>CO</b>	Community Organization
<b>CPI</b>	Community Physical Infrastructure
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>GoS</b>	Government of Sindh
<b>HCPL</b>	Human Capital (Pvt.) Ltd.
<b>IGG</b>	Income Generating Grant
<b>KII</b>	Key Informant Interview
<b>LSO</b>	Local Support Organization
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MIP</b>	Micro Investment Plan
<b>MIS</b>	Management Information System
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PAR 30</b>	Portfolio at Risk > 30 Days
<b>PC-I</b>	Planning Commission Form-I (Government Project Document)
<b>PKR</b>	Pakistani Rupee
<b>PPRP</b>	Peoples' Poverty Reduction Programme
<b>PSC</b>	Poverty Scorecard
<b>RSP</b>	Rural Support Programme
<b>RSPN</b>	Rural Support Programmes Network
<b>SRSO</b>	Sindh Rural Support Organization
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>TVST</b>	Technical and Vocational Skills Training
<b>UC</b>	Union Council
<b>UCBPRP</b>	Union Council Based Poverty Reduction Programme
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>VO</b>	Village Organization

## Preface

This report presents the findings of an independent assessment of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) component of the Peoples' Poverty Reduction Programme (PPRP), implemented by the Sindh Rural Support Organisation (SRSO) with funding from the Government of Sindh. Conducted between March and July 2025, this study aims to examine the design, implementation, effectiveness, and sustainability of CIF as a grassroots financial mechanism to empower poor rural women and enable them to enhance their household income, build assets, and improve resilience.

The CIF model, rooted in the broader community-driven development approach of the Rural Support Programmes (RSPs), represents a significant policy innovation in poverty alleviation. By providing interest-free revolving loans through women-led community institutions, CIF offers an alternative to conventional microfinance and expands financial inclusion for the poorest segments of society—many of whom are excluded from formal credit systems.

The findings in this report are based on extensive fieldwork across six districts of Sindh—Khairpur, Sanghar, Badin,

Thatta, Mirpurkhas, and Umerkot. The assessment team employed a mixed-methods approach including a survey of over 4,000 CIF beneficiary households, focus group discussions with community members, and key informant interviews with programme implementers and stakeholders.

This study was made possible through the generous support and facilitation of SRSO and the Government of Sindh. We are grateful to the community institutions—Community Organisations (COs), Village Organisations (VOs), and Local Support Organisations (LSOs) whose participation, insights, and experiences form the core of this report. We acknowledge the women beneficiaries whose courage, enterprise, and resilience continue to drive social and economic transformation in their communities.

It is our hope that the insights and recommendations presented in this report will contribute to improving the CIF model and inform future programming aimed at sustainable, inclusive development for the rural poor.

**Fazal Ali Khan**

Lead Consultant, HCPL  
and Co-founder of Devyield  
Sept 30, 2025

## Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to express its sincere gratitude to all those who contributed to the successful completion of this assessment of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) under the Peoples' Poverty Reduction Programme (PPRP).

First and foremost, we extend our appreciation to the Sindh Rural Support Organisation (SRSO) for commissioning this important study and for their consistent support throughout the evaluation process. Special thanks are due to the senior leadership and management—particularly Mr. Azar Ayaz, Member Board of Directors, and Mr. Muhammad Dittal Kalhoro, CEO—for their strategic guidance at every stage of the assessment. We also gratefully acknowledge Mr. Naveed Memon, Sr. Manager M&E, Mr. Ali Raza, Sr. Manager RM&C SRSO and their team for providing timely access to programme data, facilitating field visits, and offering valuable technical inputs throughout the study.

We are especially thankful to the district and field staff of SRSO, including Monitoring & Evaluation Officers, CIF Specialists, and Community Bookkeepers, whose dedication, coordination, and local knowledge were essential to the successful execution of fieldwork under often challenging conditions.

Our deepest appreciation goes to the members of Community Organisations (COs), Village Organisations (VOs), and Local Support Organisations (LSOs) who participated in interviews and focus group discussions. We are particularly grateful to the women beneficiaries of CIF, who generously shared their time, experiences, and insights with honesty and openness—their voices lie at the heart of this report.

We would also like to acknowledge the tireless efforts of our enumerators, field researchers, and data management team, led by Mr. Shoaib Sultan Khan, Operations Manager, HCPL; Mr. Munawer Ali Kapri, Field Coordinator; and Mr. Shakil A. Dawlat, Data Analyst. Their professionalism and commitment ensured the delivery of high-quality data collection and analysis within a tight timeline.

Finally, we thank the Government of Sindh for its continued investment in pro-poor, community-driven development. We hope that the findings and recommendations of this study contribute meaningfully to the strengthening of inclusive financial models and the further advancement of women's economic empowerment across Sindh and beyond.

### Himatullah

Chief Executive Officer, HCPL  
September 30, 2025



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Community Investment Fund (CIF) is one of the flagship interventions of the Government of Sindh's People's Poverty Reduction Programme (PPRP), implemented by the Sindh Rural Support Organisation (SRSO). It was established to provide interest-free financial resources to the poorest households, particularly women, so that they could invest in livelihoods, build resilience, and gradually move out of poverty. The funds are managed at community level through women-led institutions such as Village Organisations (VOs) and Local Support Organisations (LSOs), ensuring local ownership and accountability.

This report presents the findings of an independent assessment of CIF covering the period 2017–2025. The study used a mixed-method approach: a survey of 4,025 beneficiary households, focused group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), and analysis of CIF portfolio data. The aim was to examine CIF's effectiveness in poverty graduation, women's empowerment, cost-effectiveness, institutional sustainability, and its performance as a revolving fund.

## Key Findings

**Pro-Poor Outreach:** By December 2024, CIF had reached 149,232 unique women out of 464,724 eligible households, covering 32% of the target population. The original PKR 2.93 billion fund revolved to PKR 6.02 billion through recoveries and re-lending, with repayment rates close to 98–99%. About 84% of VOs successfully managed CIF, but 16% VOs could not be accommodated. Around PKR 523.5 million (18%) of recovered funds remained idle in bank accounts, reducing the programme's potential outreach.

**Poverty Outcomes:** The Poverty Scorecard (PSC) analysis shows that households made clear progress between 2017 and 2025:

- The proportion in the extremely poor category (PSC 0–11) fell from 28% to 20%.
- The poor category (PSC 12–23) fell from 72% to 52%.
- For the first time, 28% of households moved into the vulnerable (24–35) and better-off (36–100) categories.

The most significant upward movement occurred among households that received three to four CIF cycles, suggesting this is the optimum threshold for placing poor households on a poverty graduation pathway.

**Income and assets:** CIF investments translated into tangible improvements. Average household income and cost savings rose steadily with repeated loan cycles. Households increased ownership of goats, sheep, and cattle, while some improved housing and food security. However, 90–98% of all CIF loans were invested in livestock, with little diversification into agriculture or microenterprises. This reflects women's confidence in livestock as a low-risk activity but also highlights structural barriers to wider livelihood choices, such as lack of input support, training, and reliable market access.

**Women's empowerment:** CIF was designed as a women-centred intervention, and the study confirms that it strengthened women's role in household and community decision-making. Most women reported greater confidence in financial management, with 72–74% participating jointly in household decisions and 13% making decisions independently. Women also became more active in VOs and LSOs, building leadership skills and peer networks. In many cases, women guided other women to access CIF, signalling a multiplier effect on women empowerment. Overall, the survey findings show that CIF has significantly improved women's access to finance and strengthened community institutions. Qualitative insights also reinforce this picture. As one VO member from Mirpurkhas explained, "This money is ours—it belongs to the village. We give it, take it, and return it. It is not from outside; it is from us." Similarly, a woman from VO Jam Khan Jatoti reflected on the impact on women's decision-making power and economic independence: "Before this, we waited for our husbands to bring home money. Now, we earn ourselves." These voices underline the sense of ownership and empowerment that statistical results alone cannot capture.

**Cost-effectiveness:** CIF has proven to be far more cost-efficient than conventional microfinance and other interest-free loan programmes in Pakistan. It provides loans of PKR 15,000–40,000 on an interest-free basis, with an operational cost of only 6.5%—lower than both the Prime Minister's Interest-Free Loan scheme (10.5%) and Akhuwat (7.5%). Repayment discipline remains exceptionally high, and because the fund revolves within communities, the benefits extend well beyond the first group of recipients.

**Resilience function:** The programme period (2017–2025) was marked by economic downturns, high inflation, and repeated natural disasters in Sindh. CIF and related interventions provided a crucial safety net. Loans allowed households to smooth consumption, avoid distress sales of assets, and cope better with shocks. Even where households did not fully escape poverty, CIF helped cushion them from falling deeper into hardship. This resilience function is one of the most important contributions of CIF.

**Sustainability challenges:** While 99% of respondents reported no mismanagement under current operations, trust in CIF governance rests largely on SRSO's oversight. When asked about risks if SRSO were to exit, beneficiaries raised concerns: poor recovery (21%), lack of training (19%), weak recordkeeping (16%), favouritism (16%), and in some districts, insufficient funds. This suggests that VOs and LSOs are not yet fully prepared to manage CIF independently and need SRSO's oversight.

High rural inflation—28.9% in 2022 and 42.2% in May 2023—has eroded the real value of CIF loans and the overall real value of the CIF fund by an estimated 35%. As a result, small loan sizes are increasingly inadequate to cover input and livelihood costs, and the real value of the overall fund is decreasing.

## Conclusions

The Community Investment Fund (CIF) has proven to be an effective, inclusive, and low-cost model for advancing poverty graduation. It has delivered measurable improvements in household poverty status, incomes, women's empowerment, and community resilience. Its revolving, interest-free design and reliance on community institutions distinguish it from conventional microfinance. The experience shows that poor women, when trusted with resources and responsibility, can manage funds effectively, repay reliably, and improve their families' wellbeing. CIF has not only reduced extreme poverty but also helped households withstand repeated economic and climatic shocks. Its core strength is in its simplicity, trust, and strong community ownership.

Yet the model's potential remains only partly realised. Coverage is still limited—only 32% of eligible households in the six programme districts have been reached—while fund recycling has been slow, leaving significant resources idle. Inflation has further eroded the real value of loans, reducing their ability to meet household needs and undermining the revolving fund over time. These constraints limit CIF's longer-term sustainability and long-term impact.

To consolidate gains, CIF must guarantee at least

three to four loan cycles per household, adjust loan sizes for inflation, and build stronger linkages with markets, government programmes, and social protection systems. With these measures, CIF can move beyond short-term poverty mitigation to provide a credible pathway towards sustainable poverty graduation. It holds the potential not only to transform livelihoods in Sindh but also to serve as a scalable model of pro-poor, women-centred financial inclusion across Pakistan.

## Recommendations

The assessment highlights that CIF is a proven and cost-effective model but needs strengthening to maximise its impact. The following priorities are recommended:

1. Expand outreach and coverage – Mobilise additional resources to reach the 315,500 eligible households still excluded, activate the 917 VOs not yet managing CIF, and quickly redeploy idle funds to increase equity across districts.
2. Guarantee repeat access for graduation – Institutionalise at least three to four CIF cycles per household as the threshold for graduation, supported by stronger VO/LSO systems to manage recovery and recycling.
3. Strengthen resilience functions – Position CIF as a shock-responsive mechanism by introducing emergency loan products and linking with disaster risk reduction and social protection schemes to cushion households during crises.
4. Diversify livelihoods – Promote higher-value livestock opportunities (e.g., dairy, small ruminants, fodder, processing) for households ready for graduation. Pilot agriculture and microenterprise loans only where enabling conditions exist, supported by partnerships with government and market actors.
5. Safeguard sustainability and build institutional capacity – Gradually transfer recovery and monitoring functions from SRSO to community institutions, backed by training, digital recordkeeping, MIS-based tracking, and regular audits.
6. Protect loan value against inflation – Adjust loan sizes in line with inflation, recapitalise CIF to preserve real value, and link loans with complementary livelihood support to strengthen household incomes.
7. Consolidate women's empowerment – Keep CIF firmly embedded in women's organisations, and expand financial literacy, savings mobilisation, and leadership training to transform access to finance into sustained empowerment.

# Chapter 1:

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This report presents the assessment of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) component under the Peoples' Poverty Reduction Programme (PPRP) in the districts of Khairpur, Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Umerkot, Badin, and Thatta. The PPRP, funded by the Government of Sindh (GoS) and implemented by the Sindh Rural Support Organisation (SRSO), has been operational in these districts since 2017.

PPRP adopts a multi-sectoral, integrated approach aimed at reducing poverty and empowering rural women. Anchored in the social mobilisation strategy of the Rural Support Programmes (RSPs), the programme focuses on forming and strengthening community institutions. The RSPs social mobilisation overtime had evolved into a three-tier institutional structure anchored in women's organisations, designed to ensure inclusivity, sustainability, and scalability that was earlier tested in the GoS funded Union Council Based Poverty Reduction Programme (UCBPRP) from 2009-2016 by SRSO and other RSPs working in Sindh. The programme was then scaled to all rural union council of Sindh with the financial support of Government of Sindh under the PPRP programme and EU funded SUCCESS programme.

The social mobilisation strategy is structured as follows:

- At the grassroots level, Community Organisations (COs) at neighbourhood level are formed, each comprising 15-20 poor women – with one member representing one household.
- Each CO nominates two women to form the Village Organisation (VO) at the village level.
- VOs, in turn, nominate representatives to form a Local Support Organisation (LSO) at the union council level, which is the lowest administrative tier in Pakistan.

This three-tier system forms the backbone of programme implementation. Under UCBPRP and subsequently PPRP and SUCCESS, VOs and LSOs were entrusted with managing grants for two key financial instruments:

- A Community Investment Fund (CIF)—a revolving fund providing interest-free loans to poor women identified by COs to invest in income-generating assets.
- Income Generating Grants (IGGs)—one-time grants provided to the poorest and most vulnerable women who lacked the capacity to repay loans, as

verified by the COs.

Moreover, the UCBPRP project document (PC-I) articulated the GoS's broader vision: that community institutions would serve as a conduit for public sector departments to plan and deliver development services, thereby enhancing local governance and service delivery through participatory, community-led mechanisms.

Building on this foundation, PPRP provides a comprehensive package of household-level support including:

- Community Investment Fund (CIF)
- Income Generating Grants (IGG)
- Vocational Training Program (VTP)
- Enterprise Development Fund

The programme also provides support to Community Physical Infrastructure (CPI) implemented at community or village level.

The Community Investment Fund (CIF) is a significant component of PPRP, designed to support the financial and institutional sustainability of community institutions and to provide financial access to women members of the Community Organisation. CIF is a grant from the government of Sindh to poor households and the SRSO manages the CIF as a revolving fund while offering interest free micro-loans to women from poor households to start income-generating activities or build productive assets. To access CIF loans, a woman must be a member of the CO, must be poor (PSC 0-23), and must agree to pay back the CIF according to the terms and conditions set by the women Village Organisation in consultation with SRSO. PPRP is in its fifth year of implementation in these six districts. As of December 2024, a total of 4,647 out of 5,564 Village Organizations (VOs) have successfully established Community Investment Funds (CIF), with a cumulative seed capital of PKR 2.9 billion. These funds have provided loans to 149,232 women to support income-generating activities. Among them, 23,439 women have accessed a second cycle, 14,553 a third cycle, 7,831 a fourth cycle, and 2,533 a fifth cycle of CIF loans. The average loan amount ranges from PKR 14,000 to PKR 40,000, and beneficiaries primarily invest in livestock purchases and small-scale enterprises, enabling them to enhance household income and economic resilience.

The VOs have engaged community bookkeepers to maintain loan records, with training provided by SRSO to both VO leaders and community bookkeepers on CIF management. SRSO has also developed comprehensive policies and procedures—covering aspects such as loan amounts, repayment terms, processing fees, service charges (if any), and methods for loan processing and repayment. The core principles guiding these policies are that CIF should be "used and not

consumed" and should benefit the maximum number of poor households.

This study aims to assess the approach, impact, and effectiveness of CIF on poor households, with a focus on poverty alleviation, women's empowerment, and sustainability of community institutions.



# CHAPTER 2: STUDY FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This section presents the framework and methodological approach adopted for assessing the Community Investment Fund (CIF) component of the Peoples' Poverty Reduction Programme (PPRP) in six districts of Sindh—Khairpur, Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Umerkot, Badin, and Thatta. The study aimed to generate robust, evidence-based insights into CIF's effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, with the overarching goal of informing future programming and policy formulation.

## 2.1. Study Objectives

The assessment was guided by three primary objectives. First, it aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of CIF in achieving its intended development outcomes. This began with a comprehensive portfolio analysis, using administrative data provided by SRSO. The analysis reviewed the scale and structure of the CIF across the programme districts, examining the number of Village Organizations (VOs) with operational CIFs, loan disbursement trends across various cycles, loan sizes, sectoral use of funds (such as livestock and small businesses), and the extent of fund recovery and recycling. Building on this, the study then used a structured beneficiary survey to assess the impact of CIF at the household and individual levels. This part focused on whether access to CIF had contributed to improvements in economic resilience, particularly in terms of increased income, asset accumulation, cost savings, and women's empowerment.

Second, the study aimed to document lessons learned and best practices from the implementation of CIF. By examining how the fund was accessed, used, managed, and repaid, the research team aimed to identify what worked well and where improvements could be made. This learning is expected to inform the design and implementation of similar interventions in the future.

The third objective focused on evaluating the cost-effectiveness and sustainability of the CIF mechanism. Specifically, the study compared CIF's financial model and delivery cost with other microfinance products offered by SRSO. This comparative analysis aimed to assess whether CIF represents an economically viable and scalable model for supporting poor households through revolving, interest-free loans.

## 2.2. Study Framework

To structure the inquiry and ensure a comprehensive

analysis, the study applied a conceptual framework built around four outcome families, each representing a key area of impact. These outcome families reflect the programme's theory of change and link CIF access to measurable socio-economic changes. Each outcome family is described in the sections that follow, while the detailed hypotheses and associated indicators are presented in Annex 1.

### 1. Poverty Graduation

This outcome family examined how CIF supports the inclusion of poor women in development processes and contributes to household-level poverty graduation. The analysis began with a CIF portfolio review using administrative data from SRSO, which captured the scale, coverage, and disbursement patterns of CIF across cycles, including the number of VOs with CIFs, the cumulative amount disbursed, and the reach across five loan cycles. This provided insight into the operational footprint and reach of CIF. The study then used survey data to assess whether access to CIF has led to improvements in Poverty Scorecard (PSC) scores, increased income, and accumulation of productive assets. It also explored the degree to which CIF catalysed investment in income-generating activities such as livestock rearing, agriculture, and small businesses. Additionally, it considered whether repeated access to finance encouraged beneficiaries to engage with formal financial systems beyond the programme.

### 2. Women's Empowerment

The second outcome family focused on understanding the transformative effect of CIF on women's social and economic empowerment. This included evaluating changes in women's decision-making power within the household, control over finances, and confidence in managing income and expressing opinions. It also explored women's participation in community institutions and their evolving roles in civic life. The study used both self-reported measures and community feedback to assess perceived empowerment and shifts in gender norms.

### 3. Cost-Effectiveness and Institutional Sustainability

This outcome family analysed the financial efficiency of the CIF model and its long-term viability. It involved a comparison of CIF's

operational and delivery costs with those of traditional microfinance products. The analysis assessed the cost of serving each beneficiary, the total programme expenditure, and the return on investment based on economic outcomes at the household level. The study also examined whether community institutions (VOs and LSOs) were equipped to manage and sustain the CIF mechanism beyond project timelines.

#### 4. CIF Recovery and Revolving Mechanism

Finally, this outcome family focused on the mechanics of loan recovery and fund rotation. It assessed the efficiency and reliability of CIF repayment systems, recovery rates, and overdue rates. The study looked at how effectively funds were recycled to support additional households and whether community institutions were able to manage recoveries with minimal external intervention. Verification was conducted through PPRP's Management Information System (MIS) and VO/LSO records.

### 2.3. Methodology

The assessment employed a mixed-methods approach, integrating both quantitative and qualitative research methods to generate a holistic understanding of CIF's performance and impact.

#### 2.3.1. Study Design

The research design included three main components:

1. **Portfolio Analysis:** The study commenced with an in-depth portfolio analysis of the Community Investment Fund (CIF), using administrative and monitoring data provided by the Sindh Rural Support Organization (SRSO). This analysis served as a foundational step to understand the scale, outreach, and operational performance of the CIF mechanism across the targeted districts.

2. **Quantitative Household Survey:** A structured household survey was conducted with 4,025 CIF beneficiaries to collect data on socio-economic status, poverty scores, income levels, asset ownership, and utilisation of CIF loans. The survey provided a statistically significant dataset for analysing household-level outcomes and comparing results across districts and loan cycles.

3. **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs):** Five FGDs were conducted with women leaders from Community Organisations (COs), Village Organisations (VOs), and Local Support Organisations (LSOs). These discussions helped unpack the community's experiences with CIF,

including the loan approval process, repayment practices, challenges in implementation, and the perceived benefits and shortcomings of the fund. FGDs offered a space for collective reflection and learning.

4. **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs):** 12 KIIs were held with SRSO staff, field managers, community bookkeepers, and VO/LSO leaders. These interviews provided in-depth insights into programme design, institutional support mechanisms, targeting processes, and sustainability strategies. Informants also reflected on implementation challenges and shared recommendations for future improvements.

5. **Cost-Benefit Analysis:** A separate component of the study involved performing a cost-benefit analysis using CIF portfolio data and household-level economic outcomes. This analysis aimed to determine whether CIF offers a high return on investment, both for the programme and the beneficiaries.

#### 2.3.2. Sampling Strategy for the quantitative survey

The sampling strategy for the quantitative survey was carefully designed to ensure representative, stratified, and multi-stage coverage across the entire PPRP operational area for this assessment. The process was structured in a logical sequence, beginning at the district level and progressing down to individual beneficiaries at the Village Organisation (VO) level. The goal was to obtain a robust and statistically valid sample that accurately reflects the diversity of contexts across the six programme districts.

##### 1. Stratification at District Level

The first step in the sampling process involved stratifying the sample across all six PPRP districts—Khairpur, Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Umerkot, Badin, and Thatta. This district-level stratification was essential to ensure that the assessment captured inter-district variations in CIF implementation, fund management, loan cycles, and community dynamics.

##### 2. Inclusion of All Talukas

To ensure complete geographic coverage, the study included all Talukas (sub-districts) within the six districts. In total, 35 Talukas were considered in the sampling frame. This step helped to account for potential socio-economic and cultural differences at the sub-district level, which could influence the outcomes and perceptions of the CIF intervention.

### 3. Random Selection of One UC per Taluka

From each of the 35 Talukas, one Union Council (UC) was selected randomly. This approach ensured that each Taluka was represented in the sample while maintaining operational feasibility. The selection of UCs through random sampling minimised selection bias and enhanced the representativeness of the sample.

### 4. Selection of Village Organisations (VOs)

Within each of the 35 selected UCs, Village Organisations (VOs) were identified that had implemented multiple CIF loan cycles (1st through 5th). From this pool, a total of 110 VOs were selected across the districts, ensuring representation of both early-stage and more mature CIF cycles. The selection criteria ensured that each VO included in the sample had enough active CIF beneficiaries for meaningful analysis.

### 5. Proportional Sampling of CIF Beneficiaries

At the VO level, we have applied proportional sampling to select CIF beneficiaries from different loan cycles. This ensured that the sample included both first-time borrowers and those who had accessed the CIF multiple times. The aim was to compare experiences and outcomes across various stages of CIF engagement and capture the cumulative impact of repeated borrowing.

### 6. Sample Size Determination and Adequacy for Sub-Group Analysis

The sample size for this assessment was determined using a fixed sampling rate of 3%, applied to both the 1st cycle and the combined 2nd to 5th cycles of CIF beneficiaries. This approach yielded a total planned sample of 3,968 households, which was slightly exceeded during field implementation, resulting in a final achieved sample of 4,025 households across six districts.

This approach represents a slight variation from the original Terms of Reference (ToR), which had specified sampling 2% from the 1st cycle and 3% from the 2nd cycle only, with an envisaged sample of 3,973 households (2,267 from the 1st cycle and 1,706 from the 2nd). However, during the inception phase, the actual CIF beneficiary data received from SRSO revealed the presence of beneficiaries from the 3rd, 4th, and even 5th CIF cycles, which were not accounted for in the ToR. In response, the research team revised the sampling plan to include all active CIF cycles (1st through 5th), thereby ensuring a more accurate, inclusive, and representative assessment of the programme's implementation, reach, and impact.

Statistically, the total sample far exceeds the minimum requirement for a population-based

survey. According to the standard formula for sample size determination:

$$n = \frac{Z^2 \cdot p \cdot (1 - p)}{e^2}$$

Where:

- $n$  = minimum sample size
- $Z$  = z-score for 95% confidence (1.96)
- $p$  = estimated proportion (0.5 for maximum variability)
- $e$  = margin of error (0.05)

This yields a required sample size of approximately 384 households to estimate population-level outcomes with 95% confidence and  $\pm 5\%$  margin of error. With 4,025 completed surveys, this study's sample is more than ten times larger, enabling a high degree of precision in overall estimates.

More importantly, this large sample allows for reliable sub-group analysis across:

- Geographic areas: Each district is well represented (minimum of 455 households per district).
- Loan cycles: 1st cycle (2,044), 2nd (1,224), 3rd (521), 4th (224), and 5th (12).

The robust sample sizes in cycles 1 to 4 ensure that comparative analysis—such as assessing the impact of repeated CIF borrowing or identifying trends in poverty graduation—can be conducted with statistical confidence. While the 5th cycle sample is small ( $n = 12$ ) and findings from it are treated with caution, its inclusion supports exploratory analysis of CIF scale-up and long-term usage trends.

The adapted sampling strategy upheld the spirit of the original ToR while offering a more comprehensive and methodologically rigorous dataset. The sample's size and structure provide a solid foundation for both overall programme evaluation and detailed disaggregated insights, including analysis by district, loan cycle, and other key variables.

#### 2.3.3. Sampling Frame: Planned vs. Actual Coverage

To ensure representativeness and operational feasibility, the original sampling plan outlined coverage of 35 Talukas, 35 Union Councils (UCs), and 110 Village Organisations (VOs) across six districts. However, based on field realities, minor adjustments were made during implementation, resulting in a total of 116 VOs sampled while maintaining full coverage of Talukas and UCs. Table 1 presents a comparison of the planned and actual sample coverage:

Table 1: District-wise Sampling Frame – Planned vs. Actual (Talukas, UCs, and VOs)

District	Planned Sample			Actual Sample			Remarks
	No. of Talukas	No. of UCs	No. of VOs	No. of Talukas	No. of UCs	No. of VOs	
Badin	5	5	15	5	5	16	Additional VOs were added where planned households were not available.
Khairpur	8	8	26	8	8	27	
Mirpurkhas	8	8	20	8	8	22	
Sanghar	6	6	18	6	6	18	
Thatta	4	4	14	4	4	15	
Umerkot	4	4	17	4	4	18	
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>116</b>	


Table 2 highlights both sample achievements and shortfalls across districts and CIF cycles. While the overall sample slightly exceeded the planned target (4,024 actual vs. 3,968 planned), notable shortfalls occurred in the 1st cycle sampling for key districts: Khairpur (-124), Badin (-26), Mirpurkhas (-9), Sanghar (-23), and Umerkot (-37). These shortfalls were addressed by increasing the number of sampled beneficiaries from later CIF cycles (2nd to 4th), particularly in Khairpur, Umerkot, and Sanghar, where CIF had expanded significantly. This flexible approach ensured overall sample adequacy and enabled richer analysis across multiple CIF cohorts.

Table 2: District-wise Sampling Frame – Planned vs. Actual (Sample beneficiaries by number CIF Cycles)

District Name	Original Sample						Actual Sample Reached					
	CIF Cycle wise Number of Beneficiaries						CIF Cycle wise Number of Beneficiaries					
	1	2	3	4	5	Total	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Badin	414	227	32	13		<b>686</b>	388	228	40	17		<b>673</b>
Khairpur	512	145	122	44		<b>823</b>	388	276	122	75		<b>861</b>
Mirpur Khas	324	143	96	22		<b>585</b>	307	171	75	45		<b>598</b>
Sanghar	455	232	115	37	11	<b>850</b>	432	238	131	29	10	<b>840</b>
Thatta	238	106	78	20	3	<b>445</b>	244	135	66	10		<b>455</b>
Umerkot	322	147	72	19	19	<b>579</b>	285	176	87	48	2	<b>598</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,265</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>3,968</b>	<b>2044</b>	<b>1224</b>	<b>521</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4025</b>

Figure 1 visually depicts the absolute differences between the actual and planned CIF sample sizes by district and cycle, helping to illustrate the adjustments made during field implementation. Positive values represent over-sampling, while negative values indicate under-sampling. Significant shortfalls in the 1st cycle—especially in Khairpur and Umerkot—were offset by over-sampling in later cycles.

Figure 1: Absolute Difference Between Actual and Planned CIF Sample Sizes by District and Cycle



### 2.3.4. Sample Completion, Attrition, and Field-Level Mitigation Measures

During the field implementation phase, the study team set out to survey 3,978 CIF beneficiary households as per the revised sampling strategy. Despite encountering a range of operational challenges, the team successfully completed 4,025 interviews—surpassing the planned sample and achieving over 100% completion. This was made possible through a proactive replacement strategy and strong coordination with community institutions and field teams. However, the process involved an overall attrition and replacement rate of approximately 14% relative to the original sample list.

Several factors contributed to the need for replacements. A total of 290 beneficiaries had migrated out of the programme areas and could no longer be traced. Another 76 beneficiaries were confirmed deceased, while 212 were consistently unavailable despite repeated follow-up visits. A further 300 cases were misclassified in the Management Information System (MIS)—typically listed under the 1st CIF cycle but having received loans in the 2nd or subsequent cycles. Attrition was particularly pronounced among 1st cycle beneficiaries, especially in the districts of Khairpur, Umerkot, and Badin.

To address these challenges, the assessment team implemented several mitigation measures. These included up to three return visits to households that were initially unavailable, and the use of a pre-identified reserve list to replace

untraceable respondents. In addition, Village Organisations (VOs) and SRSO field staff played a critical role in facilitating real-time verification and logistical support during the data collection process.

While the replacement process may have introduced minor sampling bias—particularly in the 1st cycle cohort—the final sample retained proportional representation across all districts and CIF cycles. The slight variation is unlikely to affect the overall validity or reliability of the findings. The achieved sample size of 4,025 households ensures broad geographic and programmatic coverage and preserves the methodological integrity of the study. As a result, the analysis is sufficiently robust to support disaggregated and comparative assessments across CIF cycles, districts, and other sub-groups.

### 2.3.5. Data Collection Tools

The assessment employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative tools to capture both measurable outcomes and contextual insights related to the CIF intervention.

**1. Structured Household Survey:** A detailed household-level questionnaire was administered to all sampled CIF beneficiaries. The tool gathered quantitative data on household demographics, CIF utilisation, income-generating activities, poverty scores, and changes in asset ownership. This instrument served as the primary source for assessing the economic and social impact of CIF interventions.

Following feedback from SRSO, the survey tool was revised to ensure contextual relevance. The finalised instrument was then translated into Sindhi and digitised using the KOBO Toolbox platform. Before the main data collection began, the tool was field-tested, and necessary adjustments were made based on the pilot results and enumerator feedback to improve clarity, flow, and effectiveness.

The last version of the questionnaire is included in Annex 2.

**2. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guide:** The FGD guide was developed to capture the collective experiences and perceptions of women leaders engaged in the CIF process at various institutional levels. The tool included open-ended, thematically structured questions aimed at understanding how community institutions (COs, VOs, and LSOs) managed the CIF mechanism—covering loan disbursement processes, terms and conditions, repayment practices, successes, operational challenges, and sustainability strategies. The participatory nature of FGDs enabled the gathering of nuanced insights about the institutional dynamics and social impact of the programme.

**3. Key Informant Interview (KII) Guide:** The KII guide was designed to elicit in-depth individual-level perspectives from stakeholders with operational or strategic responsibilities in CIF implementation. It explored themes such as beneficiary selection, loan utilisation, institutional oversight, recordkeeping, capacity gaps, and perceptions of CIF ownership and sustainability. These interviews helped validate and contextualise findings from household surveys and FGDs.

The full sets of FGD and KII guides are provided in Annex 3.

### 2.3.6. Data Collection Process

The data collection process was carefully planned and executed in sequential phases to ensure methodological rigour, data integrity, and operational efficiency across all six programme districts.

#### 1. Training and Pilot Testing

The data collection team was identified in advance and underwent a two-day training workshop held at the SRSO office in Hyderabad. This training focused on both quantitative and qualitative tools, covering the purpose, structure, and administration of each instrument. As part of the training, a pilot test was conducted in one selected district to assess the clarity, relevance, and logical flow of the tools. Based on the pilot feedback,

necessary revisions were incorporated to enhance usability and alignment with field realities.

#### 2. Fieldwork Implementation

Following tool finalisation, the main data collection was rolled out across the sampled districts. Quantitative data was gathered using Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) through KOBO Toolbox, enabling real-time data capture, offline functionality, and automated validation checks to reduce input errors. Qualitative data—including FGDs and KIIs—was collected using pre-tested guides, with field researchers recording responses (with consent) for subsequent transcription and analysis.

#### 3. Data Quality Control

To maintain high data quality, a dedicated quality control team was deployed to monitor submissions daily. This team reviewed the completeness and internal consistency of entries and shared real-time feedback with enumerators to promptly address issues. Supervisors also conducted routine field monitoring visits, spot checks, and protocol verification exercises to reinforce compliance.

#### 4. Data Cleaning and Validation

Once collected, all survey data was uploaded to a secure central server and underwent a multi-step cleaning process using HCPL's established protocol:

- **Built-in Checks in KOBO Collect:** The survey forms included validation rules (e.g., required fields, valid numeric ranges) to minimise entry errors at source.
- **Voice Verification:** With consent, audio recordings of interviews were captured. Each day, 10–15% of these recordings were reviewed to verify that recorded responses matched digital entries. Any discrepancies were flagged for review.
- **Evening Team Debriefs:** Field teams convened daily to discuss questionable entries and identify responses needing verification or follow-up.
- **Direct Beneficiary Contact:** If further verification was required, field supervisors contacted sampled respondents via telephone to confirm or clarify responses.

- **Outlier Detection:** Cleaned data was exported to MS Excel for further checks. Statistical outliers (typically  $\pm 3$  standard deviations from the mean) were flagged and cross-referenced with interview notes, recordings, or follow-up calls for validation or correction.

Qualitative data, including FGD and KII transcripts, was processed separately and prepared for thematic coding and analysis using qualitative data management techniques.

### 2.3.7. Data Analysis

The data analysis component of the study followed a structured approach, integrating both quantitative and qualitative methods to generate comprehensive insights into the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the Community Investment Fund (CIF).

**1. Quantitative Data Analysis:** The cleaned quantitative dataset—comprising responses from 4,025 CIF beneficiary households—was analysed using statistical software such as SPSS, Excel, and STATA. The analysis focused on measuring changes in key outcome indicators including household income, asset accumulation, poverty score, and livelihood patterns. Descriptive statistics were used to summarise trends, while cross-tabulations and disaggregated analyses allowed exploration of patterns across CIF cycles, districts, and socio-demographic groups. Where applicable, inferential statistics (such as t-tests or ANOVA) were applied to assess the significance of observed changes across sub-groups.

**2. Qualitative Data Analysis:** Qualitative data gathered through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) was transcribed and subjected to thematic analysis. The research team developed a coding framework based on the study objectives, enabling the identification of recurring patterns, perceptions, and experiences related to CIF processes, outcomes, and challenges. Key themes included women's empowerment, governance of the revolving fund, repayment dynamics, and institutional capacity. These insights were used to complement and contextualise the quantitative findings, helping to explain the 'how' and 'why' behind observed trends.

**3. Cost-Benefit Analysis:** To assess economic viability, a cost-benefit analysis was conducted comparing the programme's implementation costs to the estimated household-level economic gains resulting from CIF investments. This analysis accounted for direct and indirect costs borne by SRSO, as well as the income generated by beneficiaries through livestock, enterprise, or agriculture-related activities. The resulting cost-benefit ratios offered insights into the financial sustainability of CIF as a revolving fund model and helped inform recommendations for future scaling or adaptation.

### 2.4. Ethical Considerations

The study adhered to recognised ethical standards throughout all phases of its design and implementation, ensuring the dignity, safety, and rights of all participants were respected.

**a. Informed Consent:** Prior to data collection, all participants were provided with clear and comprehensive information about the study's objectives, procedures, and expected duration. Enumerators explained participants' rights, including their right to decline participation or withdraw at any stage without any consequences. Informed verbal consent was obtained and recorded before each interview, focus group discussion, or key informant interview.

**b. Confidentiality and Data Protection:** All information gathered was treated as confidential and used exclusively for the purpose of this assessment. Personal identifiers were removed from the dataset to protect the identity of respondents. Data was stored securely, with access restricted to the core research team. Digital records were password-protected, and paper-based forms (if any) were kept in locked storage.

**c. Participant Well-being:** Every effort was made to ensure that participation in the study posed no harm—emotional, psychological, or otherwise—to respondents. Sensitive topics were approached with care, and the research team was trained to handle distress or discomfort respectfully. The study design minimised participant burden and avoided intrusive or exploitative questioning.

# CHAPTER 3: PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS OF CIF

## 3.1. CIF Disbursement and Revolving Fund Utilisation Status

A total of PKR 2.93 billion in seed capital has been allocated to Community Investment Funds (CIF) across six districts under the GoS-PPRP. As shown in Table 3 entire PKR 2.93 billion allocated as seed


money has been fully disbursed to and recovered from the beneficiaries as of December 2024. Of this, PKR 2.41 billion is actively revolving within communities, while the remaining PKR 523.5 million is unutilised in bank accounts, available for future disbursement.

Table 3: Summary of CIF Portfolio (PKR in Million) as of December 2024

Indicator	Khairpur	Sanghar	Badin	Thatta	Mirpur Khas	Umerkot	Total
A. CIF Seed Money Received from GoS-PPRP	704.4	529.1	584.2	384.6	407.8	319.3	2,929.4
B. CIF Disbursed to Beneficiaries in first cycle of CIF	704.4	529.1	584.2	384.6	407.8	319.3	2,929.4
C. CIF recovered to revolving with beneficiaries	445.6	520	429.8	296.4	396.10	318	2,405.9
D. CIF recovered and available in Banks (Unutilised from Revolving Pool)	258.8	9.1	154.4	88.2	11.7	1.3	523.5
Data Source: SRSO Excel File							

Figure 2 highlights the CIF portfolio utilisation, showing that on average 82% of recovered funds are actively revolving with beneficiaries, while 18% remain unutilised in bank accounts. District-level patterns vary considerably: Mirpur Khas, Sanghar, and Umerkot demonstrate near-perfect recycling, with almost all recoveries re-lent to communities. Thatta and Badin perform moderately, with around a quarter of recovered funds still held in bank accounts. Khairpur stands out with the weakest utilisation, where over one-third of recoveries remain idle. Overall, while the CIF model demonstrates strong recycling performance, the persistence of idle balances in certain districts underscores the need to accelerate re-disbursement to maximise outreach and impact.

Figure 2: Share of Funds Revolving vs. funds remained in Bank Accounts (as of December 2024)



<sup>1</sup> The initial CIF seed money allocation from GoS under PPRP was PKR 2,925.1 million. This was later increased by PKR 4.1 million through internal reallocations within districts and savings from other programme components. The additional funds were channelled to CIF to maximise community outreach.

PKR 2,929 million seed money, the CIF revolved to PKR 6,019 million



Table 4 and Figure 3 present the combined data on CIF disbursements and number of loans. From PKR 2,929 million seed money, the CIF revolved to PKR 6,019 million, disbursed through 292,323 loans across five cycles in six districts — reflecting a 2X rotation rate.

Table 4: CIF Disbursement by Cycle (PKR in Million) as of December 2024

District	Loans amount/numbers	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Total
Khairpur	Amount in million (PKR)	704	214	173	130	80	1,301
	Number of loans	33,023	10,021	9,212	6,428	3,641	62,325
Sanghar	Amount in million (PKR)	529	319	171	88	31	1,138
	Number of loans	29,690	15,457	7,663	3,313	822	56,945
Badin	Amount in million (PKR)	584	267	123	52	15	1,041
	Number of loans	26,175	10,579	8,789	3,858	1,037	50,438
Thatta	Amount in million (PKR)	385	228	113	73	43	842
	Number of loans	17,178	10,027	5,653	3,719	2,063	38,640
Mirpurkhas	Amount in million (PKR)	408	264	143	72	31	918
	Number of loans	23,502	9,519	7,792	4,087	1,380	46,280
Umerkot	Amount in million (PKR)	319	240	128	63	28	779
	Number of loans	19,664	8,789	5,178	3,162	902	37,695
<b>Total</b>	<b>Amount in million (PKR)</b>	<b>2,929</b>	<b>1,531</b>	<b>852</b>	<b>478</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>6,019</b>
	<b>Number of loans</b>	<b>149,232</b>	<b>64,392</b>	<b>44,287</b>	<b>24,567</b>	<b>9,845</b>	<b>292,323</b>

As shown in Figure 3, it reveals a clear declining trend of CIF disbursement and number of loans across successive cycles. In the first cycle, disbursements reached PKR 2,929.5 million, supporting 149,232 loans, indicating strong initial uptake and broad coverage. However, both the value of disbursements and the number of loans dropped in later cycles: the second cycle disbursed only PKR 1,531 million for 64,392 loans, while by the fifth cycle the figures had fallen sharply to PKR 228.4 million for just 9,845 loans. This steep reduction suggests challenges in maintaining fund rotation and scaling subsequent cycles. Several factors explain this pattern: delays in fund release from government and late start of CIF, slower

recovery rates from earlier loans, and varying capacities of Village Organisations (VOs) to manage revolving funds effectively. Weakening monitoring of the revolving process may also have contributed to underutilisation, with funds not fully absorbed into new loan cycles.

Overall, while CIF demonstrated significant outreach in its initial phase, sustaining momentum proved difficult, underscoring the importance of timely fund release, strong VO capacities, and robust recovery systems for long-term programme sustainability.

Figure 3: Cycle wise CIF Disbursement and number of loans as of Dec 2024




Table 5 presents the average CIF loan size by cycle and district, showing broadly consistent loan amounts across cycles and locations. Overall averages remained within a narrow range, starting at PKR 19,631 in the first cycle and reaching PKR 23,200 in the fifth, with no significant or systematic increase over time. While some fluctuations appear—for example, slightly higher averages in

Sanghar and Umerkot in later cycles and lower values in Badin—these are not large enough to suggest major differences in loan structuring. The results indicate that CIF loans were designed to remain uniform across districts and cycles, reflecting a standardised approach to loan allocation rather than context-specific adjustments.

Table 5: Cycle wise average size of CIF loan in PKR (As of December 2024)

CIF Cycles	Khairpur	Sanghar	Badin	Thatta	Mirpurkhas	Umerkot	Total
First	21,331	17,821	22,319	22,389	17,352	16,238	19,631
Second	21,335	20,618	25,220	22,709	27,755	27,284	23,776
Third	18,758	22,315	13,995	20,025	18,365	24,797	19,225
Fourth	20,193	26,653	13,401	19,683	17,666	19,987	19,473
Fifth	22,054	37,348	14,272	20,989	22,464	31,486	23,200

### 3.2. CIF Beneficiary Reach and Repeat Access Patterns

Table 6 presents the number of unique CIF beneficiaries reached as of December 2024, compared to the total number of eligible households across the six programme districts. In total, 149,232 unique beneficiaries accessed CIF out of 464,724 eligible households, representing coverage of 32.1%. District-level figures show similar performance, with coverage ranging between 28.1% in Thatta and 34.2% in Umerkot and Khairpur (Figure 4). Despite these variations, the data highlights that only about one-third of eligible households have been able to access CIF, pointing to both the significant outreach achieved and the considerable unmet demand that remains. This suggests that while CIF has scaled up across multiple districts, further expansion and sustainability measures will be critical to ensure wider inclusion of eligible households.




Figure 4: Percent of eligible beneficiaries accessed CIF as of Dec 2024

Table 6: Number of CIF Beneficiaries as of December 2024

Number of Times CIF Taken	Khairpur	Sanghar	Badin	Thatta	Mirpurkhas	Umerkot	Total
Total Unique Beneficiaries Reached	33,023	29,690	26,175	17,178	23,502	19,664	149,232
Number of eligible CIF Beneficiaries	97,808	94,843	81,914	61,140	71,543	57,476	464,724
% of eligible Beneficiaries	33.76%	31.30%	31.95%	28.10%	32.85%	34.21%	32.11%
Data Source: SRSO Excel File							

Figure 6 provides further insights into the frequency of CIF access among the 149,232 unique beneficiaries as of December 2024. Most beneficiaries (84,840, or 57%) accessed CIF only once, indicating limited repeat borrowing and suggesting that many households remain at the initial stage of engagement with the fund. A smaller but notable proportion of beneficiaries accessed CIF multiple times: 20,105 beneficiaries (13%) accessed it twice, 19,720 (13%) accessed it three times, and 14,722 (10%) accessed it four times. Only 9,845 beneficiaries (7%) reached the fifth cycle, reflecting both the revolving nature of the fund and the constraints in scaling sustained access. District-level patterns show that Khairpur,

Sanghar, and Badin consistently had the largest numbers of repeat borrowers, with Sanghar standing out for a higher share of beneficiaries accessing two or more cycles. These trends suggest that while CIF has succeeded in reaching many households, the low proportion of repeat borrowing points to systemic challenges such as delays in recovery, fund recycling, capacity limitations of community institutions, and uneven monitoring. Strengthening these mechanisms could enhance CIF's revolving potential and allow more households to benefit repeatedly over time.

Figure 5: Number of unique beneficiaries and frequency of CIF access (as of Dec 2024)



### 3.3. VO-Level Access to CIF and Loan Cycle Progression

Table 7 presents the extent of CIF engagement across the 5,564 Village Organisations (VOs) formed in the six programme districts as of December 2024. Out of these VOs, 4,647 VOs (84%) were actively managing a CIF portfolio, while 917 VOs (16%) did not manage CIF funds.

District-level engagement varied: Sanghar (91%), Umerkot (88%), and Khairpur (86%) had the highest proportion of VOs managing CIF, whereas Thatta

(75%) and Mirpurkhas (76%) recorded the lowest.

Progression of VOs through successive CIF cycles shows a diminishing trend. Of the active VOs, 87% managed funds in the first cycle, 71% in the second, 56% in the third, 40% in the fourth, and only 22% in the fifth cycle. VOs in Badin have particularly low rate of CIF revolving across successive cycles.

The average CIF portfolio managed per VO across all districts was PKR 526,505, with Khairpur recording the highest average (PKR 604,674) and Umerkot the lowest (PKR 422,948).

Table 7: CIF Cycle-Wise Outreach by Village Organisations (VOs)

Indicator	Khairpur	Sanghar	Badin	Thatta	Mirpurkhas	Umerkot	All Districts
Total Number of VOs	1,165	1,055	995	801	793	755	5,564
Number of VOs having active CIF Portfolio	1,001	956	824	599	606	661	4,647
Percent of VOs having active CIF Portfolio	86%	91%	83%	75%	76%	88%	84%
Only 1st Cycle (%)	98%	100%	32%	96%	99%	98%	87%
Only 2nd Cycle (%)	73%	83%	20%	82%	89%	85%	71%
Only 3rd Cycle (%)	57%	64%	21%	60%	74%	67%	56%
Only 4th Cycle (%)	36%	44%	18%	48%	56%	48%	40%
Only 5th Cycle (%)	15%	21%	9%	30%	35%	28%	22%
Average CIF portfolio per VO (PKR)	604,674	501,538	587,125	480,190	514,195	422,948	526,505
Data Source: SRSO Excel File							

### 3.4. Sectoral Use of CIF Funds Across Cycles

Table 8 shows how the beneficiaries invested their Community Investment Fund (CIF) loans across five loan cycles in six programme districts. The results make it clear that most of the money—over 90% in every district and cycle—went into livestock. This choice reflects the priorities of the women who received the loans.

**Limited Investment in Micro-Enterprises and Agriculture:** Micro-enterprises: Investment in small businesses made up only a small share of the CIF portfolio, rarely going beyond 10% in any district or loan cycle. The one exception was Umerkot in the first cycle, where 31% of funds went into enterprise activities—due to focused mobilisation efforts or stronger local business capacity. However, this level of investment was not maintained in later cycles. The steady decline in enterprise lending appears to stem from limited market access, higher risks, and weaker repayment confidence, which discouraged both borrowers and community organisations from supporting such loans.

Agriculture: Although agriculture is central to Sindh's rural economy, it received less than 1% of CIF funds across all cycles. This extremely low share reflects deep-rooted structural barriers, such as poor households and particularly women's lack of land ownership, the high cost of farm inputs, and limited control of women over productive assets. These constraints reduced both the demand for and viability of agriculture loans under the CIF, leaving the sector with only a marginal role in the overall portfolio.

In conclusion women's strong preference for livestock under CIF reflects their need for safe, familiar, and low-risk options that provide steady

returns. As poor rural women, they preferred activities that were safe, easy to manage, and gave quick returns. The loan amounts were small (between PKR 15,000 and 30,000), which also influenced their choices. Raising goats and sheep was the most popular option because it is familiar, culturally accepted, and affordable for them.




Figure 6: Sectoral Distribution of CIF Portfolio

returns. This reliance is not a weakness but an opportunity to professionalise livestock rearing through improved inputs, veterinary services, and market access, enabling a shift from subsistence to a structured livelihood model that strengthens household well-being. At the same time, diversification into micro-enterprises and agriculture remains important for long-term resilience. However, these sectors face systemic barriers—such as lack of women's land ownership, high input costs, and weak market access—that require targeted government support alongside community-level financing to unlock their full potential.



Table 8: Portfolio Distribution by Sector of Use (% of Amount Disbursed per Cycle) as of December 2024

Sector / Cycle	Khairpur	Sanghar	Badin	Thatta	Mirpurkhas	Umerkot	Total (All Districts)
<b>1st Cycle (PKR million)</b>	704.4	529.1	584.2	384.6	407.8	319.3	2,929.5
Livestock	96%	88%	92%	99%	94%	69%	91%
Agriculture	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Micro Enterprises / Businesses	3%	12%	7%	1%	6%	31%	9%
<b>2nd Cycle (PKR million)</b>	213.8	318.7	266.8	227.7	264.2	239.8	1,531.0
Livestock	94%	94%	96%	98%	97%	76%	93%
Agriculture	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Micro Enterprises / Businesses	5%	6%	3%	1%	2%	23%	7%
<b>3rd Cycle (PKR million)</b>	172.8	171.0	123.0	113.2	143.1	128.4	851.4
Livestock	95%	95%	98%	100%	98%	82%	95%
Agriculture	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Micro Enterprises / Businesses	5%	4%	1%	0%	2%	18%	5%
<b>4th Cycle (PKR million)</b>	129.8	88.3	51.7	73.2	72.2	63.2	478.4
Livestock	97%	98%	100%	100%	98%	92%	98%
Agriculture	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Micro Enterprises / Businesses	2%	1%	0%	0%	2%	8%	2%
<b>5th Cycle (PKR million)</b>	80.3	30.7	14.8	43.3	31.0	28.4	228.4
Livestock	99%	98%	99%	100%	99%	93%	98%
Agriculture	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Micro Enterprises / Businesses	1%	2%	0%	0%	1%	6%	2%

Data Source: SRSO Excel File

### 3.5. Financial Performance of CIF

The financial performance of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) under the GoS-PPRP has remained exceptionally strong, reflecting a robust repayment culture among women borrowers from the poorest households across six districts.

**Recovery Rates:** Across all districts and loan cycles, recovery rates remained above 98%, with the overall programme average standing at 99.1%. Mirpurkhas achieved a perfect 100% repayment across five cycles, while Khairpur (99.5%), Thatta (99.6%), and Umerkot (99.0%) also performed exceptionally well. These figures highlight the strength of community-based monitoring systems, the effectiveness of social collateral, and the strong sense of accountability and commitment cultivated among women borrowers.

Despite the modest loan sizes (ranging from PKR 15,000–30,000), the CIF mechanism has consistently demonstrated financial discipline, operational efficiency, and resilience. Table 9 reports the key indicators of CIF's financial performance, and the following section explains them in detail:




Figure 7: CIF Recovery Rate by Districts (As of Dec 2024)

**Resilience to Shocks:** CIF sustained its repayment performance despite three catastrophic events during programme implementation: the 2020 heavy rains (affecting all districts except Thatta), the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and the unprecedented 2022 super floods in Sindh. While conventional microfinance institutions across Pakistan faced severe repayment crises during these shocks, CIF maintained recovery rates of 99–100%.

Evidence from the micro-finance sector shows that, at the height of the COVID-19 crisis, around 70% of microfinance borrowers in Pakistan were unable to repay their loans, and field officers anticipated repayment rates as low as 34% for April 2020 (Malik, Meki, Morduch, Ogden, Quinn, & Said, 2020). Later data also show that Portfolio-at-Risk >30 days (PAR30) for Pakistan's microfinance industry reached about 6% by end-2022, before gradually stabilising to 5% in early 2023 (PACRA, 2023). In contrast, CIF maintained near-perfect repayment even during these systemic shocks.

This stark difference highlights the resilience of the CIF model. Unlike conventional MFIs that rely on financial collateral and individual contracts, CIF embeds loans within women-led community institutions. Collective responsibility, peer monitoring, and social cohesion drive repayment discipline. The evidence shows that this community-driven approach cushions the fund against external shocks and strengthens household coping mechanisms, making CIF a more sustainable and shock-resilient alternative to conventional microfinance in rural Sindh.

**Overdue Amounts and Rates:** The total overdue amount across all districts stands at PKR 13.9 million, which is less than 1% of the overall disbursed portfolio. The overdue rate is just 0.65%, with Sanghar (1.2%) and Badin (0.9%) showing higher—but still manageable—levels. These figures indicate a small subset of short-term delays, not widespread repayment issues.

**Default Rates:** Defaults remain minimal, with only

153 beneficiaries across all six districts classified as defaulters. Sanghar (65) and Badin (88) account for all default cases, while Khairpur, Thatta, Mirpurkhas, and Umerkot report zero defaults. This reflects high programme trust, the efficacy of social pressure mechanisms, and strong community engagement.

**Active Fund Ratio:** The Active Fund Ratio—the share of funds currently loaned out—varies across districts, averaging 73% overall. Umerkot (100%) and Mirpurkhas (97%) lead in active utilisation, while Badin (58%) shows scope for improvement.

The Fund Rotation Rate measures how many times CIF funds revolved within the community. On average, the funds rotated twice during the programme's duration, meaning each unit of seed capital supported two loan cycles. Umerkot (2.4x) and Mirpurkhas (2.3x) achieved the most efficient fund recycling, where the capital revolved more than twice.

Overall, the CIF mechanism has exhibited robust financial discipline and operational sustainability, even among marginalised rural women with no prior credit history. The few districts showing slightly higher delinquency (notably Sanghar and Badin) may benefit from additional capacity building, flexible repayment plans, or closer follow-up. The model's success provides a convincing case for replication and scaling, especially in community-driven poverty reduction initiatives.




Figure 8: Active Fund Ratio (As of Dec 2024)

<sup>2</sup> Malik, A., Meki, M., Morduch, J., Ogden, T., Quinn, S., & Said, F. (2020). COVID-19 and the future of microfinance: Evidence and insights from Pakistan. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 36(Supplement\_1), S138–S168. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa014>

<sup>3</sup> Pakistan Credit Rating Agency (PACRA). (2023, September). *Microfinance sector report*. Retrieved from [https://www.pacra.com/sector\\_research/PACRA%20Research%20-%20Microfinance%20-%20Sep%202023\\_1696081309.pdf](https://www.pacra.com/sector_research/PACRA%20Research%20-%20Microfinance%20-%20Sep%202023_1696081309.pdf)

Table 9: CIF Financial Performance

Indicator	Khairpur	Sanghar	Badin	Thatta	Mirpurkhas	Umerkot	Total
<b>Overall Recovery Rate (%)</b>	99.5	98.2	98.4	99.6	100.0	99.0	99.1
1st Cycle (%)	99.5	99.0	99.6	99.8	100.0	100.0	99.7
2nd Cycle (%)	100.0	98.5	99.8	99.9	100.0	99.9	99.7
3rd Cycle (%)	100.0	97.8	99.9	99.9	100.0	99.9	99.6
4th Cycle (%)	100.0	97.5	99.6	99.9	100.0	99.8	99.5
5th Cycle (%)	99.5	97.2	98.9	99.9	100.0	99.7	99.2
<b>Total Overdue Amount (Million PKR)</b>	1.4	8.4	2.3	0.9	0.3	0.6	13.9
<b># of Beneficiaries with Overdue*</b>	84	510	259	76	15	48	992
<b>Overall Overdue Rate (%)</b>	0.30	1.20	0.90	0.25	0.10	0.20	0.65
Number of Beneficiaries in Default*	0	65	88	0	0	0	153
<b>Active Fund Ratio</b>	63%	71%	58%	77%	97%	100%	73%
<b>Fund Rotation Rate</b>	1.8x	2.2x	1.8x	2.2x	2.3x	2.4x	2.1x
Data Source: SRSO Excel File							
*Note: Overdue beneficiaries are those who have missed one or more scheduled instalments but still have the possibility of repayment, whereas defaulter beneficiaries are those who have persistently failed to repay their loans within the allowable grace or collection period, and are therefore classified as defaulters.							

Estimated Operational Costs: Based on actual operational cost data provided by SRSO for Sanghar and Badin, we extrapolated the operational costs for the entire CIF portfolio under PPRP. The analysis shows that the average operational cost per beneficiary is PKR 1,254, almost identical to the two-district benchmark (PKR 1,253).

Table 10 shows that at the portfolio level, salaries and recurring operational expenses (B + C) total PKR 185.5 million, supporting 148,000 beneficiaries. When compared with the total CIF

seed fund of PKR 2.93 billion, these operational costs represent just 6.3% of total CIF resources.

For Sanghar and Badin combined, operational costs amounted to PKR 70 million, also equal to 6.3% of their CIF seed fund. This consistency between the sample districts and the extrapolated portfolio strengthens the reliability of the estimate.

Overall, the data confirm that CIF operates at a modest and efficient cost. Most resources go directly into loan capital, while a small but essential share covers staffing and operations that sustain community-level management.

Table 10: Actual and Estimated Operational Costs of CIF (PKR)

Activity	Sangharh	Badin	Total (2 districts)	PPRP Portfolio Estimate
A. CIF Seed Money (0–18 months)	529,122,500	584,189,600	1,113,312,100	2,929,400,000
B. Salaries – Social Mobilisation Units	18,000,000	19,000,000	37,000,000	95,274,890
C. Recurring Operational Costs – Social Mobilisation Teams	15,000,000	18,000,000	33,000,000	90,260,422
<b>Total Operational Costs (B + C)</b>	<b>33,000,000</b>	<b>37,000,000</b>	<b>70,000,000</b>	<b>185,535,313</b>
D. CIF Beneficiaries (BNFs)	29,690	26,175	55,865	148,000
<b>Average Cost (Total Cost ÷ BNFs)</b>	<b>1,111</b>	<b>1,414</b>	<b>1,253</b>	<b>1,254</b>
<b>Operational Cost Ratio (B+C ÷ A)</b>	<b>6.2%</b>	<b>6.3%</b>	<b>6.3%</b>	<b>6.3%</b>

Source: SRSO provided cost data; portfolio estimates extrapolated from Sanghar and Badin

<sup>4</sup> Government of Pakistan. (2019). Prime Minister's Kamyab Jawan – Interest Free Loan Scheme Guidelines. Islamabad: Ministry of Finance.

<sup>5</sup> Journal of Islamic Business and Management Research (JIBMR). (2013). Akhuwat: The power of interest-free microfinance. Journal of Islamic Business and Management Research, 3 (1), 1–20.

Malik, S., Farooq, M., & Hussain, T. (2019). Akhuwat: Measuring success for a non-profit organization.

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[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332175822\\_Akhuwat\\_Measuring\\_Success\\_for\\_a\\_Non\\_profit\\_Organization](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332175822_Akhuwat_Measuring_Success_for_a_Non_profit_Organization)

**Comparative Cost Efficiency of CIF:** As the operational cost of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) under PPRP is estimated at PKR 1,254 per borrower. At portfolio level, this translates into a total operational cost of PKR 185.5 million, which is just 6.3% of the PKR 2.93 billion CIF seed fund. This ratio is remarkably low compared with other microfinance models in Pakistan.

For comparison, the Prime Minister's Interest-Free Loan (PMIFL) scheme operates with portfolio costs of around 10.5%, including 8% administrative expenses and a 2.5% loan-loss provision. Akhuwat, the country's largest interest-free microfinance provider, has historically reported an average cost per borrower of USD 19.50 (~PKR 2,000 in 2013) and an administrative overhead of about 7.5% of disbursements. In contrast, conventional microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically incur even higher costs, with operational expenses averaging 8% of portfolio, plus loan-loss provisions—equivalent to PKR 3,200 per borrower.

From the perspective of credit pricing, the difference is even starker. Microfinance banks (MFBs) in Pakistan charge 25–33% annual mark-up/service charges, depending on loan type and institution. For example, Khushhali Bank's Sarsabz Karobar loan carries a 25% APR, while its livestock loan is priced at 33% APR. The First Microfinance Bank offers agriculture and livestock loans at 31.4% APR, and FINCA Microfinance Bank charges between 28% and 32% APR. Beyond formal institutions, poor households often rely on informal moneylenders, where rates can soar to 80% annually (ibid).

Against this backdrop, the CIF model clearly stands out as a highly affordable and socially protective financing mechanism. It enables poor

women to access capital through their own community institutions, without falling into debt traps or exploitative lending cycles. CIF achieves its cost efficiency by leveraging women-led community organisations, volunteerism, and social collateral, thereby reducing the need for costly institutional infrastructure.

Even under a conservative assumption where operational costs rise to PKR 1,500 per borrower, CIF would remain more cost-efficient than PMIFL, Akhuwat, or conventional MFIs. Taken together, the evidence strongly affirms CIF's position as one of the most efficient and inclusive models of financial access in Pakistan, combining low delivery costs with deep community ownership.

**Comparative Operational Cost Efficiency**  
Operational Cost Ratio (%)




Figure 9: Comparative Operational Cost Efficiency

<sup>6</sup> Akhtar, S., Aleem, A., & Raza, S. H. (2019). Microfinance in Pakistan: Trends, challenges and opportunities. *Lahore Journal of Economics*, 24 (Special Edition), 15 –38.

Ali, A., Rauf, S., & Hussain, M. (2023). Efficiency of microfinance institutions in Pakistan. *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences*, 43 (1), 101 –115.

State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). (2011). *Microfinance review 2011*. Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan.

<sup>7</sup> Anwar, T., Khan, F. A., Hassan, L., & Ejaz, A. (2025). Impact of Financial Inclusion Using Community Investment Fund on Poverty Graduation in Rural Sindh of Pakistan. *Journal of Contemporary Macroeconomic Issues*, 6(1), 95 –110. Retrieved from <https://ojs.scekr.org/index.php/jcemi/article/view/199>

# CHAPTER 4: BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS

## 4.1. Community Participation and External Facilitation in CIF Selection and MIP Development

This section analyses the roles played by different actors—community institutions, family members, and SRSO staff—in facilitating access to the Community Investment Fund (CIF) and supporting the development of Micro Investment Plans (MIPs). It also explores the extent to which CIF utilisation aligns with MIPs, providing insights into the level of community ownership, institutional engagement, and external dependency across districts.

As shown in Table 11, SRSO staff facilitated most CIF selections across all districts, with their involvement peaking in Khairpur and Mirpurkhas (51% each). While such support is expected during the initial stages—particularly for conducting the Poverty Scorecard (PSC) survey and identifying eligible households—the design of CIF envisages a gradual transfer of responsibility to community institutions. Under this process, Community Organisations (COs) identify beneficiaries, Village Organisations (VOs) appraise and approve loans, and Local Support Organisations (LSOs) intervene

only when disputes or recovery issues arise.

In practice, COs were more active in Badin (42%) and Umerkot (43%), reflecting progress towards local ownership in these districts. VOs were moderately engaged, especially in Thatta (31%) and Sanghar (28%), though their role remains uneven across the programme. LSOs, meanwhile, had a limited role—just 2% in Thatta and 3% in Umerkot. This does not necessarily indicate weakness, as their involvement is only required in exceptional cases; rather, it reflects the limited need for conflict resolution or recovery support so far.

Overall, while there are encouraging signs of community-led facilitation, the process still relies heavily on SRSO staff. To ensure sustainability, the shift of CIF selection and loan approval responsibilities to COs and VOs must be accelerated, with LSOs remaining in reserve for oversight and dispute resolution when required.

Table 11: Percentage of Responses by CIF Facilitator and District - Who facilitated your selection for CIF loan?

Facilitator	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	Grand Total
CO	42%	20%	29%	29%	26%	43%	31%
VO	23%	14%	11%	28%	31%	20%	21%
LSO	12%	14%	8%	10%	2%	3%	9%
SRSO Staff	24%	51%	51%	33%	41%	34%	39%
Others	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Number of responses	1,133	1,628	1,075	1,611	630	1,091	7,168

As shown in Table 12, most beneficiaries (4,009 out of 4,025, or over 99%) reported using the Community Investment Fund (CIF) according to their household's Micro Investment Plan (MIP). This high level of alignment suggests strong adherence to planned economic activities and effective use of the CIF as a tool for structured, need-based investment. However, a small number

of beneficiaries (16) who did not follow their MIPs cited urgent personal or household needs—such as medical expenses, home repairs, or family emergencies like weddings—as reasons for diverting funds. These responses highlight the economic vulnerability faced by some households, where immediate survival needs can outweigh longer-term investment plans.

Table 12: Use of CIF According to the Micro Investment Plan (MIP)-number of beneficiaries

MIP	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	Total
No	4	1	8	3	-	-	16
Yes	669	860	590	837	455	598	4009
<b>Total</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>861</b>	<b>598</b>	<b>840</b>	<b>455</b>	<b>598</b>	<b>4025</b>

Table 13 shows that SRSO staff were the most frequently cited source of support for MIP preparation (42% overall), with particularly high involvement in Khairpur (75%), Thatta (61%), and Mirpurkhas (51%). This reflects a strong dependency on external facilitation, especially in districts where local institutions may be weaker. However, in Sanghar (50%) and Mirpurkhas (36%), a substantial proportion of respondents developed their MIPs with family support, indicating higher self-reliance and better awareness or capacity at

the household level. Community members (CO/VO) played a notable role in Badin (30%) and Umerkot (27%), suggesting stronger grassroots engagement in those districts. LSO staff were rarely cited as support providers (4% overall), indicating a limited role in the MIP process. Overall, while external technical support remains significant, there are positive signs of community and family-led planning in some areas, which could be nurtured for long-term sustainability.

Table 13: Source of Support in Developing Micro Investment Plans (MIPs)

Support Source	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	Total
CO/VO Member	30%	6%	6%	25%	16%	27%	18%
LSO Staff	9%	3%	1%	3%	2%	6%	4%
Self	20%	14%	2%	6%	17%	1%	10%
Self with Family	13%	2%	36%	50%	4%	29%	23%
SRSO Staff	18%	75%	51%	13%	61%	37%	42%
No Response	10%	0%	5%	1%	0%	1%	3%
Total Responses (n)	673	861	598	840	455	598	4,025

#### 4.2. CIF Disbursement Patterns, Loan Cycles, and Financial Performance Trends

This section explores the distribution and dynamics of Community Investment Fund (CIF) disbursements across multiple loan cycles, examining trends in access, average amounts, repayment behaviour, and service charges. The data reveals how CIF support was distributed over time and across districts, offering insights into equity, sustainability, and the programme's responsiveness to evolving household needs. It also highlights the gradual increase in average loan size, decreasing service charges, and steady repayment trends—pointing toward an increasingly mature and inclusive community-managed financing mechanism.

As shown in Table 14, over half of the respondents (51%) received support through the first CIF cycle, with consistent proportions across all districts. A smaller share (30%) received a second cycle, while third and fourth cycle access declined significantly to 13% and 6%, respectively. Only 0.2% received a fifth cycle, and only in Sanghar. This trend suggests

that while initial access to CIF was widespread, repeat funding became increasingly limited, due to resource constraints, programme design, or evolving eligibility criteria. The data indicates a clear tapering of CIF cycles, pointing to the need for alternative or sustained financing mechanisms for households with continued needs or viable reinvestment opportunities.




Figure 10: Percent of beneficiaries received number of CIF cycles (All Beneficiaries)

Table 14: District wise percent of beneficiaries received number of CIF Cycles

Received CIF Cycle	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	Total
Only once	58%	45%	51%	51%	54%	48%	51%
Twice	34%	32%	29%	28%	30%	29%	30%
3 times	6%	14%	13%	16%	15%	15%	13%
4 times	3%	9%	8%	3%	2%	8%	6%
5 times	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Total Responses (n)	673	861	598	840	455	598	4,025

The data in Table 15 shows the distribution of Community Investment Fund (CIF) support among 4,025 beneficiary households, highlighting both the frequency and average amount received. Over half of the beneficiaries (50.8%) received CIF only once, with an average amount of PKR 21,550. About 30.4% received it twice, receiving an average of PKR 41,283, while 12.9% accessed the fund

three times, averaging PKR 56,800. A smaller proportion—5.6%—received CIF four times, with an average of PKR 71,431, and only 0.3% (12 households) of households received CIF five times, receiving the highest average of PKR 86,083. Overall, the average amount received per beneficiary across all households was PKR 35,082.

Table 15: Average amount of CIF received by percent of beneficiaries (n=4025)

Received CIF cycles	Number of Beneficiaries	Average Amount per Beneficiary (PKR)
Only once	50.8%	21,550
Twice	30.4%	41,283
3 times	12.9%	56,800
4 times	5.6%	71,431
5 times	0.3%	86,083
All households	100%	<b>35,082</b>

Figure 11 further highlights the dual trend in CIF access (The blue bars represent the average cumulative CIF amount received per beneficiary, while the red line represents the percentage of beneficiaries accessing each number of cycles): while the average cumulative amount received by beneficiaries increases steadily with each additional cycle (from PKR 21,550 for one-time recipients to PKR 86,083 for five-time recipients),

the proportion of beneficiaries accessing multiple cycles declines sharply—from over half (50.8%) who accessed CIF only once, to just 0.3% who received support five times. This indicates that although repeat access significantly enhances financial support and strengthens livelihoods, most beneficiaries remain limited to a single cycle, constraining the overall potential for deeper and sustained impact.

Figure 11: Cumulative CIF support by number of times CIF received by the sample beneficiaries.




Table 16 shows that while CIF coverage patterns are broadly similar across districts, some significant differences stand out. Khairpur has a notably higher proportion of beneficiaries receiving CIF three (14%) and four times (9%) compared to other districts, indicating more sustained access. In contrast, Badin has the highest percentage (58%) of households receiving CIF only once, suggesting limited follow-up support. Umerkot stands out for providing the highest average

amounts across all cycles—particularly for the second (PKR 54,483) and third (PKR 70,517) disbursements—reflecting a more generous fund allocation. Thatta records the highest average for four-time recipients at PKR 89,300, while Sanghar and Umerkot are the only districts with households receiving CIF five times, with Sanghar reporting a peak average of PKR 126,000.

Table 16: CIF Cycle-wise Coverage and Average Amount Received by District

Received CIF	Indicator	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	Total / Avg
Only once	% of Beneficiaries	58%	45%	51%	51%	54%	48%	51%
	Avg Amount per Beneficiary	19,109	21,235	21,814	21,502	23,160	23,716	21,550
Twice	% of Beneficiaries	34%	32%	29%	28%	30%	29%	30%
	Avg Amount per Beneficiary	38,171	39,873	38,234	35,950	45,474	54,483	41,283
3 times	% of Beneficiaries	6%	14%	13%	16%	15%	15%	13%
	Avg Amount per Beneficiary	56,050	49,533	59,293	53,198	56,924	70,517	56,800
4 times	% of Beneficiaries	3%	9%	8%	3%	2%	8%	6%
	Avg Amount per Beneficiary	71,588	66,360	72,622	64,966	89,300	78,365	71,431
5 times	% of Beneficiaries	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0.3%	0%
	Avg Amount per Beneficiary				78,100		126,000	86,083
	<b>Total Responses (n)</b>	673	861	598	840	455	598	4,025

Table 17 shows that from 2018 to 2024, a total of 7,001 CIF loans were disbursed to the 4,025 sample beneficiaries. Three key findings emerge from the data:

1. Dominance of first-cycle loans: The bulk of disbursements (4,025 loans) were first-cycle loans, while uptake of repeat loans declined sharply over time. Only 18% of the sample households accessed a second loan, 6% a third, and fewer than 1% progressed to a fourth or fifth cycle.
2. Slow and staggered rollout: The sample reveals a major gap between CIF's intended design and actual implementation. Ideally, all targeted households should have received their first loan within the first 2 years of the programme

implementation, allowing for multiple borrowing and repayment cycles during the project period. Instead, many beneficiaries were still receiving their first loan as late as 2023–2024, which significantly constrained opportunities for repeat borrowing and limited the revolving potential of the fund within the beneficiaries.

3. Rising loan sizes: The average loan size increased, from PKR 13,763 in 2018 to PKR 26,902 in 2024. This growth reflects both inflationary adjustments and increased confidence in beneficiaries' repayment capacity. Later-cycle loans were typically larger, suggesting higher investment needs and greater trust in repeat borrowers.




Figure 12: Year-wise Percent of Sample Households by CIF Loan Cycle (2018–2024)

Table 17: Year- and Cycle-wise Number of Loans and Amount Disbursed to Sample Beneficiaries

CIF Cycle	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Total
Number of Loans:	526	501	735	858	1,023	1,683	1,675	7,001
1st Loan	526	467	482	580	539	894	537	4,025
2nd Loan	-	34	246	236	376	461	628	1,981
3rd Loan	-	-	7	42	101	292	315	757
4th Loan	-	-	-	-	7	36	183	226
5th Loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12
Amount (Million PKR):	7.24	7.31	11.70	13.80	18.64	39.01	45.06	142.77
1st Loan	7.24	6.76	7.70	9.41	10.12	23.10	16.12	80.44
2nd Loan	-	0.55	3.90	3.68	6.57	9.44	16.34	40.47
3rd Loan	-	-	0.11	0.72	1.84	5.68	8.08	16.42
4th Loan	-	-	-	-	0.12	0.78	4.27	5.17
5th Loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.27	0.27
Average amount per loan	13,763	14,599	15,922	16,087	18,219	23,178	26,902	20,392
1st Loan	13,763	14,484	15,970	16,224	18,766	25,842	30,010	19,986
2nd Loan	-	16,176	15,841	15,572	17,463	20,484	26,013	20,428
3rd Loan	-	-	15,429	17,095	18,188	19,461	25,641	21,694
4th Loan	-	-	-	-	17,143	21,667	23,322	22,867
5th Loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	22,083	22,083

### 4.3. Socio-Economic Outcomes and Livelihood Improvements from CIF Support

This section presents detailed evidence of the socio-economic impacts of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) on beneficiary households, based on income growth, cost savings, asset acquisition, productive reinvestment, financial behaviour, and improvements in children's education. The data across multiple tables shows that repeated CIF support correlates with increased income and asset accumulation, stronger financial confidence, more strategic use of earnings, and indirect benefits such as higher school enrolment. These outcomes collectively highlight the potential of CIF as a catalyst for sustainable rural livelihoods, especially when embedded within broader poverty reduction and social mobilisation strategies.

Table 18 shows that the beneficiaries overwhelmingly invested their CIF loans in livestock across all cycles and districts. Business loans accounted for 5–6% in most cycles, spiking to 16.7% in the 5th. Loans for agriculture purpose remained marginal at less than 1% throughout the 5 cycles of CIF.

The steep drop in total loans—from 4,025 in the 1st cycle to just 12 in the 5th (a 99.7% decrease)—occurred because of multiple factors, including phased programme rollout, delays in government fund releases, delays in repayment from previous loans, and implementation challenges that limited repeated access for the same households.

About 92% of CIF beneficiaries invested in livestock, by purchasing goats. This dominance shows how central livestock remains to rural household economies in Sindh. Women, who traditionally care for livestock and are the main borrowers of CIF loans, prefer goats because they are practical, low-risk, and fit easily into household life. One key informant explained: “A goat reproduces every six months—twice a year. Families usually buy a goat with a kid or a pregnant goat and sell the first kid (often a male, sometimes already present at purchase) to repay their loan, while keeping the mother goat to produce more offspring in the future.”

Unlike farming, which requires land ownership, or small businesses, which demand skills, capital, and market access—constraints that are especially acute for ultra-poor households where most are landless tenants, women rarely own land, and their mobility outside the home is limited—goat rearing is simple, affordable, and home-based. It provides milk for household use or sale, offspring as income-generating assets, and a financial safety net in times of need, making it the most viable livelihood for poor and ultra-poor households, particularly women. In the FGD one VO member noted, “We plan loans around Eid. We buy animals, fatten them, and sell for profit. It helps us repay easily.”

Table 18: All Districts – CIF Loan Purpose by Cycle (Sectoral Share in %)

CIF cycles	Total Loans	% Livestock	% Business	% Agriculture	% Other
1 <sup>st</sup> cycle	4,025	92.6%	5.5%	0.6%	1.3%
2nd CIF	1,981	92.7%	6.1%	0.5%	0.8%
3rd CIF	757	93.6%	5.3%	0.5%	0.5%
4th CIF	236	93.6%	5.5%	0.4%	0.4%
5th CIF	12	83.3%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%

This preference for livestock is further supported by the consistently high proportion of beneficiaries—100% across all loan cycles—who reported their investments as good, and over 88% who had prior experience in the activity (Figure 13). The slight dip in prior experience to 83% in the 5th cycle may reflect a small number of households exploring new ventures, but overall, the data confirms that CIF loans effectively supported women in building on familiar, low-risk livelihoods that align with their existing knowledge and household roles. Notably, when asked how they would use CIF again if given the opportunity, 97% of respondents said they would reinvest in the same activity, underscoring their confidence in livestock-based livelihoods and the relevance of CIF support to their long-term economic strategies. However, a small number of beneficiaries reported their investment did not yield returns due to unforeseen challenges—such as illness, livestock deaths, or household emergencies—which forced them to divert funds away from productive use. These cases highlight the importance of strengthening resilience and providing additional support mechanisms for the most vulnerable households.

Table 19 demonstrates a strong positive relationship between the number of times CIF received and its contribution to household income, cost savings, and asset accumulation. These outcomes were shaped by the type of investment made:

- Livestock investments generated income from the sale of animals. Cost savings came from household consumption of milk and meat,




Figure 13: Beneficiaries' Perceived Investment Quality and Prior Experience by CIF Cycle

reducing dependence on the market for food purchases. Asset accumulation was achieved as livestock multiplied, creating a growing stock of productive animals that could be sold in emergencies or reinvested into household livelihoods.

- Agricultural investments produced income from crop sales, while cost savings arose from consuming self-produced food and using agricultural by-products for fodder or fuel. Asset accumulation was reflected in improved farming inputs, tools, or incremental increases in cultivated area.
- Small business investments provided income through profits from shopkeeping or petty trade. Cost savings were achieved by reducing household spending on groceries or daily-use items sourced from their own shops. Assets accumulated in the form of shop inventories, equipment, and stronger market linkages.

Beneficiaries who received CIF only once reported modest annual profit (PKR 8,462), cost savings (PKR 1,750), and asset accumulation (PKR 29,145) from the CIF investment. This low return is consistent with how poor households typically use initial access to credit: first-cycle loans are often smaller in size and directed toward debt repayment, or stabilising household essentials, rather than generating significant income or asset accumulation. Many households also approached their first CIF loan with caution, reflecting limited experience with financial products and risk aversion.

In contrast, households that received CIF three or more times reported significantly higher returns. For instance, three-time recipients earned an average yearly profit of PKR 42,312, saved in costs PKR 17,612 annually, and reported asset accumulation worth PKR 47,216 from their CIF investments. The most substantial gains were observed among four-

time recipients, with a combined yearly income (profit + cost savings) of PKR 80,892 and the highest average asset accumulation of PKR 65,945. While five-time recipients reported the highest combined income and cost savings (PKR 117,019), their average asset accumulation (PKR 52,700) was lower than that of four-time recipients. This variation is due to the small sample size (n=12), which limits the reliability and representativeness of these figures and warrants cautious interpretation.

These improvements reflect how access to subsequent CIF cycles enabled households to consolidate prior gains and reinvest in more productive and higher-return activities livestock expansion, small-scale enterprises, and agricultural inputs. These repeat investments not only generated higher income and savings but also enhanced asset accumulation by diversifying livelihood sources and reducing dependency on external markets.

Table 19: Reported Yearly Income, Cost Savings, and Asset Improvement by Number of CIF Cycles Received

CIF Cycle	Only once	Twice	3 times	4 times	5 times	All households
No. of sample beneficiaries (n)	2044	1224	521	224	12	4025
% Reporting income/profit	88%	96%	98%	100%	100%	93%
Average Yearly Income/Profit (PKR)	8,462	24,910	42,312	61,105	102,100	21,773
% Reporting Cost Savings	49%	55%	72%	78%	58%	55%
Average Yearly Cost Savings (PKR)	1,750	8,702	17,612	25,215	25,575	8,437
Average Yearly Costs income +Costs Saving (PKR)	9,252	29,669	54,962	80,892	117,019	26,493
% Reporting improvement in assets	66%	67%	73%	68%	83%	67%
Average Improved value of Assets (PKR)	29,145	38,318	47,216	65,945	52,700	36,614


Overall, the data suggests that repeated CIF support enhances household economic well-being by boosting income, reducing household expenses, and building productive assets. The evidence underscores that the CIF model works best when households receive multiple cycles of support, as each successive cycle builds financial confidence, strengthens repayment capacity, and enables a

gradual shift from subsistence spending toward sustainable, income-generating, and asset-building activities. As illustrated in Figure 14 indicate that at least four cycles of CIF support may be considered a benchmark for achieving meaningful and sustained impact on household income, expenditure patterns, and asset accumulation to put the beneficiaries on the path of poverty graduation.





Figure 14: Annual Cost Savings, profit and value of assets accumulated by CIF investment (PKR) of sample households.



As shown in Table 20, beneficiaries used income from CIF investments in diverse ways, reflecting a balance between livelihood sustainability and household needs. The most common uses were reinvestment in the same activity (26%) and household food consumption (26%), indicating that CIF-generated income helped households both strengthen existing livelihoods and meet essential nutritional needs. Additionally, 16% of responses cited spending on health, 13% on savings, and 10% on education, highlighting the broader role of CIF in supporting well-being and resilience. District-level patterns reveal variation: Umerkot (31%) and Badin

(30%) reported the highest reinvestment in the same activity, while Sanghar (23%) recorded the highest share of income saved. Overall, Table 13 demonstrates that CIF income was not only productive but also flexible, enabling poor households to respond to both immediate and longer-term priorities. This is further supported by beneficiaries' self-assessment of their financial condition after receiving CIF support: when asked "How would you rate your current financial condition after the CIF?", 67% reported it had much improved, 27% reported slight improvement, 5% saw no change, and only 1% felt worse off.

Table 20: Reported Use of Income from CIF Investments by District

District	Reinvested (Same Activity)	Reinvested (Other Activity)	Household Food	Education	Health	Savings	Others	Responses (n)
Badin	30%	6%	35%	4%	12%	8%	5%	969
Khairpur	28%	9%	21%	16%	16%	10%	0%	2,785
Mirpurkhas	26%	3%	34%	7%	18%	9%	2%	1,254
Sanghar	20%	11%	22%	8%	14%	23%	1%	2,054
Thatta	24%	2%	36%	6%	23%	8%	1%	708
Umerkot	31%	3%	24%	10%	16%	15%	1%	1,321
<b>All Districts</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>9,091</b>

Table 21 highlights the broader impacts of CIF beyond direct financial support. While very few beneficiaries (33 out of 4025) accessed other sources of finance, those who did often faced high interest rates— from both banks and informal lenders. More significantly, most beneficiaries reported increased confidence in handling loans (89.2%) and managing finances independently (79%

felt "very confident"). Additionally, over half (52%) supported or advised other women in accessing CIF, reflecting strong community-level knowledge sharing. These findings suggest that CIF played a vital role in not just providing financial access but also fostering financial empowerment and peer-driven support networks.


Table 21: CIF Impact – Financial Inclusion, Confidence, and Peer Support

Source	No. of Beneficiaries	Average Loan Amount (PKR)	Average Interest Rate
<b>A. Access to Other Sources of Finance</b>			
Microfinance Banks	18	66,667	20%
Commercial Banks	7	29,000	25%
Money Lender	2	16,000	50%
Family & Friends	6	10,000	0%
<b>B. Confidence and Peer Support After CIF</b>			
Indicator	No. of Beneficiaries	% of Beneficiaries	Remarks
Felt confident to handle loans after CIF experience	3,590	89.2%	Based on self-reported improvement post-CIF experience
Reported being “Very Confident” in financial management	3,194	79%	Reflects increase in financial literacy and confidence
Advised/supported other women to access CIF	2,095	52%	Indicates knowledge sharing and community leadership

The CIF has had a clear impact on productive asset ownership among beneficiary households, particularly in small livestock. Figure 15 clearly shows prior to the intervention, 39% of households reported owning goats or sheep; this proportion rose sharply to 70% after CIF investment, indicating that small ruminants were the most accessible and preferred entry-level asset. Ownership of larger livestock such as cows and buffaloes showed only a modest increase, from 6% to 9%, reflecting the higher capital and maintenance costs associated

with these assets. Similarly, shop ownership rose marginally from 2% to 3%, suggesting that engagement in non-farm enterprises remains limited due to greater financial and market barriers. Overall, the data demonstrates that CIF has been most effective in supporting households to acquire smaller, manageable assets that provide immediate livelihood benefits and strengthen economic resilience, while uptake of higher-value or enterprise-based assets remains constrained.

Figure 15 : Percent of CIF beneficiaries owning productive assets before and after CIF investment.



As shown in Table 22 the cross-district analysis reveals that CIF interventions had the most pronounced impact on goat and sheep ownership, particularly in Sanghar and Badin, where baseline levels were very low. In contrast, ownership of larger

livestock such as cows and buffaloes increased only modestly across all districts. Shop ownership also remained limited, with only minor gains observed in Umerkot, Mirpurkhas, and Badin, and no change in Thatta.

Table 22: Change in Percentage of Beneficiary Households Owning Key Assets (Goat/Sheep, Cow/Buffalo, Shop) Before and After Accessing CIF, by District

District	Goat/Sheep (Before CIF)	Goat/Sheep (After CIF)	Cow/Buffalo (Before CIF)	Cow/Buffalo (After CIF)	Shop (Before CIF)	Shop (After CIF)
Badin	28%	63%	8%	10%	2%	4%
Khairpur	53%	78%	4%	6%	1%	2%
Mirpurkhas	43%	72%	7%	11%	3%	5%
Sanghar	14%	62%	1%	4%	0%	1%
Thatta	51%	67%	5%	7%	0%	0%
Umerkot	53%	79%	14%	18%	6%	9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>70%</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>3%</b>

As shown in Table 23, CIF access contributed to consistent growth in goat and sheep ownership across all cycles, with households moving from 36–41% ownership at baseline to 68–76% after receiving CIF. This trend suggests that small ruminants served as the primary entry-level asset for most poor and ultra-poor households.

Cow and buffalo ownership remained modest through the first four cycles (5–11%) but rose more sharply among households with five cycles (from 8% to 17%), indicating that repeated CIF loans enabled some families to “graduate” into higher-value

livestock. Similarly, shop ownership showed little growth until the fifth cycle, when it increased from 2% to 3%, reflecting diversification into non-farm enterprises.

While the number of households with five CIF cycles was smaller than in other categories, the consistency of the trend across asset types suggests that multiple CIF cycles can play an important role in enabling economic progression—from small livestock to larger livestock and eventually to enterprise-based activities.

Table 23 : Change in Percentage of Households Owning Assets Before and After Receiving CIF Loans, by Number of CIF Cycles

Number of CIF Cycles	Goat/Sheep (Before CIF)	Goat/Sheep (After CIF)	Cow/Buffalo (Before CIF)	Cow/Buffalo (After CIF)	Shop (Before CIF)	Shop (After CIF)
Only once	36%	68%	5%	7%	2%	3%
Twice	40%	70%	7%	10%	2%	4%
3 times	41%	76%	7%	11%	1%	3%
4 times	54%	76%	7%	11%	5%	6%
5 times	33%	75%	8%	17%	8%	17%
All households	39%	70%	6%	9%	2%	3%

The progression pathway (Figure 16) derived from Table 24 illustrates how CIF, when sustained over multiple cycles, not only helps households secure manageable entry-level assets like goats and sheep

but also supports a gradual shift towards larger livestock and small businesses. This demonstrates multiple access to CIF’s potential as a graduation mechanism for poor households.



Figure 16: Progression pathway of asset ownership across multiple CIF cycles.




Table 24 shows a positive shift in children's school enrolment after households accessed CIF and other interventions of the PRP. Across all districts, the proportion of school-going children increased from 44% to 49%, while the proportion of out-of-school children declined from 56% to 51%. Khairpur and Umerkot saw the largest improvements (9% and 6%, respectively), suggesting that financial support from CIF income may have helped ease educational costs. While progress remains gradual, these findings suggest that CIF may have indirectly supported education by reducing household

financial stress. Additionally, this improvement is not due to CIF alone—other components of the PRP project, such as social mobilisation, linkages with government service departments, and broader community development efforts, may also have contributed to increased school enrolment and retention. These complementary interventions enhanced awareness, access, and the enabling environment for children's education in poor rural households.

Table 24: District-wise Enrolment Status of Children Before and After Accessing CIF (% of Children)

District	Children Going to School (Before)	Children Going to School (After)	Children Out of School (Before)	Children Out of School (After)
Badin	43%	45%	57%	55%
Khairpur	45%	54%	55%	46%
Mirpurkhas	39%	45%	61%	55%
Sanghar	48%	50%	52%	50%
Thatta	34%	38%	66%	62%
Umerkot	49%	55%	51%	45%
<b>Total</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>56%</b>	<b>51%</b>

#### 4.4. Women's Empowerment


This section explores the transformative effects of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) on women's social and economic empowerment. It examines changes in household decision-making, financial control, confidence, and skills development, as well as the influence of CIF on gender norms and women's civic participation. The analysis is based on self-reported data and community feedback.

children's education (72%) and marriage (74%). Women's sole decision-making remains low (7–10%) but peaks at 10% for CIF fund use—indicating slight empowerment in financial decisions. Overall, the results suggest that CIF may have contributed to more inclusive and balanced household decision-making.

#### Household Decision-Making

Figure 17 shows that joint decision-making dominates across all household areas, especially for

Figure 17: Decision making authority by key decision areas (All Beneficiaries – n=4025)



As shown in Table 25, across all domains, over 40% of women reported playing an active consultative role ("proposing ideas" or being "consulted"), while just 3–4% said they were merely informed after decisions were made. Notably, 13% of women had

the final say on the use of CIF funds—highlighting a moderate level of agency, especially where programme interventions are involved.

Table 25: Women's Role in Household Decision-Making by Area (Self-Reported, % of Responses)

Decision Area	Consulted, Not Final Decision	Informed After Decisions	Final Say	Proposed Ideas
Visiting Family or Friends	44%	4%	11%	41%
Medical Treatment	43%	4%	11%	42%
Children's Schooling & Education	44%	4%	11%	42%
Children's Marriage	44%	4%	11%	42%
Major Household Purchase	43%	4%	11%	42%
Use of CIF	42%	3%	13%	42%

## Increased Involvement in Household Decision-Making

To assess how women's roles evolved after accessing the CIF, beneficiaries were asked to identify areas where their involvement had changed. The results, summarised in Table 26, confirm and build upon earlier findings (Figure 17 and Table 25), highlighting a clear shift toward more active participation in household decisions. Across districts, the most notable increase was in financial decision-making (30%), aligning with later data showing 89% of women felt more confident managing loans and 79% felt very confident handling finances post-CIF. This underscores the CIF's effectiveness in boosting both financial literacy and women's influence over economic matters at home.

Additionally, 22% of women reported greater involvement in healthcare decisions and 20% in their children's education. These figures echo earlier findings from Table 25, where women were frequently consulted or held decision-making authority in these areas, suggesting that their voices are increasingly being acknowledged in personal and family matters. While women's sole decision-making remains low (10–13%), the higher proportion of women reporting increased involvement (30%) reflects not only cases of gaining full authority but also shifts from exclusion to consultation, or from being consulted to participating in joint decisions. This points to progress in inclusivity, but full autonomy remains limited.

Table 26: Changing role of women in household decision making.

District	Financial decisions	Healthcare	Children's education	Social activities	Child marriage	Other
Badin	32%	24%	22%	14%	6%	2%
Khairpur	29%	22%	22%	17%	10%	0%
Mirpur Khas	21%	23%	18%	20%	14%	4%
Sanghar	34%	22%	17%	21%	6%	0%
Thatta	39%	20%	19%	16%	5%	0%
Umerkot	29%	20%	21%	22%	8%	0%
All Beneficiaries	30%	22%	20%	18%	8%	1%

## Confidence in Expressing Opinions & Contributing Factors

The data presented in Table 27 reveals that 88% of women across all districts now feel confident expressing their opinions in household decisions, indicating a significant empowerment outcome linked to the CIF and related programme interventions. Confidence levels were reported highest in Khairpur (99%), Thatta (98%), and Umerkot (96%), while Badin (73%) and Sanghar (78%) show slightly lower—yet still strong—figures.

The most cited enabler of this change is women's financial contribution (39%), highlighting that access to and control over financial resources significantly boosts women's voice in household matters. Support from family members (36%) and training provided under the programme (25%) also played notable roles, reinforcing the importance of a holistic approach to women's empowerment—one that combines economic inclusion with social support and capacity building.

Table 27: Confidence in Expressing Opinions & Contributing Factors

District	Confident expressing your opinions in household decisions.		What contributed to this change?		
	No	Yes	Financial Contribution	Support from Family	Training
Badin	27%	73%	42%	37%	21%
Khairpur	1%	99%	43%	37%	20%
Mirpurkhas	14%	86%	32%	38%	30%
Sanghar	22%	78%	34%	41%	25%
Thatta	2%	98%	38%	25%	36%
Umerkot	4%	96%	40%	34%	26%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>25%</b>

### Decision-Making on taking CIF loan.

The data presented in Table 28 shows that joint decision-making between husband and wife dominated across all districts, with 69% of beneficiaries reporting shared decisions on taking and allocating the CIF loan amount. Only 13% of households reported decisions being made solely by the husband, while 18% noted that women made the decision independently. This reflects a positive trend towards inclusive household financial planning, though full autonomy for women remains limited.

When husbands made the decisions alone, the main justification (43%) was their expertise in the area of investment, followed by family trust (43%), and cultural norms (14%). This suggests that in most

cases, male decision-making is perceived as competence- or trust-based. This is further confirmed when looking at cases of joint decision-making, where the leading reasons were expertise in the activity (43%), family trust (36%), and cultural norms (20%).

Interestingly, Khairpur and Mirpurkhas, while reporting high levels of joint decision-making (76% and 83% respectively), show contrasting motivations. In Khairpur, 91% of decisions made solely by husbands were due to family trust, while in Mirpurkhas, 84% cited cultural norms, indicating that in some areas, traditional gender roles still significantly influence financial decisions.

Table 28: Summary of Decision Making about CIF loan.

District	Decision about CIF loan amount?			Primary Reason (Husband)			Primary Reason (Joint Decision)		
	Husband	Joint	Woman herself	Cultural norms	Expertise in area	Trust by family	Cultural norms	Expertise in area	Trust by family
Badin	18%	60%	22%	14%	62%	24%	31%	45%	24%
Khairpur	4%	76%	21%	3%	6%	91%	17%	53%	29%
Mirpurkhas	8%	83%	8%	84%	10%	6%	28%	43%	29%
Sanghar	29%	60%	12%	4%	48%	48%	17%	41%	42%
Thatta	6%	69%	25%	7%	41%	52%	5%	45%	50%
Umerkot	7%	68%	25%	3%	23%	74%	22%	27%	51%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>69%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>36%</b>



## Managing Income from CIF Investment

Table 29 shows that joint decision-making is the predominant mode of managing income from CIF investments across all districts, with 74% of beneficiaries reporting shared control with family members. This reflects strong household collaboration and possibly increased recognition of women's roles in financial management.

Meanwhile, 19% of respondents reported managing the income independently, with the highest

autonomy observed in Umerkot (37%) and Badin (31%), suggesting regional variation in women's agency. Only 6% said the family manages it entirely, and 1% reported "other" forms of management.

Overall, the findings point to positive outcomes in promoting shared financial decision-making and individual empowerment through the CIF initiative.

Table 29: Who manages the income received from CIF investment?

District	Managed by all Family members	Women (beneficiary) manages independently	Jointly managed by wife and husband	Other arrangement	Number of beneficiaries (n)
Badin	5%	31%	59%	5%	673
Khairpur	2%	17%	81%	0%	861
Mirpurkhas	15%	6%	79%	1%	598
Sanghar	8%	9%	82%	0%	840
Thatta	1%	18%	81%	0%	455
Umerkot	3%	37%	60%	0%	598
<b>Total</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>4025</b>

## Financial Confidence and Skills

Table 30 clearly indicates that managing the CIF loan and its income led to a substantial increase in financial management confidence, with 90% of respondents reporting improved financial confidence. This trend is consistent across all districts, with the highest reported confidence in Thatta (99%), Khairpur (98%), and Umerkot (98%).

In terms of specific skill areas improved, the most frequently cited was budgeting (39%), followed by

saving/investing (33%) and negotiating (28%). Notably, Thatta showed strong gains in budgeting (46%) and saving/investing (42%), while Umerkot had a high response in budgeting (45%). These results highlight that CIF management has not only built overall financial confidence but also helped women develop practical financial skills—critical for sustainable economic empowerment.

Table 30: Impact of Managing CIF Loan on Women's Financial Confidence and Specific Areas of Skill Improvement

District	Financial Management Improved		Area Improved			
	No	Yes	Budgeting	Negotiating	Saving/investing	Other
Badin	20%	80%	35%	35%	31%	0%
Khairpur	2%	98%	42%	25%	34%	0%
Mirpurkhas	10%	90%	38%	26%	37%	0%
Sanghar	23%	77%	35%	32%	33%	0%
Thatta	1%	99%	46%	11%	42%	1%
Umerkot	2%	98%	45%	30%	25%	0%
Grand Total	10%	90%	39%	28%	33%	0%

## Responsibility for Loan Repayment

The results in Table 31 show that a significant proportion of women bear the primary responsibility for repaying the CIF loan. On average, 50% of women reported managing the repayment independently, which demonstrates both accountability and a strong sense of ownership over the financial resources accessed through the programme. This trend is especially prominent in Thatta (82%) and Umerkot (67%), where most women reported being solely responsible for repayment.

In contrast, only 20% of respondents indicated that male members alone were responsible for repayment, with Sanghar (35%) and Mirpurkhas (28%) showing the highest levels of male-dominated repayment. Meanwhile, 30% of respondents described repayment as a shared household responsibility, particularly in Khairpur (45%) and Sanghar (39%), pointing to more collective approaches in some contexts.

Taken together, these results suggest that the CIF has expanded women's economic roles by positioning them as central actors in managing

financial obligations. However, the nature of this empowerment is complex. As shown earlier in Table 28, only 18% of women independently decided to take the CIF loan, yet Table 31 reveals that half are solely responsible for repayment. This gap suggests that while women are increasingly trusted—or expected—to manage repayments, they do not always hold equivalent authority in deciding whether or how the loan should be taken in the first place.

Rather than a contradiction, this finding illustrates the uneven trajectory of empowerment: women's accountability and responsibilities are increasing more rapidly than their decision-making authority. While this shift reflects recognition of women's financial reliability, it also highlights a persistent gender imbalance in household financial decision-making. For CIF and similar interventions, this insight underscores the importance of coupling women's financial responsibilities with strengthened agency in loan contracting and investment decisions, ensuring that empowerment is not limited to bearing the burden but extends to exercising meaningful authority.

Table 31: Responsibility for Paying Back the CIF Loan – By Gender and Household Involvement

District Name	I am alone responsible	Only male members are responsible	Whole Family is responsible	Beneficiaries (n)
Badin	52%	26%	22%	673
Khairpur	50%	5%	45%	861
Mirpurkhas	37%	28%	35%	598
Sanghar	26%	35%	39%	840
Thatta	82%	13%	5%	455
Umerkot	67%	10%	23%	598
<b>Total</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>4025</b>

Overall, the CIF initiative has led to substantial gains in women's empowerment by increasing their involvement in household decisions, enhancing financial confidence and capability, and shifting traditional gender roles. The evidence suggests that

when women are trusted, trained, and included in financial systems, they emerge as confident contributors to both household welfare and community development.



## Motivation to Join Community Organisations

Across all districts, access to resources emerged as the most cited reason for joining community organisations, with 32% of respondents highlighting it as their primary motivation as shown in Table 32. This was especially pronounced in Thatta (41%), Sanghar (36%), and Mirpurkhas (33%), indicating a strong pull factor where practical support is available. The second most common motivator was networking (26%), followed closely by a desire to contribute to the community (25%), and encouragement from others (17%).

District-wise, Mirpurkhas showed a distinct pattern, with 36% of respondents citing encouragement as their main motivator—higher than any other district—suggesting the influence of local mobilisation efforts or peer networks. Meanwhile,

Badin and Khairpur showed relatively balanced motivations, but Khairpur stood out with the highest share motivated by networking (31%), possibly reflecting a stronger tradition of collective engagement.

Notably, the high proportion of women joining for access to resources highlights the critical role of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) as a core incentive. CIF access not only motivates initial participation but also helps retain membership and attract new women into community organisations. These findings underline the strategic value of combining economic opportunities with social mobilisation to foster sustained women's engagement in collective action.

Table 32: Primary factors that motivated women to join the community organisations.

District	Networking	Access to resources	Contribute to community	Encouragement	Total responses
Badin	27%	33%	25%	15%	1413
Khairpur	31%	27%	24%	18%	2194
Mirpurkhas	10%	33%	20%	36%	461
Sangar	27%	36%	27%	10%	1195
Thatta	14%	41%	26%	19%	624
Badin	25%	30%	26%	19%	1217
All	26%	32%	25%	17%	7104

## Women's Participation in Civic Engagement

The results of Table 33 show a strong positive shift in women's community participation following access to the CIF loan. To assess the impact of CIF on civic engagement, respondents were asked two specific questions during the survey:

1. "Since receiving the CIF loan, has your participation in community activities increased, remained the same, or decreased?"
2. "What types of community activities have you engaged in?" (with multiple options allowed, including attending meetings, volunteering, and taking on leadership roles).

The responses reveal a significant increase in community participation, with 84% of women across all districts reporting increased involvement after accessing the CIF loan. This shift is especially

notable in Khairpur (98%), Umerkot (97%), and Thatta (90%), indicating the transformative role of CIF in fostering civic engagement.

In terms of the types of engagement, attending community meetings was the most common activity (48% overall), with Thatta (69%) and Mirpurkhas (53%) reporting the highest participation. Volunteering was the second most cited activity (33%), followed by leadership roles (18%)—with Khairpur (23%) and Umerkot (22%) standing out for women's leadership participation.

These findings confirm that the CIF programme did not just improve financial outcomes but also enabled women to take a more active and confident role in community life, supporting broader social empowerment outcomes.

Table 33: Increased Community Participation and Types of Engagement

District	Increased	Attending Meetings	Volunteering	Leadership Roles	Total (n)
Badin	75%	47%	35%	18%	673
Khairpur	98%	44%	34%	23%	861
Mirpurkhas	75%	53%	27%	18%	598
Sanghar	70%	46%	39%	15%	840
Thatta	90%	69%	26%	4%	455
Umerkot	97%	46%	32%	22%	598
<b>All</b>	<b>84%</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>4025</b>

The data in Table 34 reveals a high overall confidence (89%) among respondents in voicing their opinions in community forums, with notable variations across districts. Khairpur, Thatta, and Umerkot exhibit exceptionally high confidence levels (98–99%), while Sanghar reports comparatively lower confidence at 74%, indicating potential barriers to participation in that district. The success of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) emerges as the most influential factor in Badin (53%), while it has the least influence in Thatta (24%), where community support (49%) and training (27%) take precedence. Mirpurkhas stands out for the highest contribution of training (28%) to increased confidence.

Overall, community support (37%) and training (22%) play important yet varying roles across districts. Notably, the factors driving empowerment differ across spheres: within households, women's confidence is most strongly linked to their financial contribution (39%), while in community settings, social support (37%) and training (22%) play a more decisive role. This distinction underlines the importance of combining



economic inclusion at the household level with social and institutional support for women's civic participation.

At the same time, there is an important contrast between women's experiences and prevailing social attitudes: while 89% of women report feeling confident to voice opinions in community forums, only around a quarter of community members support women's engagement in such roles (Table 35). This suggests that programme interventions have successfully strengthened women's confidence and willingness to participate, even though community acceptance and structural barriers continue to lag.

Table 34: Community Members' Confidence in Voicing Opinions in Forums and Contributing Factors Across Districts

District	Do you feel more confident voicing opinions in community forums?		If yes, what has contributed to this confidence?		
	Number of responses (n)	Yes (%)	Success of CIF	Community support	Training
Badin	673	80%	53%	32%	15%
Khairpur	861	99%	44%	35%	21%
Mirpurkhas	598	90%	42%	30%	28%
Sanghar	840	74%	34%	43%	23%
Thatta	455	98%	24%	49%	27%
Umerkot	598	98%	42%	37%	21%
<b>All</b>	<b>4025</b>	<b>89%</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>22%</b>

The data in Table 35 highlights mixed and generally low community support for women's engagement across various domains, with significant variation across districts. On average, only 27% of respondents believe women should discuss community issues, and just 22% support their participation in voting—indicating a limited acceptance of women's civic involvement. Thatta stands out with the highest support for discussing community issues (36%) and domestic decision-making (30%) but shows the lowest support for financial management (3%) and leadership (10%), suggesting a selective perception of women's roles. Sanghar mirrors this pattern with relatively high support for community discussions (32%) and voting (25%) but extremely low approval (6%) for

women in domestic decisions. Mirpurkhas shows the highest acceptance for women's role in domestic decisions (23%), while Badin reports the lowest (13%). Support for women holding leadership roles remains low across all districts, averaging just 17%, reflecting broader gender norms limiting women's authority in public spaces. Overall, the findings indicate there are structure deeply rooted gender biases in the society, with stronger resistance to women's involvement in decision-making and leadership than in traditional or domestic roles, highlighting the need for targeted gender sensitisation and empowerment initiatives particularly improving education level within the overall society as indicated in the next section.

Table 35: Community Beliefs About Women's Roles – Perceptions on Women's Engagement in Civic, Financial, and Domestic Spheres by District

District	Discuss Community Issues	Participate in Vote	Hold Leadership	Manage Finances	Domestic Level Decisions	Number of responses (n)
Badin	32%	25%	16%	15%	13%	1900
Khairpur	21%	21%	19%	18%	20%	2807
Mirpurkhas	23%	19%	17%	18%	23%	2109
Sanghar	32%	25%	21%	16%	6%	2132
Thatta	36%	21%	10%	3%	30%	660
Umerkot	27%	21%	16%	16%	20%	2006
<b>Total</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>11614</b>

### Barriers to Participation

The data in Table 36 highlights the principal barriers restricting women's participation in community life, with clear inter-district variations. On average, lack of education (32%) and cultural norms (30%) emerge as the most frequently cited obstacles across the six districts. Thatta stands out for its exceptionally high concern with lack of education (56%)—significantly above the overall average—while reporting the lowest constraint from cultural norms (19%) and family duties (16%). In contrast, Sanghar reports the highest influence of cultural norms (36%), indicating strong sociocultural restrictions in that district. Mirpurkhas is notable for its high level of concern

around limited accessibility to services (21%), which is also the highest across all districts, suggesting infrastructure or logistical barriers. Umerkot reports the highest rate of family duties (29%) as a limiting factor, pointing to gendered household roles as a key barrier there.

Overall, while barriers are multidimensional, the dominance of educational and cultural limitations underscores the need for integrated interventions focusing on awareness-raising, education for women and girls, and community-level norm transformation to enable more inclusive participation.

Table 36: Key Barriers Hindering Women's Participation in Community Activities by District

District	Cultural Norms	Lack of Education	Family Duties	Limited Accessibility to Services	Number of responses (n)
Badin	34%	31%	24%	11%	1753
Khairpur	32%	31%	24%	13%	2469
Mirpurkhas	27%	26%	26%	21%	1871
Sanghar	36%	32%	24%	8%	1967
Thatta	19%	56%	16%	10%	658
Umerkot	24%	31%	29%	16%	1810
<b>Total</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>10528</b>

## Women's Empowerment – Synthesised Findings

Figure 18 brings together key indicators from Tables 25–36, presenting a consolidated view of women's empowerment across household, financial, and civic domains. It shows strong gains in women's confidence, financial skills, and community participation following access to the CIF. However, autonomy in loan decision-making and community acceptance of leadership roles remain low, while cultural norms and lack of education continue to act as barriers. These findings highlight both the progress achieved and the uneven nature of empowerment, where women's responsibilities are expanding faster than their authority.

**Household Empowerment:** Women are increasingly consulted in household decision-making (44%, Table 25), with 30% reporting a greater role in financial matters after accessing the CIF (Table 26). Confidence has risen significantly, with 88% feeling assured in expressing opinions within the household (Table 27). While inclusivity has improved, sole decision-making authority remains low (10–13%), showing empowerment is more collective than autonomous.


**Financial Empowerment:** The CIF has strengthened women's financial skills and confidence, with 90% reporting improved financial management (Table 30). Half of the women (50%) are now solely responsible for loan repayment (Table 31),

demonstrating accountability. However, only 18% independently decided to take a loan (Table 28), and just 19% manage CIF income independently (Table 29). This highlights an uneven trajectory where responsibility is rising faster than authority.

**Civic Empowerment:** At the community level, 84% of women reported increased participation in activities (Table 33), and 89% expressed confidence in voicing opinions at forums (Table 34). Yet community acceptance lags: only 17% of community members support women in leadership roles (Table 35). Barriers remain significant, with cultural norms (30%) and lack of education (32%) cited as the most common obstacles to participation (Table 36).

**Synthesis:** Overall, the CIF has meaningfully enhanced women's confidence, participation, and financial accountability. Yet empowerment is uneven: women are often accountable for financial obligations without equal decision-making power, and their growing self-confidence is not fully matched by community acceptance. These findings underscore the need for interventions that not only expand financial inclusion but also address structural barriers, gender norms, and educational constraints to achieve deeper and more sustainable empowerment.

Figure 18: Key Indicators of Women's Empowerment (Tables 25–36)



#### 4.5. Beneficiaries Perceptions of CIF Access, Ownership, and Institutional Trust

Before examining community perceptions of ownership, trust, and sustainability, it is important to first assess how beneficiaries experienced the CIF access process itself. As shown in Table 37, respondents across the six districts viewed the process as simple, low-cost, and transparent. On average, beneficiaries spent PKR 769 on related expenses (e.g., transportation and documentation) and received the CIF within 45 days, usually requiring only one visit to their community organisation or the SRSO office. Khairpur stood out with the lowest costs (PKR 297), the shortest waiting time (33 days), and the highest satisfaction across most indicators, pointing to a particularly efficient delivery mechanism. In contrast, Thatta

recorded the highest costs (PKR 1,244), while Sanghar beneficiaries required more visits and expressed lower satisfaction with both application ease (79%) and loan processing (76%).

Several other indicators reinforce the perception of accessibility and fairness. Collateral was universally not required (98%), loans were generally suited to beneficiaries' intended purposes (82%), and overall satisfaction with processing was high (88%). Moreover, perceived fairness in beneficiary selection was nearly universal (98%). These results suggest that CIF has been delivered in a manner that is broadly efficient, equitable, and trusted, though district-level disparities—especially in Thatta and Sanghar—highlight the need for more consistent implementation.

Table 37: Beneficiary feedback about access to CIF

District	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	All Districts
Avg. Personal Expenses Incurred for example transportation, documentation (PKR)	995	297	804	946	1,244	549	769
Avg. Days to Receive CIF	48	33	45	55	44	50	45
Avg. No. of Visits to CO/VO/SRSO Office	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Application Process Was Simple	87%	99%	82%	79%	96%	98%	90%
CIF Terms and condition explained by VO/LSOs leaders	53%	32%	27%	31%	9%	36%	33%
CIF Terms and condition explained by SRSO field staff	39%	50%	58%	54%	86%	52%	54%
CIF Terms and condition explained by peers	2%	18%	14%	14%	5%	11%	12%
No Collateral Required	100%	100%	99%	92%	100%	100%	98%
Loan Was Suitable for Intended Purpose	74%	96%	79%	74%	79%	92%	82%
Very Satisfied with Loan Processing	85%	97%	92%	76%	86%	92%	88%
Fair Beneficiary Selection	97%	100%	98%	96%	98%	96%	98%
Number of Beneficiaries (n)	673	861	598	840	455	598	4,025

Building on these positive experiences of access, beneficiaries also expressed a strong sense of ownership over the fund. As presented in Table 38, 73% considered CIF to be a community-owned resource, with particularly high affirmation in Umerkot (96%), Khairpur (76%), Thatta (76%), and Badin (76%). Yet, ownership perceptions did not always align with functionality. For example, in Sanghar, only 35% reportedly knew that the fund was still revolving and just 42% knew others were still receiving CIF support, suggesting a mismatch between perceived ownership and actual information of the fund.

Trust in SRSO as the managing institution was also consistently high, with 88% of beneficiaries reporting increased confidence in the organisation. Khairpur (99%), Umerkot (94%), and Thatta (93%) displayed near-universal trust, whereas Sanghar stood out with more mixed views: 64% expressed strong trust and 36% only moderate trust. Interestingly, these results reveal a contrast: even where awareness of repayment tracking was low (e.g., 68% in Badin reported no awareness), trust in SRSO remained strong. This suggests that trust is based less on detailed knowledge of the fund processes and more on overall reputation and beneficiary experience with SRSO.

Table 38: Summary of CIF Beneficiary Perceptions by Thematic Area (in %)

Thematic Area	Key Findings Across Districts
Awareness of How Repayments Are Tracked	- Overall, 68% of beneficiaries are aware of how repayments are tracked. - Highest awareness in Khairpur (98%), Umerkot (94%), and Thatta (77%). - Badin shows the lowest awareness (15%), with 68% unaware.
Perception of CIF as a Community-Owned Resource	- 73% of all respondents fully consider CIF community-owned. - Strongest ownership sense in Umerkot (96%), Khairpur (76%), Thatta (76%), and Badin (76%). - Mirpurkhas (63%) and Sanghar (55%) trail behind.
Trust in SRSO	- 88% of respondents report significantly increased trust. - Near-universal trust in Khairpur (99%), Umerkot (94%), and Thatta (93%). - Sanghar stands out with only 64% reporting high trust and 36% somewhat.
What Works Well	- Most commonly cited strengths: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fast disbursement (29%) – highest in Thatta (52%), Sanghar (28%), Umerkot (28%).</li> <li>• Fair selection (23%) and recordkeeping (23%) also highly rated.</li> <li>• Support services (16%) and low cost (9%) rated lower overall.</li> </ul>
What Needs Improvement	- Most cited areas for improvement: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More training (33%) – highest in Thatta (44%) and Khairpur/Mirpurkhas (38%).</li> <li>• Better recovery (25%), tracking tools (15%), and transparent selection (15%) also highlighted.</li> <li>• Mobile banking (10%) is a niche but important concern, especially in Mirpurkhas (18%).</li> </ul>

### CIF Fund Sustainability, Usage, and Risk Perceptions

The data in Table 39 reflects beneficiaries' perceptions of CIF continuity and access. Overall, 59% of respondents reported that the fund is still revolving, with stronger awareness in Umerkot (84%) and Thatta (77%). By contrast, Sanghar stands out as a concern, where only 35% of respondents said the fund remains active.

A similar pattern emerges in perceptions of access: while 68% overall reported that others in their community are still receiving CIF support, the

proportion again drops sharply in Sanghar (42%). These parallel results reinforce the finding that, although CIF is widely perceived as continuing in most districts, significant gaps in awareness and visibility remain in certain areas.

Together, these indicators suggest that beneficiaries generally see CIF as a sustained and accessible mechanism, but uneven perceptions across districts—particularly in Sanghar—highlight the importance of strengthening communication, transparency, and fund monitoring to reinforce confidence in its long-term viability.

Table 39: Community Investment Fund (CIF) Functionality, Access, and Reuse Across Districts

District	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	Total
Is the CIF fund still revolving?							
Yes (%)	55%	56%	64%	35%	77%	84%	59%
Are others still receiving CIF in your community?							
Yes (%)	68%	80%	63%	42%	77%	85%	68%
Sample size (n)	673	861	598	840	455	598	4025

The data in Table 40 provides insights into how beneficiaries perceive CIF governance, the extent of SRSO's role in fund tracking, and the risks they associate with sustainability once SRSO support is withdrawn.

Tracking responsibilities are reported to be primarily managed by SRSO staff (73%), with limited roles for

VO Executives (19%) and LSOs (7%). District-level data shows especially high reliance on SRSO in Mirpurkhas (90%), Umerkot (88%), and Thatta (80%). This reflects strong institutional oversight but also suggests that community-level ownership and capacity for financial governance remain underdeveloped.

Perceptions of mismanagement under the current system are minimal: 99% of respondents across all districts stated that there had been no such issues in their communities. Yet, when asked about potential risks if SRSO were to exit, respondents expressed notable concerns. The most frequently cited threats included poor recovery (21%), lack of training (19%), poor recordkeeping (16%), and favouritism (16%). In Thatta and Khairpur, fears of insufficient funds (26% each) and lack of training (29% and 21%, respectively) were particularly prominent.

This contrast highlights an important tension: while current CIF operations are trusted and perceived as transparent, beneficiaries fear that the system may not remain robust without SRSO's oversight. In other words, confidence in CIF governance today largely rests on SRSO's presence, rather than on the independent capacity of community institutions. Unless recordkeeping, monitoring, and recovery mechanisms are more fully transferred to VOs and LSOs, the sustainability of CIF largely depends on the continued support from SRSO.

Table 40: CIF Governance, Mismanagement, and Perceived Threats (by District)

Indicator	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	Total
Who Manages Tracking of CIF?							
- LSO (%)	2%	5%	4%	15%	17%	3%	7%
- Other (%)	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%
- SRSO Staff (%)	44%	69%	90%	76%	80%	88%	73%
- VO Executive (%)	54%	26%	4%	9%	3%	9%	19%
Sample Size (Tracking)	673	861	598	840	455	598	4025
Have There Been Mismanagement Issues?							
- No (%)	99%	100%	97%	100%	100%	100%	99%
- Yes (%)	1%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Sample Size (Mismanagement)	673	861	598	840	455	598	4025
<i>*Top Perceived Threats to CIF (%) in case SRSO support stops</i>							
- Poor Recovery	24%	18%	21%	23%	21%	20%	21%
- Favouritism	22%	8%	9%	23%	9%	16%	16%
- Poor Records	15%	18%	10%	22%	17%	14%	16%
- Lack of Training	17%	21%	16%	15%	29%	22%	19%
- Lack of Funds	16%	26%	24%	8%	8%	20%	17%
- No Bank Link	2%	1%	10%	3%	1%	8%	4%
- Other	4%	8%	11%	5%	16%	0%	6%
Total Responses (Threats)	1779	1912	1243	2139	727	1938	9738
<i>* Respondents could select multiple options for perceived threats.</i>							

In terms of support required for the long-term sustainability of CIF, training emerged as the most frequently cited need (26%), followed by regular audits (18%), robust recovery systems (17%), and the introduction of digital recordkeeping tools (11%) (Table 41). District-level variations highlight important nuances. In Thatta, half of all respondents (50%) prioritised training and nearly a third (30%)

called for larger funds—by far the highest demand across all districts—pointing to significant gaps in both financial resources and institutional capacity. Mirpurkhas also stood out, with more than a quarter (26%) of respondents emphasising the need for a larger fund, suggesting local perceptions of resource insufficiency.

Table 41: What support do you think will be needed for sustainability of CIF?

District	Badin	Khairpur	Mirpurkhas	Sanghar	Thatta	Umerkot	Total
Audits	18%	22%	10%	23%	5%	17%	18%
Training	24%	25%	21%	29%	50%	25%	26%
Recovery System	22%	14%	13%	22%	9%	16%	17%
Digital Records	12%	11%	9%	12%	3%	13%	11%
Community monitoring	9%	7%	11%	11%	2%	15%	10%
Technical support	6%	10%	10%	4%	1%	10%	7%
Larger fund	9%	12%	26%	0%	30%	4%	10%
<b>Total Responses (n)</b>	1889	2212	1530	2270	534	2024	10459

### External Factors Affecting CIF Sustainability

While survey findings provide valuable insights into how beneficiaries perceive CIF access, ownership, and sustainability, secondary data highlights a number of structural and economic factors that shape the programme's long-term viability. These factors are not directly drawn from the household survey but are critical for interpreting community concerns – particularly the demand for larger funds expressed in some districts.

A first factor is the coverage gap. As noted earlier in this report, nearly 68% of eligible households have not yet accessed CIF. This gap creates continued pressure on the revolving fund, as many households remain excluded from financial support. The perception of scarcity is therefore not only about the adequacy of current loan sizes but also about the limited reach of the fund relative to demand.

A second, and equally critical, factor is the erosion of the real value of CIF loans due to inflation. Rural inflation in Pakistan has accelerated sharply in recent years, reaching 28.9% in 2022 and peaking at 42.2% in May 2023. According to figures from the

Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, cited in the Ex-post Evaluation of the SUCCESS Programme in Sindh (2025), this surge has had a particularly severe impact on rural households. Rising food and input costs have directly undermined the utility of small loans, while also diminishing the overall value of the revolving CIF pool. It is estimated that this inflationary pressure has reduced the purchasing power of CIF resources by around 35%<sup>8</sup>.

Taken together, these external factors help explain why the beneficiaries also call for larger CIF allocations was particularly strong in Thatta (30%) and Mirpurkhas (26%) – Table 41. The demand does not simply reflect beneficiary perceptions in isolation, but rather structural challenges: unmet coverage and diminishing real value of loans in an inflationary environment. Unless future CIF design takes these pressures into account – by expanding outreach and indexing loan sizes to inflation – the fund risks losing both its effectiveness and credibility, even if governance mechanisms and training are strengthened.

### 4.6. Reach of PPRP's other Livelihood and Support Interventions and perceived benefits

Table 42 presents the status of CIF sample beneficiaries receiving other interventions of PPRP. Among all PPRP interventions, educational support reached the highest proportion of the sample (11%), with 78% reporting high benefit. Similarly, enterprise/value chain support achieved the highest satisfaction rate, with 89% of beneficiaries rating it as highly beneficial and none finding it unhelpful.

Income-generating grants (IGG) and vocational/technical training (VTP) were also impactful, with over half of the recipients reporting high benefits. Conversely, CPI/village rehabilitation

and post-disaster support had lower high-benefit perceptions (37% and 27%, respectively), though the majority still found them moderately useful.

The micro health insurance scheme had limited reach (0.3%) but was generally well received. Kitchen gardening and low-cost housing received moderate satisfaction, with a slightly higher proportion noting limited benefit.

Overall, the data reflects a high level of perceived benefit across most interventions, with room for improvement in coverage and effectiveness of certain components like disaster rehabilitation and insurance.

Table 42: Number of sample Beneficiaries received benefits from other PPRP Interventions and Their Perceived Benefit Levels

Intervention	No. of Beneficiaries	% of Sample	High Benefit	Moderate Benefit	Low Benefit	Not Beneficial
Income Generating Grant (IGG)	242	6%	61%	36%	2%	1%
Vocational/Technical Training (VTP)	306	8%	55%	42%	2%	2%
Low-Cost Housing/Shelter Support	123	3%	62%	34%	4%	0%
CPI/Village Rehabilitation Support	112	3%	37%	59%	4%	0%
Micro Health Insurance (MHI)	14	0.3%	50%	43%	7%	0%
Educational Support	437	11%	78%	19%	2%	1%
Enterprise/Value Chain Support	178	4%	89%	11%	0%	0%
Kitchen Gardening Support	68	2%	50%	41%	6%	3%
Village Rehabilitation (Post-Disaster)	51	1%	27%	71%	0%	2%

We asked the CIF beneficiary about support and services they have received in addition to the PPRP interventions. The data presented in Table 43 reveals that cash assistance (primarily from BISP/Ehsaas and the Government of Sindh) had the widest reach, benefitting 46% and 21% of the sample beneficiaries respectively, with 66% reporting high benefits. Education support and livelihood training had the highest levels of perceived benefit (92%), though received by a smaller proportion of respondents, mainly through government and NGOs. Shelter and housing support was primarily government-led and also showed a strong positive impact (85% high

benefit). Less widespread interventions such as health services, ration distribution, and WASH schemes reached fewer beneficiaries but still received generally high satisfaction ratings. NGOs and SRSO played a modest yet visible role in multiple interventions, particularly in agricultural input support and water/sanitation schemes, though with limited overall reach. Notably, very few beneficiaries found any intervention to be non-beneficial, reflecting overall positive perceptions across services received.

Table 43: Perceived Benefit and Service Provider Coverage of Social Protection and Support Interventions (n=4025)

District Name	% of sample beneficiaries received benefit from:				Level of perceived benefits reported by beneficiaries			
	BISP/Ehsas	Govt of Sindh	NGOs	SRSO	High	Low	Moderate	Not Beneficial
Cash assistance	46%	21%	2%	-	66%	2%	32%	-
Ration or food distribution	-	-	1%	-	55%	14%	32%	-
Health services (e.g., vaccination, medical camp)	-	4%	4%	-	78%	2%	20%	-
Education support (e.g., free books, scholarships)	1%	18%	1%	-	92%	5%	4%	-
Livelihood training or vocational skills	-	-	3%	-	92%	7%	1%	-
Shelter/housing support	-	7%	2%	1%	85%	9%	6%	-
Agricultural or livestock input support	-	-	1%	1%	92%	4%	3%	1%
Water/sanitation scheme	-	-	3%	-	94%	3%	3%	-

<sup>8</sup> Ex-post Evaluation of the Sindh Union Council and Community Economic Strengthening Support (SUCCESS) Programme, Oxford Policy Management 2025

#### 4.7. Improvements in Household Poverty Status Following CIF Support

This section presents data on changes in the Poverty Scorecard (PSC) bands of CIF beneficiary households between 2017 and 2025, showing how poverty profiles shifted during the PPRP implementation.

Figure 19 compares the poverty status of PPRP beneficiaries in 2017 and 2025, based on PSC bands. It shows a modest but noticeable improvement in household poverty levels over this period.

The share of households in the poorest PSC band (0–11) fell from 28% in 2017 to 20% in 2025, suggesting that 8% of the ultra-poor households improved their living conditions. Likewise, the proportion in the poor band (12–23) declined by 20%, indicating that many households moved into higher PSC categories.

At the same time, more households shifted into the vulnerable (PSC 24–35) and relatively better-off

(PSC 36–100) bands. By 2025, these groups together accounted for 28% of households—up from 0% in 2017—with 20% in the vulnerable band and 8% in the better-off band.

These shifts show that some poor households moved out of extreme poverty and that many experienced gradual improvements in their living conditions, progressing along the poverty spectrum. This progress is likely the result of combined support from the CIF, other PPRP components, and assistance provided by government and NGOs. These support systems played a crucial role in protecting poor and ultra-poor households from the harsh effects of economic downturns, high inflation, and repeated disasters that affected Sindh in particular and Pakistan more broadly between 2017 and 2025. Without such support, the impact on these groups would have been far more severe.

In summary, the chart highlights a gradual upward trend in poverty scores, with fewer households trapped in extreme poverty by 2025.

Figure 19: Change in Poverty Status of CIF Beneficiaries (n=4025)




Table 44 tracks the poverty status of 4,025 CIF beneficiary households between 2017 and 2025 using the Poverty Scorecard (PSC). It shows how households moved across four PSC bands: PSC 0–11 (extremely poor), 12–23 (poor), 24–35 (vulnerable), and 35–100 (better-off). The table records both where households started in 2017 and where they were by 2025.

Among households that began in the poorest band (PSC 0–11), only 23% remained there by 2025. The majority had moved upward: 50% shifted into the poor band (PSC 12–23), 18% advanced to the vulnerable band (PSC 24–35), and 9% reached the better-off band (PSC 35–100). Similarly, of those who started in the poor band (PSC 12–23), 28% progressed to higher PSC categories (24–100), 53% remained in the same band, and 19% fell back into the lowest category.

By 2025, the overall distribution of beneficiaries had changed:

- PSC 0–11: declined from 28% to 20%.
- PSC 12–23: declined from 72% to 52%.
- PSC 24–35: increased to 20%.
- PSC 35–100: increased to 8%.

These shifts indicate that many households made gradual progress out of extreme level of poverty. However, not all households advanced. Some remained in the same band, which may reflect persistent structural barriers such as limited productive assets, chronic illness, lack of livelihood opportunities, or dependence on irregular income sources. Others even fell into lower bands, likely due to economic shocks, repeated natural disasters, loss of household income earners, and the impact of inflation eroding real income gains.

Overall, the data shows that a modest share of the beneficiary households improved their economic situation during the programme period, though vulnerability and setbacks persisted for others.

**Table 44: Movement in Poverty Status of CIF Beneficiaries Based on Poverty Scorecard (2017–2025)**

	PSC Band	After PPRP (2025)				(n)	% Beneficiaries Before PPRP
		0-11	12-23	24-35	36-100		
Before PPRP (2017)	0-11	253 (23%)	559 (50%)	207 (18%)	101 (9%)	1120	28%
	12-23	550 (19%)	1534 (53%)	581 (20%)	240 (8%)	2905	72%
	(n)	803	2,093	788	341	4,025	
% of Beneficiaries After PPRP		20%	52%	20%	8%		

#### Impact of CIF Cycles on Household Poverty Status (2017–2025)

Table 45 and Figure 20 show how households moved across poverty bands between 2017 and 2025, depending on the number of CIF cycles received. At baseline, all households were poor, split between the extremely poor (PSC 0–11) and poor (PSC 12–23) categories, with none in the vulnerable or better-off bands.

By 2025, extreme poverty had declined in every group, and for the first time, households appeared in the vulnerable and better-off categories. With one

cycle, the share of extremely poor households fell from 30 to 21 percent, while 27 percent moved up to vulnerable or better-off status. Households receiving two or three cycles saw further gains: extreme poverty dropped to 20 and 17 percent respectively, and around one-third moved into higher categories. The four-cycle group followed a similar pattern, with 19 percent remaining in extreme poverty and 26 percent moving upward. The five-cycle group, though very small, showed the most dramatic shift: none remained in extreme poverty, and 42 percent were in the vulnerable or better-off bands.

**Table 45: CIF Cycle-wise Change in Poverty Status of Beneficiaries (2017–2025)**


CIF Cycles	HHs (n)	Before CIF (2017)		After CIF (2025)			
		PSC (0–11)	PSC (12–23)	PSC (0–11)	PSC (12–23)	PSC (24–35)	PSC (36–100)
Once	2,044	30%	70%	21%	52%	19%	8%
Twice	1,224	26%	74%	20%	52%	20%	9%
Three	521	24%	76%	17%	52%	21%	10%
Four	224	24%	76%	19%	55%	18%	8%
Five	12	42%	58%	0%	58%	25%	17%

Figure 21 reinforces this trend. The red area (extremely poor) shrinks steadily with more cycles, disappearing entirely in the five-cycle group. The orange area (poor) remains the largest band, showing that most households stayed poor even after support. Meanwhile, the yellow and blue areas (vulnerable and better-off) expand with each cycle, demonstrating upward mobility.

Taken together, the evidence underlines two key points. First, repeated CIF access consistently reduced extreme poverty and created new pathways into the vulnerable and better-off categories. The

data suggests that the most noticeable upward mobility begins after the third and fourth CIF cycles, when around one-third of households move beyond the poor band. This indicates that three to four cycles may be considered the optimum threshold for placing poor households on a credible path to poverty graduation. Second, the persistence of the poor band shows that while CIF effectively mitigated the depth of poverty, most households still require complementary interventions in livelihoods, markets, and social protection to sustain and accelerate this progress.

Figure 20: CIF cycle-wise sample household PSC distribution after CIF (2025)



#### 4.8. Impact of CIF and CIF+BISP on Household Poverty Levels

As noted in Table 43 notably 46 percent of CIF beneficiaries in the sample were already receiving BISP social protection cash transfers. This significant overlap underscores the importance of examining how social protection (BISP) and livelihood financing (CIF) interact – and whether their combination produces greater or different outcomes compared to CIF alone.

The two programmes are designed to address different but complementary dimensions of poverty. BISP provides quarterly cash transfers to meet immediate consumption needs, especially for food security, while CIF enables households to access productive capital for income generation and asset building. Comparing outcomes for Only CIF and CIF+BISP households therefore provides critical insights for programme design and policy decisions.

The Poverty Scorecard (PSC) data presented in Table 46 illustrates these dynamics. Before PPRP, all households in both groups were concentrated in the poorest bands (PSC 0–23). In the Only CIF group, 25 percent were extreme poor (PSC 0–11) and 75

percent were poor (PSC 12–23). In the CIF+BISP group, 32 percent were extreme poor and 68 percent were poor. None of the households in either group had PSC score above 23.

The data shows that after PPRP interventions, notable upward shifts occurred on PSC score of the beneficiaries. In the Only CIF group, extreme poverty declined from 25 to 14 percent, and 36 percent of households moved upward into the vulnerable (PSC 24–35) and non-poor (PSC 35–100) categories. In the CIF+BISP group, extreme poverty fell more sharply from 32 to 18 percent, but upward mobility into higher bands was relatively smaller, with 29 percent reaching the vulnerable and non-poor categories.

This comparison suggests that the two approaches are complementary. Only CIF proved more effective in enabling households to climb further up the wellbeing ladder, supporting longer-term poverty graduation. CIF+BISP, on the other hand, was more effective in reducing the depth of extreme poverty, showing the value of combining basic consumption support with productive investment.


Table 46: PSC Distribution of beneficiary households – Only CIF vs. CIF+BISP (Before & After PPRP)

Intervention	Time Period	PSC 0–11 (Extreme Poor)	PSC 12–23 (Poor)	PSC 24–35 (Vulnerable)	PSC 35–100 (Non-poor)	Number of sample Beneficiaries (n)
Only CIF	Before PPRP	25%	75%	0%	0%	1217
	After PPRP	14%	50%	26%	10%	1217
BISP+CIF	Before PPRP	32%	68%	0%	0%	1865
	After PPRP	18%	54%	19%	10%	1865

Policy Implications: For sustainable poverty graduation, it is important to integrate the short-term protection provided by BISP with the longer-term livelihood investments supported by CIF. The combination allows households to meet immediate food and consumption needs while building

pathways to income growth and resilience. This evidence underscores the importance for policymakers of designing integrated social protection and livelihood strategies, rather than implementing them in isolation.

Figure 21: Household PSC Bands \_ Comparison of Only CIF and CIF+BISP (Before & After PPRP)



## 4.9. Insights from FGDs and KIIs

This section presents an in-depth narrative of insights derived from the Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with stakeholders and women beneficiaries involved in the Community Investment Fund (CIF) under the People's Poverty Reduction Project (PPRP). These qualitative perspectives reveal the CIF model's operational dynamics, challenges, successes, and its transformative potential at both institutional and community levels.

### 1 Community Ownership and Collective Accountability

A central insight from both KIIs and FGDs is the high level of community ownership associated with the CIF. Beneficiaries consistently perceive the fund as a communal resource, rather than an external aid mechanism. This sense of ownership stems from the participatory planning, transparent decision-making, and shared responsibility embedded within the VO and LSO structures. As one VO member from Mirpurkhas articulated during the FGD, "This money is ours—it belongs to the village. We give it, take it, and return it. It is not from outside; it is from us."

CIF professionals and social mobilizers echoed this sentiment, emphasizing the revolving nature of the fund as a source of pride. The community-led mechanisms for fund disbursement and recovery reinforce the perception that the CIF is not just a loan, but a local asset governed by mutual trust and accountability.

### 2 Women's Empowerment and Social Change

The CIF has had a pronounced impact on the economic and social empowerment of women. Across all FGDs, participants spoke about how access to CIF loans has changed their lives—not only financially but socially. One woman from VO Jam Khan Jatoi shared, "Before this, we waited for our husbands to bring home money. Now, we earn ourselves. We can feed our children better, save for dowry, and even buy solar panels."

Women's increased income has directly contributed to greater confidence and household decision-making power. VO leaders reported higher participation of women in community meetings, with many taking leadership roles for the first time. According to a monitoring officer, "Women-led VOs are more organised. Their books are maintained properly, and they follow up more consistently on repayments."

The social impact extends beyond economics. In several cases, women shared that respect from their families and communities had increased, and they now feel safer and more empowered. One

participant noted, "Even our husbands now listen when we speak. They ask for our opinion. This was unthinkable before."

### 3 Loan Utilisation, Planning, and Income Gains

A strong pattern that emerged from both interviews and group discussions was the prudent use of CIF loans for income-generating purposes. The loans were largely used for livestock rearing, setting up small shops, or home-based businesses like tailoring and embroidery. A notable success story from VO Muhammad Hashim described a member who received two CIF loans and gradually built up a livestock portfolio valued at over PKR 250,000.

However, a key challenge also surfaced: delays in disbursement. Such delays often led to members diverting funds to meet emergency needs, such as healthcare or school fees. A CIF professional noted, "When loan disbursement from SRSO is delayed by months, the beneficiaries' priorities change. They first need to deal with emergencies before they can invest in income-generating activities." Despite this, many women found innovative ways to maximise the utility of the loans, including using festival periods like Eid for livestock sales to generate profits and repay loans.

### 4 Repayment Mechanisms and Challenges

CIF loan repayments rely heavily on peer accountability and community pressure rather than on structured systems. VO leaders remind members about repayment deadlines, but they do not maintain a systematic monthly tracking mechanism for loan dues and recoveries. At SRSO, reviews also happen mostly on an annual basis, leaving gaps in timely monitoring. As one Regional General Manager noted, "The system still depends too much on field staff. We need monthly tracking tools in the hands of the VO leaders."

Still, transparency remains weak due to the lack of receipt issuance and formalised tracking. One VO President explained, "We write repayments in our VO record books, but we do not always issue receipts to the beneficiaries. Issuing receipts should be mandatory."

### 5 Institutional Capacity and Dependence on Project Staff

Another prominent theme was the limited institutional capacity of VO and LSO leaders. SRSO provided one-time trainings, but many respondents admitted they continue to rely on SRSO staff for recordkeeping, MIP preparation, and compliance oversight.

A participant in Khairpur explained, “We got a training at the start of the programme on what and how to do, but we forget the details over time. The SRSO team always helps, so we do not feel the urgency to manage it ourselves.” Instead of mentoring and equipping VO leaders with simplified tools, field staff often assumed the responsibilities meant for VOs.

The Programme Implementation Manual and guidelines clearly define the roles of SRSO field staff and VOs in CIF operations. However, one-time trainings have not been sufficient to ensure consistent application. Over time, many VOs stopped following the procedures as outlined in the manual.

## 6 Social Inclusion and Impact on Marginalised Groups

The CIF model has effectively reached women from marginalised backgrounds, including widows, religious minorities, and ultra-poor households. During FGDs, several women expressed that it was their first time accessing any form of financial assistance. One woman stated, “I applied for zakat for years and got nothing. But with CIF, I got a loan with respect and dignity.”

In addition, women highlighted the CIF's contribution to youth empowerment. Some used the loan to set up businesses for their children—ranging from shops to motorcycle taxis.

CIF not only helps us, but it helps our children find ways to work. In our village, jobs are hard to find. This loan gave us a new option, shared a VO member in Mirpurkhas.

## 7 Sustainability and Exit Readiness

While CIF's revolving structure is theoretically sustainable, both KIIs and FGDs confirmed that the model is not yet ready for a complete handover. Women leaders admitted their dependence on

SRSO for technical and financial oversight.

“We're proud that the fund is still revolving,” said a VO President. “But if SRSO stops today, we might not be able to run it the same way.”

Staff echoed this concern, highlighting the absence of standard operating procedures across districts and inconsistent governance practices. To prepare for sustainability, participants recommended strengthening institutional autonomy, investing in real-time monitoring systems, and phasing the exit based on readiness.

## 8 Recommendations from the Field

Insights from these discussions suggest several priority actions to strengthen the CIF model:

- Extend firsthand, practical training for VO/LSO leaders, with mentorship and refresher courses.
- Digitise loan records and repayment tracking at the community level.
- Increase loan size and flexibility for successful repeat borrowers.
- Institute receipt books and enforce recovery documentation.
- Develop and implement a phased CIF exit strategy informed by community readiness.

These insights from the field reinforce that CIF is more than a microloan—it is a catalyst for empowerment, institutional development, and community resilience. Its success lies not only in economic returns but in the dignity, confidence, and solidarity it fosters among women. Yet, for the model to mature into a fully community-managed fund, deliberate capacity strengthening, decentralised systems, and a carefully crafted sustainability strategy must be prioritised.



# CHAPTER 5: SYNTHESIS OF KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 5.1. Synthesis of Key Findings in Relation to the Study Hypotheses

This section synthesises the key findings of the CIF assessment, organised around the four outcome families and ten hypotheses outlined in the study ToR. The analysis draws on survey data from 4,025 beneficiaries, complemented by FGDs and KIIs, to provide a comprehensive picture of CIF's performance in poverty graduation, women's empowerment, cost-effectiveness, institutional sustainability, and fund recycling.

### Outcome Family 1: Poverty Graduation

H1: CIF ensures inclusion of women from poor and poorest households in the development process.

CIF maintained a strong pro-poor focus. All surveyed beneficiaries had baseline PSC scores  $\leq 23$ , confirming proper targeting of poor and ultra-poor households. Most women (82%) invested their loans in income-generating activities aligned with their MIPs, and 90% rated the application process as simple and accessible. Participation in COs and VOs was high (85%), and 52% of women supported peers in accessing CIF, reflecting both empowerment and knowledge sharing.

By December 2024, **149,232 unique beneficiaries** had accessed CIF out of **464,724 eligible households**, equivalent to **32.1% coverage**. District-level coverage ranged from about 28% in Thatta to 34% in Khairpur and Umerkot.

At the institutional level, **84% of VOs (4,647 of 5,564)** were actively managing CIF funds, while 16% had not yet managed CIF, pointing to scope for expanded outreach.

From an initial seed capital of PKR 2.93 billion, the CIF portfolio revolved to PKR **6.02 billion**. About 82% of recoveries were re-lent to beneficiaries, while PKR 523.5 million (18%) remained idle in bank accounts by the end of 2024, reflecting fund absorption bottlenecks in some districts.

Repeat access was moderate: 57% of households received CIF once, 13% twice, 13% three times, 10% four times, and 7% five times. Districts like Khairpur and Sanghar achieved stronger rotation, while Thatta and Umerkot lagged.

H2: Access to CIF improves the poverty score of beneficiary households.

Between 2017 and 2025, the share of households in

extreme poverty (PSC 0–11) declined from 28% to 20%, while those in the poor band (PSC 12–23) fell from 72% to 52%. At the same time, 28% of households moved into the vulnerable (PSC 24–35) and better-off (PSC 36–100) categories for the first time.

Cycle-wise analysis shows that meaningful gains begin after the third and fourth cycles of CIF loans, when one-third of households' transition into higher PSC bands. The five-cycle group performed strongest, with none in extreme poverty and 42% reaching higher bands, though this represents a very small sample. These shifts indicate incremental improvements and movement along the poverty spectrum, influenced by a combination of CIF support, other PPRP components, and broader social and economic factors.

The programme period (2017–2025) was marked by multiple shocks, including economic downturns, high inflation, and repeated natural disasters in Sindh. CIF and related support mechanisms played a vital role in cushioning poor and ultra-poor households against these shocks. Without such support, the negative impacts would have been far more severe. This resilience function is one of CIF's most important contributions, even where households did not fully escape poverty.

H3: Access to CIF increases household income and asset base.

CIF recipients reported clear economic benefits. Average annual income from CIF investment increased progressively with more CIF cycles—from PKR 8,462 (one cycle) to PKR 102,100 (five cycles). Cost savings also rose, particularly from self-produced food and reduced expenditures. Goat/sheep ownership increased from 39% to 70%, and cow/buffalo ownership from 6% to 9%. Shop ownership remained low, rising only from 2% to 3%. This asset pattern aligns with women's traditional roles and suggests CIF investments were well-targeted.

The combined yearly benefit of income and cost savings ranged from PKR 9,252 (one cycle) to PKR 117,019 (five cycles). Beneficiaries also reported increased household resilience, including better food security, consumption smoothing, and enhanced capacity to withstand economic shocks.

H4: Women CIF beneficiaries are investing more in productive assets.

Most CIF loans were used for productive purposes. Over 93% of respondents reported income generation from livestock, agriculture, or small business. Reinvestment of profits into the same activity (26%), savings (13%), health (16%), and education (10%) were common uses demonstrating productive and welfare-linked utilisation. Livelihood-enhancing activities—especially livestock—were favoured due to their manageability and low entry barriers for rural women.

Livestock remained the primary investment sector across all districts and loan cycles, accounting for 90–98% of total disbursements. Investment in micro enterprises and agriculture remained limited (under 10%), reflecting either market access limitations or risk aversion behaviour among women borrowers.

### **Outcome Family 2: Women's Empowerment**

H5: Access to CIF improves women's intra-household decision-making.

CIF significantly contributed to women's agency. Across all key decisions (children's education, health, purchases), joint decision-making was dominant (72–74%), but 13% of women had the final say on CIF usage. Moreover, 79% felt “very confident” in financial management, and 89.2% felt empowered to handle loans post-CIF. Active participation in household decisions and VO/LSO roles has increased. These changes signal enhanced economic and social empowerment, though sole decision-making remains limited.

Women also reported increased confidence to engage with local institutions, manage finances, and support other women in accessing CIF—building a foundation for peer-led empowerment and leadership.

### **Outcome Family 3: Cost-Effectiveness and Institutional Sustainability**

H6: CIF provides cost-effective financial access to poor households.

CIF loans (PKR 15,000–40,000) are interest-free and managed by women-led VOs and LSOs. The operational cost per borrower (PKR 1254) is significantly lower than conventional microfinance (PKR 3,000–6,000). CIF repayment rates (~99%) match or exceed recovery rates reported by micro-finance institutions. CIF beneficiaries reported high satisfaction, and economic returns per rupee invested are favourable. CIF thus offers a low-cost, inclusive alternative to conventional microfinance.

A comparative analysis of the CIF model against conventional microfinance products highlights its cost-effectiveness, inclusivity, and long-term sustainability. The CIF is uniquely targeted at women from poor and poorest households, specifically those with Poverty Scorecard (PSC) scores below 23. It is managed by women-led community institutions (VOs and LSOs), enhancing local ownership and operational sustainability. Unlike formal MFIs that charge interest rates of 20–35% and require collateral or group guarantees, CIF loans are interest-free, flexible, and accessible repeatedly to the same household. The revolving nature of the fund allows for continued loan access with minimal bureaucratic processes. CIF loans range between PKR 15,000–30,000 and maintain a recovery rate of approximately 99%, comparable to top-performing MFIs. Moreover, the average CIF's operational cost of PKR 1254 per loan is significantly lower than the PKR 3,000–6,000 per loan for typical microfinance providers. Despite offering zero-interest loans, CIF beneficiaries report comparable or even higher levels of household-level economic benefits, especially in terms of increased income and cost savings. This reflects not only the cost-effectiveness of CIF as a financial delivery mechanism, but also its ability to serve as a sustainable, pro-poor alternative to market-based microfinance models.



Table 47: Comparative Analysis of CIF and Conventional Microfinance Models in Pakistan

Indicator	CIF (SRSO-PPRP)	Conventional Microfinance (Pakistan)	Sources for Conventional Microfinance (Pakistan)
Target Group	Women with PSC < 23 (ultra-poor/poor)	Low to middle-income (some targeting poor)	Based on programme design
Loan Size (PKR)	15,000–40,000	25,000–50,000	PMN (2023); Shah et al. (2022)
Interest Rate	0%	20% – 35% annually	ADB (2022); PMN (2023)
Repayment Rate	~99%	98% – 99%	PMN (2023)
Operational Cost per Loan (PKR)	343– 511	3,000 – 6,000	ADB (2022); PMN (2023)
Loan Purpose Flexibility	High (livestock, microbusiness, etc.)	Moderate (may be sector-specific)	Based on programme documentation
Repeat Loan Access	Yes (up to 5 cycles)	Yes (conditional on credit history)	Programme documents
Collateral Requirement	No	Sometimes required or group guarantee	PMN (2023)
Management Structure	Community-led (VOs)	Institution-led	Shah et al. (2022); ADB (2022)
Sustainability Approach	Revolving, community managed & Institutionally Supported	Institutionally driven	Based on programme documentation
<b>Sources:</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>☒ ADB. (2022). <i>Microfinance in Pakistan: Sector overview and operational efficiency</i>. Asian Development Bank.</li> <li>☒ Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN). (2023). <i>Pakistan Microfinance Review 2022-2023</i>. Islamabad, Pakistan.</li> <li>☒ Shah, A., Ahmed, A., &amp; Khan, M. (2022). <i>Effectiveness of microfinance programmes in poverty alleviation: Evidence from Pakistan</i>. <i>Journal of South Asian Development Studies</i>, 18(3), 112–135.</li> </ul>			

CIF also scores high on perceived sustainability. About 84% of beneficiaries confirmed regular reuse of recovered loans, and 68% stated others in their communities continue to access CIF. Community ownership is strong—73% believe CIF is fully owned by the community, and 88% trust SRSO.

However, 59% confirmed CIF funds remain revolving in their communities, suggesting operational gaps in the remaining areas. Awareness of fund tracking was uneven—only 15% in Badin reported knowledge of tracking mechanisms—indicating a need for strengthened communication.

Furthermore, unutilised CIF balances of PKR 888 million point to fund absorption bottlenecks, especially in Badin and Sanghar, despite strong fund recovery. Key support needs identified include training (26%), improved recovery systems (17%), digital records (11%), and regular audits (18%).

H7: CIF has a low cost-benefit ratio.

The combined average yearly household benefit (income + cost savings) was PKR 26,493. Given an average operational cost of under PKR 1254 per loan and 67% of beneficiaries reporting improved assets, CIF delivers strong economic returns. Four-time CIF recipients earned PKR 80,892 annually, with asset increases averaging PKR 65,945. These outcomes highlight a favourable cost-benefit profile, especially with repeated CIF access.

Repeat CIF access amplified impact—households receiving 3+ cycles saw significantly higher income gains and asset improvements compared to single-cycle recipients, validating the importance of sustained access.

#### Outcome Family 4: CIF Recovery and Revolving Cycle

H8: CIF recovery mechanisms are strong.

CIF recovery performance is robust—repayment rates stand at ~99%, and 84% of beneficiaries confirmed regular reinvestment of recovered loans. SRSO staff primarily manage tracking (73%), supplemented by VO executives (19%). Only 1% reported any mismanagement.

However, risks such as poor recovery (21%), favouritism (16%), poor records (16%), and lack of training (19%) were perceived as threats by the beneficiaries. These underline the need for more robust governance systems.

Active fund ratios varied across districts, from 58% in Badin to 100% in Umerkot. Fund rotation rates averaged 2.1x, with Mirpurkhas and Umerkot leading. Despite this, fund absorption in some districts was low highlighting the need for better fund flow tracking, planning, and demand generation.

## 5.2. Conclusion

The Community Investment Fund (CIF) under the GoS-PPRP, implemented by SRSO, has proven to be a pro-poor, women-centred and cost-effective financial inclusion model. By December 2024, CIF had reached 149,232 unique women out of 464,724 eligible households—32.1% coverage. Portfolio performance has been strong: recovery is 98%; the original PKR 2.93 billion seed capital has revolved to PKR 6.02 billion; and 82% of recoveries were re-lent, with PKR 523.5 million (18%) lying idle in bank accounts. At the institutional level, 84% of VOs (4,647 of 5,564) were actively managing CIF, while 16% (917) had not yet done so.

Household outcomes improved over 2017–2025. The share of households in PSC 0–11 fell from 28% to 20%, those in PSC 12–23 from 72% to 52%, and for the first time 28% of households moved into the vulnerable and better-off categories. The clearest upward mobility occurs after three to four CIF cycles, suggesting this is the optimum threshold for placing households on a credible graduation pathway. Alongside this, CIF contributed to stronger women's agency and financial confidence, reinforcing both economic and social empowerment.

The programme period (2017–2025) was marked by multiple shocks, including economic downturns, high inflation, and repeated natural disasters in Sindh. CIF and related support mechanisms played a vital role in cushioning poor and ultra-poor households against these shocks. Without such support, the negative impacts would have been far more severe. This resilience function stands out as one of CIF and PPRP interventions most important contributions, even where households did not fully escape poverty.

Despite these gains, challenges persist, almost 68% of eligible households (315,500) remain unreached, 16% of VOs are yet to manage CIF, some funds remain unutilised and repeat access falls sharply after the first cycle. Sectoral concentration in livestock and uneven institutional capacity further limit impact.

Sustainability is also a critical concern. Though 99% of respondents reported no mismanagement under current operations, reflecting high trust in CIF governance by SRSO. Yet, when asked about risks if SRSO were to exit, beneficiaries voiced significant fears, including poor recovery (21%), lack of capacity (19%), weak recordkeeping (16%), and risk of favouritism (16%). In districts like Thatta and Khairpur, concerns about insufficient funds (26%) and inadequate training (29% and 21%) were particularly high. This suggests that confidence in CIF today is rooted in SRSO's continued presence, rather than in the independent capacity of VOs and LSOs. Unless governance, recovery and monitoring systems are further institutionalised at community level, CIF's long-term continuity will remain dependent on the SRSO support.

Finally, the erosion of the real value of CIF loans due to inflation poses a systemic risk. Rural inflation surged to 28.9% in 2022 and 42.2% in May 2023, reducing the purchasing power of CIF resources by an estimated 35%. This can undermine the effectiveness of small loan sizes, particularly in meeting rising input costs, while also weakening the real value of the revolving fund itself. Without mechanisms to adjust loan sizes or link CIF to broader livelihood and market strategies, the programme's ability to drive sustained poverty reduction will be constrained.



### 5.3. Recommendations

Based on the findings of the CIF assessment, the following recommendations are proposed to strengthen the effectiveness, equity, and sustainability of the Community Investment Fund (CIF) model under the GoS-PPRP:

#### 1) Expand Outreach and Coverage

- Mobilise additional CIF resources to reach 315,500 eligible households (68%) still unreached, ensuring more equitable access across districts.
- Activate the 917 VOs (16%) that have not yet managed CIF, addressing governance and readiness barriers.
- Deploy idle funds (PKR 523.5 million, 18%) quickly through district-level re-lending benchmarks and stronger oversight.

#### 2) Ensure Repeat Access for Graduation

- Institutionalise 3–4 CIF cycles per household as the optimum threshold for graduation, with transparent criteria for eligibility, repayment, and performance.
- Strengthen VO/LSO mechanisms to manage recovery and recycling so that repeat loans are accessible without delays.

#### 3) Strengthen Resilience Functions

- Formalise CIF's role as a shock-cushioning mechanism, ensuring timely loan access for households hit by economic downturns, inflation, or disasters.
- Introduce emergency or contingency loan products to protect ultra-poor households from resorting to distress sales or harmful coping strategies.
- Build linkages with disaster risk reduction and social protection schemes to complement CIF support in times of crisis.

#### 4) Diversify Loan Use within Livestock and Lay the Groundwork for Agriculture and Enterprise

- Support diversification within livestock-based activities (e.g., dairy farming, medium-scale small ruminant enterprises, fodder production, and value-added processing), especially for households that advanced onto the poverty graduation path after four to five CIF cycles. For these households, larger-scale and higher-value livestock opportunities can reduce risk, enhance profitability, and sustain

upward mobility, while remaining aligned with women's skills and cultural roles.

- Pilot small-scale agriculture and microenterprise loans in selected areas, but only where enabling conditions exist. Link these pilots with government extension services, input suppliers, and buyers/off takers to ensure viability.

- Build partnerships with market actors and government departments to create the support systems—training, input access, technology, and guaranteed market linkages—needed for women to enter agriculture or enterprise activities sustainably.

- Develop risk-sharing mechanisms (such as livestock insurance or disaster-contingency funds) to protect households from sector-specific shocks and increase confidence in diversification.

#### 5) Safeguard Sustainability and Institutional Capacity

- Gradually transfer recovery, monitoring, and fund management functions from SRSO to capable VOs and LSOs, with structured technical backstopping.

- Strengthen community governance through regular training, audits, and digital recordkeeping, particularly in weaker-performing districts.

- Institutionalise MIS-based tracking and reporting, validated with VO-level records, to enhance transparency and build confidence in community-led management.

#### 6) Adjust for Inflation and Preserve Loan Value

- Index CIF loan sizes to inflation-adjusted thresholds so that beneficiaries can realistically meet rising input and consumption costs.

- Periodically review fund size and capitalise CIF with additional resources to offset erosion in real value.

- Layer CIF with complementary livelihood programmes (skills, enterprise support, market access) to ensure sustainable improvements in household income.

#### 7) Consolidate Women's Empowerment

- Continue embedding CIF within women's organisations, ensuring that women co-sign and approve utilisation decisions.

- Scale financial literacy, savings mobilisation, and budgeting skills training to convert financial access into long-term empowerment and resilience.

## Annex -1: Hypotheses and Indicators

The study is structured around testing 10 hypotheses that are grouped in five families of outcomes. For each hypothesis, a list of specific

### Family 1: Poverty graduation

H1: CIF ensures inclusion of women from the poor and poorest households in the development process.

- Overall assessment of CIF beneficiaries' data with inclusion perspective.
- Assessment of CIF beneficiaries' perspectives for participation in COs, VOs, and LSOs.
- Instances of CIF beneficiaries beginning to access financial services from other sources as matter of spill over and after gaining experience of handling finance.

H2: Access to capital (CIF) improves the poverty score of beneficiary households.

- Change in sample CIF beneficiary households PSC scores.

H3: Access to capital (CIF) increases household income and asset base.

Female individual level outcome measured through the followings indicators:

Decision-Making Autonomy	Household decisions (health, purchases, schooling, CIF usage, and Children Marriages)
Financial Control	CIF fund control, income management, budgeting/savings skills
Confidence & Agency	Self-reported increase in confidence, ability to express opinions
Community Engagement	Membership in groups, participation in meetings, civic roles
Perceived Empowerment	Attitudes towards women's roles, recognition of barriers, increased influence

### Family 3: Cost effectiveness, Cost Benefit Analysis, and institutional sustainability

H6: CIF provide cost effective financial access to the poorest and poor households.

- Cost of access to CIF per beneficiary
- Comparison of costs of access to other typical micro-credit programmes
- Total profit to be earned on CIF amount and yearly operational expenses.
- Program sustainability

H7: CIF has a low cost-benefit ratio.

- Calculate cost benefit ratio for the main types of

indicators to be analysed and their construct is presented as following. The service provider can suggest improvement to the hypothesis and indicators of measurement.

- Increase in valuation of assets e.g. livestock and small enterprises as result of CIF investment.

- Increase in income annually from CIF investment.

H4: Women CIF beneficiaries investing more in income generating activities and livelihood assets.

- Proper utilisation rate: productive or consumption usage of CIF beneficiaries

- Productive usage types: Livestock, Agriculture and Enterprise

- Consumption reasons

Family 2: Women empowerment

H5: Access to CIF improves women's intra-household decision making.

CIF investments made by beneficiaries.

### Family 4: CIF Recovery and revolving Cycle

H8: CIF recovery mechanism

Asses a recovery mechanism using the following indicators:

- CIF cycles
- CIF recovery rate
- CIF overdue rate
- Verification of CIF Recovery through Bank Accounts & PPRP MIS

## Study on the Approach and Impact of Community Investment Fund (CIF)

(GOS funded PPRP of SRSO)

سنڌ حڪومت جي مالي سهڪار سان سروس جي منصوبي ”عوام جي غربت گهٽائڻ جو پروگرام“ تحت ڪميونٽي

انويستمينٽ فنڊ (CIF) / قرض جي اثر ۽ طريقڪار جو جائزو وٺڻ

## Survey Questionnaire

سروي جو سوالنامو

## Consent Statement

My name is [Enumerator's Name], and I work with Himat Consulting Pvt. Ltd. We are conducting a survey for the Sindh Rural Support Organisation (SRSO) to understand how the PPRP CIF loan has helped your household. Your responses will remain confidential and will be used solely to improve the programme. This survey will take about 45 to 60 minutes. You may skip any question or stop the interview at any time.

رضامندي جو بيان.

منهنجو نالو [سروي ڪندڙ جو نالو] آهي، ۽ مان Himat Consulting Pvt. Ltd. سان ڪم ڪري رهيو آهيان. اسان سنڌ رورل سپورٽ آرگنائيزيشن (SRSO) لاءِ هڪ سروي ڪري رهيا آهيون ته جيئن ڄاڻ حاصل ڪري سگهجي ته عوام جي غربت گهٽائڻ جو پروگرام PPRP جي CIF قرض توهان جي گهراڻي لاءِ ڪيئن مددگار ثابت ٿيو. توهان جا جواب راز ۾ رکيا ويندا ۽ صرف پروگرام کي بهتر بنائڻ لاءِ استعمال ٿيندا. اهو سروي لڳ ڀڳ 45 کان 60 منٽ وٺندو. توهان ڪنهن به سوال کي ڇڏڻ يا ڪنهن به وقت انٽرويو کي روڪڻ جو حق رکو ٿا.

Do you agree to participate in this survey?

 Yes  No (End the survey if 'No')

ڇا توهان هن سروي ۾ شرڪت ڪرڻ لاءِ راضي آهيو؟  
 ها  نه (جيڪڏهن "نه" ته سروي ختم ڪيو)

## Section A: Identification

سيڪشن A: سڃاڻپ

A1. District Name	ضلع جو نالو	
A2. Union Council Name	يونين ڪائونسل جو نالو	
A3. Village Name	ڳوٺ جو نالو	
A4. VO Name	وي او/ديھ جي تنظيم جو نالو	
A5. CO Name	سي او/ڳوٺاڻي تنظيم جو نالو	
A6. Respondent Name	جواب ڏيندڙ جو نالو	
A7. Contact Number	رابطي جو نمبر	
Age of the Respondent	جواب ڏيندڙ جي عمر	
Marital Status: (Single, Married, Widowed, Divorced)	ازدواجي حيثيت (ڪنوارو، شادي شده، بيواهه، طلاق شده)	
A8. Date	تاريخ	
A9. Enumerator Name	سروي ڪندڙ جو نالو	
A10. Enumerator Contact	سروي ڪندڙ جي رابطي جو نمبر	
A11. GPS Location	جي پي ايس تحت پتو	

## Section B: Targeting and Loan Access

سيڪشن B: هدف ۽ قرض تائين رسائي

B1. What was your household's Poverty Scorecard (PSC) score when CIF was approved?

B1. جڏهن توهان جو قرض منظور ٿيو، تڏهن توهان جي گهراڻي جي غربت جو انگ (PSC) انگ ڪيترو هو؟

What is your Designation in CO:

ڳوٺاڻي تنظيم/سي او ۾ اوهان جو عهدو ڪهڙو آهي؟

Member Manager President

صدر مئنيجر ميمبر

B2. Who facilitated your CIF selection? (Select all that apply)

CO  VO  LSO  SRSO staff  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

B2: توهان کي قرض ڏيڻ ۾ ڪير سهڪار ڪندڙ آهي؟ (جيڪا به لاڳو هجي چونڊيو):

ڳوٺاڻي تنظيم/سي او  دهلي تنظيم/وي او  مقامي تنظيم/ايل ايس او  سرسو  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

B3. Were you asked to prepare a Micro Investment Plan (MIP)?

Yes  No

B3: ڇا توهان کي قرض جو منصوبو (MIP) ٺاهڻ لاءِ چيو ويو؟

ها  نه

B4. If yes, who helped you with the plan?

Self  Self with family  CO/VO member  LSO staff  SRSO staff  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

B4: جيڪڏهن ها، ته منصوبي ٺاهڻ ۾ ڪنهن مدد ڪئي؟

خود  خود + گهراڻو  ڳوٺاڻي تنظيم (سي او)/دهلي تنظيم (وي او) جو ميمبر  مقامي تنظيم (ايل ايس او) جو اسٽاف

سرسو جو اسٽاف  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

B5. How many times have you received CIF?

One  Two  Three  Four  Five.

B5: توهان ڪيترا ڀيرا قرض حاصل ڪيو آهي؟

هڪ دفعو  ٻه دفعا  ٽي دفعا  چار دفعا  پنج دفعا

Was CIF utilized according to the MIP?

Yes  No

ڇا قرض منصوبي مطابق استعمال ڪيو هو؟

ها  نه

If No, what was the reason that CIF not utilized according to the MIP?

جيڪڏهن نه، منصوبي مطابق قرض استعمال نه ڪرڻ جو ڪهڙو سبب هو؟

B6. CIF Loan Cycle Details (Repeat this table for each CIF cycle):

B6: مليل قرض جو تفصيل (قرض ڪيترا دفعا مليل آهي)

	1 <sup>st</sup> CIF loan	2 <sup>nd</sup> CIF Loan	3 <sup>rd</sup> CIF Loan	4 <sup>th</sup> CIF Loan	5 <sup>th</sup> CIF Loan
Year Received ڪهڙي سال قرض مليو					
Loan Amount received (PKR) مليل قرض جي رقم					
Specify the amount of any service charges					

	1 <sup>st</sup> CIF loan	2 <sup>nd</sup> CIF Loan	3 <sup>rd</sup> CIF Loan	4 <sup>th</sup> CIF Loan	5 <sup>th</sup> CIF Loan
paid for receiving the CIF. قرض حاصل ڪرڻ لاءِ ڪا به رقم ادا ڪئي هجي ته ان جا تفصيل لکو					
How much money did you return in total? اوهان قرض جي ادائگي ۾ ڪٿي ڪيتري رقم ادا ڪئي؟					
Main Purpose of Loan قرض وٺڻ جو اهم مقصد	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Farming <input type="checkbox"/> Enterprise <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> يا ڪو ٻيو: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Farming <input type="checkbox"/> Enterprise <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> يا ڪو ٻيو: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Farming <input type="checkbox"/> Enterprise <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> يا ڪو ٻيو: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Farming <input type="checkbox"/> Enterprise <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> يا ڪو ٻيو: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Farming <input type="checkbox"/> Enterprise <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> يا ڪو ٻيو: _____
If Invested (tick the main activity) جيڪڏهن سيڙپڪاري ڪئي آهي (مڪيه سرگرمي تي نشان لڳايو)	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____
Was this investment in an activity you had prior experience in? ڇا اوهان ان ڪم ۾ پئسا سيڙپ ڪيا جنهن ۾ اوهان کي پهريان تجربو هو؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه
Do you feel it was a good investment decision?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه

	1 <sup>st</sup> CIF loan	2 <sup>nd</sup> CIF Loan	3 <sup>rd</sup> CIF Loan	4 <sup>th</sup> CIF Loan	5 <sup>th</sup> CIF Loan
اوهان ڇا ٿو لڳي ته سيٽپاري وارو فيصلو سٺو هو؟					
If no, why not? جڪيڏهن نه ته، ڇو؟					

If you could access CIF again, how would you use it?

Same activity  New activity (specify): \_\_\_\_\_

جڏهن اوهان کي وري قرض/سي آءِ ايف ملي ته اوهان ان جو ڪيئن استعمال ڪندا؟  
 ساڳيءَ ڪم ۾  ڪنهن نئين ڪم ۾ (تفصيل لکو)

### Section C: Income from CIF Activity

سيڪشن سي: قرض مان ايندڙ آمدني

C1. Please fill the following details for each CIF cycle:

C1: مختلف وقتن تي ملندڙ قرض جا تفصيل لکو:

	1 <sup>st</sup> CIF loan	2 <sup>nd</sup> CIF Loan	3 <sup>rd</sup> CIF Loan	4 <sup>th</sup> CIF Loan	5 <sup>th</sup> CIF Loan
Main Activity Invested In? اهم ڪم جنهن ۾ قرض جا پئسا سيٽپ ڪيا	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> Small business <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ننڍڙو ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> Small business <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ننڍڙو ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> Small business <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ننڍڙو ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> Small business <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ننڍڙو ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> Small business <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> چوپايو مال <input type="checkbox"/> زراعت <input type="checkbox"/> ننڍڙو ڪاروبار <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____
Did It Generate Income? ڇا ان مان آمدني پيدا ٿي؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه
If yes, income frequency? جيڪڏهن ها، ته آمدني ڪڏهن ملندي آهي؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Daily <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Seasonal <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> روزانه <input type="checkbox"/> هفتي وار <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> مُندائتي <input type="checkbox"/> سالانه	<input type="checkbox"/> Daily <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Seasonal <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> روزانه <input type="checkbox"/> هفتي وار <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> مُندائتي <input type="checkbox"/> سالانه	<input type="checkbox"/> Daily <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Seasonal <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> روزانه <input type="checkbox"/> هفتي وار <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> مُندائتي <input type="checkbox"/> سالانه	<input type="checkbox"/> Daily <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Seasonal <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> روزانه <input type="checkbox"/> هفتي وار <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> مُندائتي <input type="checkbox"/> سالانه	<input type="checkbox"/> Daily <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Seasonal <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> روزانه <input type="checkbox"/> هفتي وار <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> مُندائتي <input type="checkbox"/> سالانه
Yearly Profit Earned Directly from This Investment (PKR)					

انهيءَ سيڙپڪاري مان ساليانو ڪيترو منافعو ڪمرايو					
Did you reinvest income into your activity? ڇا اوهان پنهنجي آمدني کي دوباره انهيءَ ڪاروبار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه
If yes, invested in which activities (tick the main activity) جيڪڏهن ها ته ڪهڙي ۾ ڪم ۾ سيڙپ ڪيا (اهم ڪم تي نشان لڳايو)	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Invested in Livelihood <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> روزگار ۾ سيڙپ ڪئي <input type="checkbox"/> هنگامي صورتحال <input type="checkbox"/> تعليم <input type="checkbox"/> صحت <input type="checkbox"/> شادي <input type="checkbox"/> ٻيو _____
Did the CIF investment contribute to any cost savings (e.g., through milk or meat consumption, etc.)? ڇا قرض جي سيڙپڪاري ڪنهن به خرچ جي بچت ۾ مدد ڪئي (جهڙوڪ کير يا گوشت واپرائڻ وغيره)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه
If yes, specify the total amount saved annually. جيڪڏهن ها ته سالياني ڪيتري رقم بچائي					

Income Use & Reflections

آمدني جو استعمال

C2. How did you spend the income from CIF? (Select all that apply)

- Loan repayment  Reinvested (same activity)  Reinvested (other activity)  
 Household consumption  Education  Health  Savings  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

قرض مان حاصل ڪيل آمدني کي اوهان ڪيئن خرچ ڪيو؟ (سڀني تي نشان لڳايو جيڪو لاڳو ٿين ٿا)  
 قرض جي واپسي  ٻيهر سيڙپڪاري (ساڳي ڪم ۾)  ٻيهر سيڙپڪاري (ٻئي ڪم ۾)  
 گهر جي کاڌي پيئي جي خرچ ۾  تعليم  صحت  بچت  ٻيو: \_\_\_\_\_

C3. How would you rate your current financial condition after the CIF?

- Much improved  Slightly improved  Same  Worse?

قرض کانپوءِ توهان پنهنجي موجوده مالي حالت جي ڪيئن درجه بندي ڪيو ٿا؟  
 گهڻي بهتر  ٿوري بهتر  ساڳي  خراب

Section D: Financial Spillover

سيڪشن D: مالي اثر جو ڦهلاءُ

D1. After receiving CIF, did you approach any other financial services?

Yes  No

قرض حاصل ڪرڻ کان پوءِ، ڇا توهان ڪنهن ٻئي مالي خدمتون ڏيندڙ ادارن تائين رسائي حاصل ڪئي؟  
 ها  نه

D2. If yes, from where?

جيڪڏهن ها، ته ڪٿان؟

Source ذريعو	Accessed رسائي حاصل ڪئي	Amount of loan taken in PKR ڪيترو قرض ڪنيو	Total Amount Repaid taken in PKR ڪل ڪيتري رقم ادا ڪئي آهي	Total amount To Be Repaid ڪل ڪيتري رقم ادا ڪرڻي آهي
Microfinance Institution ننڍي سطح جا قرض ڏيندڙ ادارا	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه			
Commercial Bank تجارتي بئنڪ	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه			
Money Lender پئسا اودارا ڏيندڙ	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه			
Friends/Family دوست/خاندان	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه			
Other: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه			
ڪو ٻيو: _____				

D3. Did CIF experience build your confidence to handle loans?

Yes  No  Not sure?

ڇا اوهان کي سروس جي منصوبي تحت ملندڙ قرض جي تجربي ٻين قرضن کي سنڀالڻ ۾ اعتماد وڌايو؟  
 ها  نه  ڀڪ ناهي

D4. How confident are you in managing finances now?

Very  Not at all.

هاڻي اوهان مالي انتظام ڪاري ۾ ڪيترو پراعتماد آهيو؟  
 تمام  ڪجهه ڪجهه  بلڪل به نه

D5. Have you advised or supported other women in accessing CIF?

Yes  No

ڇا توهان ٻين عورتن کي قرض حاصل ڪرڻ ۾ مدد يا صلاح ڏني آهي؟

ها  نه

If yes, how? \_\_\_\_\_

جيڪڏهن ها، ته ڪيئن: \_\_\_\_\_

Section E: Household Asset Base

سيڪشن E: گهراڻي جي اثاثن جو تفصيل

E1. What assets did you own before CIF?

E1. قرض/سي آءِ ايف کان اڳ توهان وٽ ڪهڙا اثاٽ هئا؟

Asset Type اثاٽي جو قسم	Owned مراڪ	Partially owned (sharing) جزوي طور مراڪي آهي (پائيواري)	Quantity (Enter half of the total asset in case of shared ownership) تعداد (پائيواري جي مراڪي جي صورت ۾ اٺائي جو اڌ لکو)	Estimated Value (PKR) (Enter half the amount in case of shared ownership) اندازن قيمت (پائيواري جي مراڪي جي صورت ۾ اڌ رقم لکو)
Goats/Sheep بڪريون/ريڍ	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Cows/Buffalo مريهن/گئون	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Land (acres) زمين (ايڪڙن ۾)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه			
Shop دڪان	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه			
Shelter/House گهر	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه			

E2. What did you buy or improve with CIF?

توهان قرض/سي آءِ ايف مان ڇا بهتر ڪيو يا ڇا خريد ڪيو؟

Asset Type اثاٽي جو قسم	Invested CIF? قرض جي سيڙپ ڪئي	Additional Quantity اضافي تعداد	Amount Invested (PKR) ڪيتري رقم سيڙپ ڪئي
Goats/Sheep بڪريون/ريڍ	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Cows/Buffalo گئون/مريهن	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Land (acres) زمين (ايڪڙن ۾)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
If yes, please specify. جيڪڏهن ها ته تفصيل لکو			
Shop دڪان	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
If yes, please specify. جيڪڏهن ها ته تفصيل لکو			
Shelter/House گهر/رهائش	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
If yes, please specify. جيڪڏهن ها ته تفصيل لکو			
Household appliances گهر جو سامان	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
If yes, please specify.			

جيڪڏهن ها ته تفصيل لکو			
Other: _____ بيو: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		

E3. Has the total value of your household's productive assets increased?

Yes  No

ڇا توهان جي گهراڻي جي پيداوار ڪندڙ اثاثن جي مجموعي قيمت وڌي آهي؟

ها  نه

E4. If yes, what assets do you own now?

جيڪڏهن ها، ته هاڻي توهان وٽ ڪهڙا اثاٽ آهن؟

Asset Type اثاٽي جو قسم	Owned مالڪ	Quantity تعداد	Estimated Value (PKR) اندازن قيمت
Goats بڪريون	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Cows/Buffalo گئون/مرينه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Land (acres) زمين (ايڪڙن ۾)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Shop دڪان	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Shelter/House گهر/رهائش	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		
Other: _____ بيو: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes / <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه		

E5. Education Status Before and After Accessing CIF

قرض/سي آءِ ايف حاصل ڪرڻ کان اڳ ۽ بعد ۾ تعليم جي صورتحال

	Before CIF قرض/سي آءِ ايف کان اڳ	Now هاڻي
Number of school-going children (5-16 years) اسڪول ويندڙ ٻارن جو تعداد (5 کان 16 سال تائين جا ٻار)		
Number of out-of-school children اسڪول نه ويندڙ ٻارن جو تعداد		

Section F: Decision-Making Authority & Financial Autonomy

سيڪشن F: فيصلو ڪرڻ جو اختيار ۽ مالي خودمختياري

F1. Who typically makes decisions in your household regarding the following areas?

توهان جي گهراڻي ۾ هيٺين ذڪر ڪيل معاملن تي عام طور تي ڪير فيصلو ڪري ٿو؟

Decision Area ڪهڙن ڪمن يا سرگرمين تي فيصلو سازي ٿئي ٿي؟	Main Decision by? فيصلو ڪندڙ ڪير هوندو آهي؟	Your role in decision توهان جو فيصلي ۾ ڪردار

<p>Visiting family or friends خاندان يا دوستن سان ملاقات</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Woman Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Men Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Joint Decision <input type="checkbox"/> عورت اڪيلي <input type="checkbox"/> مرد اڪيلو <input type="checkbox"/> گڏيل فيصلو</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> I propose ideas or suggestions. <input type="checkbox"/> I have the final say. <input type="checkbox"/> I am consulted but do not make the final decision. <input type="checkbox"/> I am informed after decisions are made. <input type="checkbox"/> مان خيال يا تجويزون پيش ڪريان ٿو <input type="checkbox"/> مون وٽ آخري فيصلو آهي <input type="checkbox"/> مون سان مشورا ڪيا ويندا آهن پر آخري فيصلو نه آهي <input type="checkbox"/> فيصلو ٿيڻ کان پوءِ مون کي اطلاع ڏنو ويندو آهي.</p>
<p>Your own medical treatment پنهنجي ذاتي علاج جي لاءِ</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Woman Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Men Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Joint Decision <input type="checkbox"/> عورت اڪيلي <input type="checkbox"/> مرد اڪيلو <input type="checkbox"/> گڏيل فيصلو</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> I propose ideas or suggestions. <input type="checkbox"/> I have the final say. <input type="checkbox"/> I am consulted but do not make the final decision. <input type="checkbox"/> I am informed after decisions are made. <input type="checkbox"/> مان خيال يا تجويزون پيش ڪريان ٿو <input type="checkbox"/> مون وٽ آخري فيصلو آهي <input type="checkbox"/> مون سان مشورا ڪيا ويندا آهن پر آخري فيصلو نه آهي <input type="checkbox"/> فيصلو ٿيڻ کان پوءِ مون کي اطلاع ڏنو ويندو آهي.</p>
<p>Children's education and schooling ٻارن جي تعليم ۽ اسڪول</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Woman Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Men Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Joint Decision <input type="checkbox"/> عورت اڪيلي <input type="checkbox"/> مرد اڪيلو <input type="checkbox"/> گڏيل فيصلو</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> I propose ideas or suggestions. <input type="checkbox"/> I have the final say. <input type="checkbox"/> I am consulted but do not make the final decision. <input type="checkbox"/> I am informed after decisions are made. <input type="checkbox"/> مان خيال يا تجويزون پيش ڪريان ٿو <input type="checkbox"/> مون وٽ آخري فيصلو آهي <input type="checkbox"/> مون سان مشورا ڪيا ويندا آهن پر آخري فيصلو نه آهي <input type="checkbox"/> فيصلو ٿيڻ کان پوءِ مون کي اطلاع ڏنو ويندو آهي.</p>
<p>Marriages of children ٻارن جي شادي</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Woman Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Men Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Joint Decision <input type="checkbox"/> عورت اڪيلي <input type="checkbox"/> مرد اڪيلو <input type="checkbox"/> گڏيل فيصلو</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> I propose ideas or suggestions. <input type="checkbox"/> I have the final say. <input type="checkbox"/> I am consulted but do not make the final decision. <input type="checkbox"/> I am informed after decisions are made. <input type="checkbox"/> مان خيال يا تجويزون پيش ڪريان ٿو <input type="checkbox"/> مون وٽ آخري فيصلو آهي <input type="checkbox"/> مون سان مشورا ڪيا ويندا آهن پر آخري فيصلو نه آهي <input type="checkbox"/> فيصلو ٿيڻ کان پوءِ مون کي اطلاع ڏنو ويندو آهي.</p>
<p>Major household purchases گهر جي اهم سامان وغيره جي خريداري</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Woman Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Men Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Joint Decision <input type="checkbox"/> عورت اڪيلي <input type="checkbox"/> مرد اڪيلو <input type="checkbox"/> گڏيل فيصلو</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> I propose ideas or suggestions. <input type="checkbox"/> I have the final say. <input type="checkbox"/> I am consulted but do not make the final decision. <input type="checkbox"/> I am informed after decisions are made. <input type="checkbox"/> مان خيال يا تجويزون پيش ڪريان ٿو <input type="checkbox"/> مون وٽ آخري فيصلو آهي <input type="checkbox"/> مون سان مشورا ڪيا ويندا آهن پر آخري فيصلو نه آهي <input type="checkbox"/> فيصلو ٿيڻ کان پوءِ مون کي اطلاع ڏنو ويندو آهي.</p>
<p>Use of CIF loan funds قرض/بيني آءِ ايف جو استعمال</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Woman Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Men Alone <input type="checkbox"/> Joint Decision <input type="checkbox"/> عورت اڪيلي <input type="checkbox"/> مرد اڪيلو <input type="checkbox"/> گڏيل فيصلو</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> I propose ideas or suggestions. <input type="checkbox"/> I have the final say. <input type="checkbox"/> I am consulted but do not make the final decision. <input type="checkbox"/> I am informed after decisions are made. <input type="checkbox"/> مان خيال يا تجويزون پيش ڪريان ٿو <input type="checkbox"/> مون وٽ آخري فيصلو آهي <input type="checkbox"/> مون سان مشورا ڪيا ويندا آهن پر آخري فيصلو نه آهي <input type="checkbox"/> فيصلو ٿيڻ کان پوءِ مون کي اطلاع ڏنو ويندو آهي.</p>

F2. Since receiving the CIF loan, has your involvement in household decision-making:

Increased  Remained the same  Decreased.

قرض/ببي آء ايف حاصل ڪرڻ کان پوءِ، ڇا توهان جو گهراڻي ۾ فيصلو ڪرڻ ۾ شموليت وڌي آهي؟  
 وڌيو  ساڳيو رهيو  گهٽيو

F3. In which areas have your involvement changed? (Select all that apply)

Financial decisions  Children's education  Children marriages  Healthcare  Social activities  Other:

\_\_\_\_\_

ڪهڙي معاملن تي توهان جي شموليت ۾ تبديلي آئي آهي؟ (انهن سڀني تي نشان لڳايو جيڪي لاڳو ٿين ٿا)

مالي فيصلن  ٻارڙن جي تعليم  ٻارن جي شادي  صحت جي سار سنڀال  سماجي سرگرميون  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

F4. Do you feel more confident expressing your opinions in household decisions?

Yes  No

ڇا توهان گهراڻي جي فيصلي ۾ پنهنجي راءِ جي اظهار ۾ وڌيڪ اعتماد محسوس ڪيو آهي؟  
 ها  نه

F5. What contributed to this change?

Financial contribution  Support from family  Training  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

اها تبديلي ڪهڙي ڳالهه جي ڪري آئي؟

مالي مدد  خاندان کان مدد  تربيت  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

Financial Autonomy and Control

مالي خودمختياري ۽ ڪنٽرول

F6. Who decided how to allocate the CIF loan amount?

Woman herself  Husband  Joint  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

قرض/ببي آء ايف جي رقم کي ڪيئن ۽ ڪهڙي مقصد لاءِ خرچ ڪجي ان جو ڪنهن فيصلو ڪيو؟  
 عورت خود  مرد  گڏيل  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

F7. What was the primary reason?

Expertise in area  Trust by family  Cultural norms  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

بنيادي سبب ڇا هو؟

ماهر هجڻ  خاندان جو اعتماد  روايتي ۽ ثقافتي اصول  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

F8. Do you control the income received from CIF utilization ?

Yes  No  Partially?

ڇا اوهان جو قرض/ببي آء ايف مان حاصل ٿيندڙ آمدني تي ضابطو آهي؟  
 ها  نه  جزوي طور

If yes, rate your control on income received from CIF utilization.

Fully  Partially

جيڪڏهن ها، ته قرض/ببي آء ايف مان حاصل ٿيندڙ آمدني تي اوهان جي ضابطي جي ليول/درجو ٻڌايو؟  
 مڪمل طور  جزوي طور

F9. How is this income managed?

I manage independently  Joint decision  Family manages  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

هي آمدني ڪيئن منظم ڪئي وئي آهي؟

مان آزادانه طور تي منظم ڪريان ٿو  گڏيل فيصلو  خاندان منظم ڪري ٿو  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

F10. How do you use the income? (Select all that apply)

Reinvest  Household Consumption  Education  Health  Savings  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

توهان آمدني کيئن استعمال ڪندا آهيو؟ (سڀني تي نشان لڳايو جيڪي لاڳو ٿين ٿا)

ٻيهر سيڙپڪاري  گهر جو خرچ  تعليم  صحت  بچت  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

F11. Which of these do you prioritize?

Reinvest  Household Consumption  Education  Health  Savings  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

انهن مان اوهان ڪنهن کي ترجيح ڏيو ٿا؟

ٻيهر سيڙپڪاري  گهر جو خرچ  تعليم  صحت  بچت  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

F12. Has managing the CIF loan improved your financial confidence?

Yes  No

ڇا قرض/بيني آءِ ايف کي منظم ڪرڻ سان توهان جي مالي اعتماد ۾ بهتري آئي آهي؟

ها  نه

F13. If yes, in which areas? (Select all that apply)

Budgeting  Negotiating  Saving/investing  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

جيڪڏهن ها، ته ڪهڙن معاملن ۾؟ (سڀني تي نشان لڳايو جيڪي لاڳو ٿين ٿا)

بچيندڙ ڪرڻ  لين دين ڪرڻ  بچت/سيڙپڪاري  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

F14. Who is responsible for paying the CIF loan back?

I am alone responsible  Only male members are responsible  Whole Family is responsible

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

قرض جي ادائگي لاءِ ذميوار ڪير آهي؟

آئون اڪيلو ذميوار آهيان  صرف مرد ميمبر ذميوار آهن  سڄو خاندان ذميوار آهي  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

## Section G: Community Participation and Civic Engagement

سيڪشن G: ڪميونٽي جي شرڪت ۽ شهري سرگرمين ۾ حصو وٺڻ

G1. Are you currently a member of any community organizations?

Yes  No

ڇا توهان هن وقت ڪنهن ڳوٺاڻي/ڪميونٽي تنظيم جا ميمبر آهيو؟

ها  نه

G2. If yes, what motivated you to join? (Select all that apply)

Networking  Access to resources  Contribute to community  Encouragement  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

جيڪڏهن ها، ته توهان کي شامل ٿيڻ لاءِ ڪهڙي ڳالهه اتساهيو/موتائر ڪيو؟ (سڀني تي نشان لڳايو جيڪي لاڳو ٿين ٿا)

نيٽورڪنگ/رابطه وڌائڻ  وسيلن تائين رسائي  پنهنجي برادري جي مدد ڪرڻ  حوصله افزائي  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

G3. Since receiving the CIF loan, has your participation in community activities:

Increased  Remained the same  Decreased.

قرض/بيني آءِ ايف حاصل ڪرڻ کانپوءِ، ڇا توهان جي ڳوٺ جي سرگرمين ۾ شرڪت رهي آهي:

وڌي وئي  ساڳي رهي  گهٽجي وئي

G4. What types of activities have you engaged in? (Select all that apply)

Attending meetings  Volunteering  Leadership roles  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

توهان ڪهڙين سرگرمين ۾ حصو ورتو آهي؟ (سڀني تي نشان لڳايو جيڪي لاڳو ٿين ٿا)

گڏجاڻي ۾ شرڪت  رضاڪارائي ڪم  اڳواڻي جو ڪردار ادا ڪرڻ  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

G5. Do you feel more confident voicing opinions in community forums?

Yes  No

ڇا اوهان پاڻ کي تنظيم يا ان جي گڏجاڻين ۾ پنهنجا خيال يا راءِ ڏيڻ وقت وڌيڪ پراعتماد محسوس ڪندا آهيو؟

ها  نه

G6. If yes, what has contributed to this confidence?

Success of CIF  Community support  Training  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

جيڪڏهن ها، ته ڪهڙي سبب جي ڪري اعتماد وڌيو؟

قرض/سي آءِ ايف جي ڪاميابي  ڪميونٽي جو تعاون  تربيت  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

G7. Do you believe women should engage in the following? (Select all that apply)

Discuss community issues  participate in vote  Hold leadership  Manage finances  Household level

decisions  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

ڇا اوهان سمجهو ٿا ته عورتن کي هيٺين سرگرمين ۾ حصو وٺڻ گهرجي؟ (سڀني تي نشان لڳايو جيڪي لاڳو ٿين ٿا)

برادري جي مسئلن تي ڳالهائڻ  ووٽ ڪرڻ  اڳواڻي ڪرڻ  مالي انتظامڪاري  گهراڻي سطح تي فيصلو سازي ۾ حصو وٺڻ  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

G8. What are the key barriers for women in your community? (Select all that apply)

Cultural norms  Lack of education  Family duties  Limited accessibility to services  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

توهان جي ڪميونٽي ۾ عورتن لاءِ اهم رڪاوٽون ڪهڙيون آهن؟ (سڀني تي نشان لڳايو جيڪي لاڳو ٿين ٿا)

روايتي ۽ ثقافتي ريتون رسمون  تعليم جي کوٽ  خاندان جون ذميواريون  خدمت نائين محدود رسائي  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

#### Section H: Cost-Effective Access to Finance via Women-Led Institutions

سيڪشن H: عورتن جي اڳواڻي وارن ادارن ذريعي گهٽ خرچ وارن مالي سهولتن تائين رسائي

H1. How many days it takes from applying to receiving CIF: \_\_\_\_\_

قرض/سي آءِ ايف جي درخواست ڏيڻ کان وٺي قرض وصول ڪرڻ ۾ ڪيترا ڏينهن لڳندا آهن؟

H2. Number of visits made to CO/VO/SRSO office:  1  2  3 or more.

ڳوٺاڻي تنظيم (سي او)/ديهي تنظيم (وي او)/مقامي تنظيم (ايل ايس او)/سرسو آفيس ۾ ڪيتريون ڀيرا وڃڻ ٿيون؟  1  2  3 يا وڌيڪ

H3. How much personal expenses are incurred while accessing CIF (for example transportation, documentation) ? Amount in PKR \_\_\_\_\_.

قرض/سي آءِ ايف حاصل ڪرڻ دوران ذاتي ڪيترو خرچ ڪيو؟ (مثال طور اچڻ وڃڻ جو پاڙو/ڪرايو، ڪاغذن جي فوٽو ڪاپي يا جمع ڪرائڻ)؟ رقم ڀرين ۾ \_\_\_\_\_

#### Comparison with Other Financial Services

ٻين مالي خدمتون ڏيندڙ ادارن سان پيٽ

H4. Have you ever taken loans from other sources?

Yes  No

ڇا توهان ڪڏهن ٻئي اداري يا ذريعن کان قرض ورتو آهي؟

ها  نه

H5. If yes, what was the purpose of the loan? Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

جيڪڏهن ها ته ان قرض کڻڻ ڪهڙو مقصد هو؟ مهرباني ڪري تفصيل لکو: \_\_\_\_\_

H4. Comparison of CIF with other sources:

قرض/سي آءِ ايف جو ٻين مالي ادارن/ذريعن سان پيٽ

Feature خاصيت	CIF قرض/سي آءِ ايف	Local Moneylender مقامي سطح تي پنسا اوڌارا ڏيندڙ	Micro Finance ننڍي سطح جا قرض ڏيندڙ ادارا	Commercial Bank تجارتِي بئنڪ
1.What was the total interest amount paid on loan? (in PKR) قرض تي ڪُل ڪيترو وياج ادا ڪيو؟ (رپين ۾ لکو)				
2.How much processing fee did you pay for this loan? (in PKR) قرض وصول ڪرڻ تائين اوهان ڪيتري في يا اضافي خرچ ڪيا؟ (رپين ۾ لکو)				
3.What was the total amount of loan you were allowed to take? (in PKR) اوهان کي قرض جي ڪيتري رقم وٺڻ جي اجازت/منظوري ڏني وئي؟ (رپين ۾ لکو)				
4.How far (in kilometres) is the nearest branch/office of this loan provider? قرض ڏيندڙ جي ويجھي ترين برانچ/آفيس اوهان جي گھر کان ڪيترا ڪلو ميٽر پري آهي؟				
5.How many visits did you make to apply for the loan? قرض جي درخواست ڏيڻ لاءِ اوهان ڪيترا دفعا انهن جي برانچ/آفيس ويا؟				
6.How would you rate the complexity of the application process? اوهان درخواست ڏيڻ جي عمل کي ڪيترو ڏکيو يا آسان سمجهو ٿا؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Simple <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Complicated <input type="checkbox"/> Very Complicated <input type="checkbox"/> تمام آسان <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه ڏکيو هو <input type="checkbox"/> تمام گهڻو ڏکيو هو	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Simple <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Complicated <input type="checkbox"/> Very Complicated <input type="checkbox"/> تمام آسان <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه ڏکيو هو <input type="checkbox"/> تمام گهڻو ڏکيو هو	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Simple <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Complicated <input type="checkbox"/> Very Complicated <input type="checkbox"/> تمام آسان <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه ڏکيو هو <input type="checkbox"/> تمام گهڻو ڏکيو هو	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Simple <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Complicated <input type="checkbox"/> Very Complicated <input type="checkbox"/> تمام آسان <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه ڏکيو هو <input type="checkbox"/> تمام گهڻو ڏکيو هو
7.Did anyone help you complete the application process? ڇا درخواست جو عمل مڪمل ڪرڻ ۾ ڪنهن اوهان جي مدد ڪئي؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Family member <input type="checkbox"/> Community member <input type="checkbox"/> Staff member <input type="checkbox"/> گھر جو فرد <input type="checkbox"/> برادري/گھونڊ جو فرد <input type="checkbox"/> اسٽاف جو	<input type="checkbox"/> Family member <input type="checkbox"/> Community member <input type="checkbox"/> Staff member <input type="checkbox"/> گھر جو فرد <input type="checkbox"/> برادري/گھونڊ جو فرد <input type="checkbox"/> اسٽاف جو ميمبر	<input type="checkbox"/> Family member <input type="checkbox"/> Community member <input type="checkbox"/> Staff member <input type="checkbox"/> گھر جو فرد <input type="checkbox"/> برادري/گھونڊ جو فرد <input type="checkbox"/> اسٽاف جو ميمبر	<input type="checkbox"/> Family member <input type="checkbox"/> Community member <input type="checkbox"/> Staff member <input type="checkbox"/> گھر جو فرد <input type="checkbox"/> برادري/گھونڊ جو فرد <input type="checkbox"/> اسٽاف جو ميمبر

8.What documents were required to apply for the loan? قرض جي درخواست ڏيڻ لاءِ ڪهڙا ڪاغذ گهربل هئا؟				
9.How many days did it take from submitting the application to receiving the loan amount? درخواست جمع ڪرائڻ کان وٺي قرض جي رقم وصول ڪرڻ تائين ڪيترا ڏينهن لڳا؟				
10.Was the repayment schedule flexible or rigid? قرض واپس ڪرڻ جو طريقو ڪار/شيديو آسان هو يا ڏکيو؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Flexible <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> آسان <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> ساليانو	<input type="checkbox"/> Flexible <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> آسان <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> ساليانو	<input type="checkbox"/> Flexible <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> آسان <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> ساليانو	<input type="checkbox"/> Flexible <input type="checkbox"/> Monthly <input type="checkbox"/> Yearly <input type="checkbox"/> آسان <input type="checkbox"/> ماهوار <input type="checkbox"/> ساليانو
11.Was any collateral or security required for the loan? ڇا قرض لاءِ ڪنهن قسم جي ضمانت يا سڪيورٽي جي گهرج هئي؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه
12.If yes, please specify the type of collateral provided (e.g., land, livestock, jewellery, bank statement, cash): جيڪڏهن ها ته مهريائي ڪري ڪهڙي قسم جي ضمانت ڏني وئي هئي؟ (زمين، چوپايو مال، زيور، بينڪ جي اسٽيٽمينٽ، ڪيش)				
13.Was the loan suitable for the purpose you needed it for? ڇا قرض اوهان جي ضرورت جي مقصد لاءِ مناسب هو؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> Not Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> تمام مناسب <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه مناسب <input type="checkbox"/> مناسب نه هو	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> Not Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> تمام مناسب <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه مناسب <input type="checkbox"/> مناسب نه هو	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> Not Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> تمام مناسب <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه مناسب <input type="checkbox"/> مناسب نه هو	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> Not Suitable <input type="checkbox"/> تمام مناسب <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه مناسب <input type="checkbox"/> مناسب نه هو
14.Overall, how satisfied were you with this loan processing? مجموعي طور تي، اوهان هن قرض جي درخواست ڏيڻ کان ويندي قرض جي رقم حاصل ڪرڻ تائين ڪيترو مطمئن هئا؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> Not Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> تمام گهڻو مطمئن <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه مطمئن <input type="checkbox"/> مطمئن ناهيان	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> Not Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> تمام گهڻو مطمئن <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه مطمئن <input type="checkbox"/> مطمئن ناهيان	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> Not Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> تمام گهڻو مطمئن <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه مطمئن <input type="checkbox"/> مطمئن ناهيان	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> Not Satisfied <input type="checkbox"/> تمام گهڻو مطمئن <input type="checkbox"/> ڪجهه مطمئن <input type="checkbox"/> مطمئن ناهيان

Institutional Efficiency and Transparency

ادارتي ڪارڪردگي ۽ شفافيت

H5. Who explained CIF terms?

VO/LSO leader  Field staff  Peer  Nobody?

قرض/سي آءِ ايف جي شرطن جي وضاحت ڪنهن ڪئي؟

ڊيھي تنظيم (وي او)/مرقامي تنظيم (ايل ايس او) جي اڳواڻ  سروسو جي اسٽاف  ساٿي  ڪو به نه

H6. Was the CIF selection process:

Fair  Sometimes unfair  Not transparent?

قرض/سي آء ايف جي چونڊ جو عمل ڪيئن هو؟  
منصفانه  ڪڏهن ڪڏهن غير منصفانه  غير شفاف

H7. Are you aware of how repayments are tracked?

Yes  Somewhat  No

توهان کي ڄاڻ آهي ته قسطون ڪيئن چيڪ/ٽريڪ ڪيون وڃن ٿيون؟  
ها  ڪجهه  نه

Perception of CIF as a Community-Owned Resource

قرض/سي آء ايف کي ڪميونٽي/برادري جي ملڪيت طور ڏسڻ بابت اوهان جا خيال

H8. Do you feel CIF is community-owned?

Yes – fully  Somewhat  No

ڇا اوهان محسوس ڪريو ٿا ته قرض/سي آء ايف ڪميونٽي/برادري جي ملڪيت آهي؟  
ها مڪمل طور  ڪجهه  نه

H9. Is your trust in SRSO increased?

Much  Somewhat  No change  Less trust?

ڇا اوهان جو سروس اداري تي پروسو/اعتماد وڌيو آهي؟  
تمام گهڻو  ڪجهه  ڪابه تبديلي ناهي  نه

H10. What works well? (Select all)

Fast disbursement  Recordkeeping  Fair selection  Support  Low cost  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

ڪهڙيون شيون سٺي نموني ڪم ڪنديون آهن؟ (سڀني تي ٽڪ لڳايو جيڪي به لاڳو ٿين ٿا)  
 تڪڙي رقم جاري ٿيڻ  رڪارڊ رکڻ  منصفانه چونڊ  سهائتا  گهٽ لاڳت  ٻي \_\_\_\_\_

H11. What can be improved? (Top 3)

More training  Better recovery  Tracking tools  Transparent selection  Mobile banking  Link to formal finance  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

ڇا بهتر ڪري سگهجي ٿو؟  
 وڌيڪ تربيون  بهتر قرض جي ادائينگي  چيڪ/ٽريڪ ڪرڻ جو طريقو  شفاف چونڊ  موبائيل تي بئنڪ/اداري جي ايپليڪشن  
 ٻين قرض ڏيندڙ ادارن سان رابطو  ٻي \_\_\_\_\_

Institutional Sustainability of CIF

قرض/سي آء ايف جي ادارتي پائداري

I1. Is the CIF fund still revolving?

Yes  No  Do not know?

ڇا قرض/سي آء ايف فنڊ اڃا تائين هلي رهيو آهي؟  
ها  نه  خبر ناهي

I2. Are others still receiving CIF in your community?

Yes  No  Do not know?

ڇا ٻيا قرض/سي آء ايف حاصل ڪري رهيا آهن؟  
ها  نه  خبر ناهي

I3. Who manages tracking of CIF?

VO executive  LSO  SRSO staff  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

قرض/سي آء ايف جي چيڪ/ٽريڪنگ ڪير ڪندو آهي؟  
ديهي تنظيم (وي او) جي انتظام ڪميٽي  مقامي تنظيم (ايل ايس او)  سروس جو اسٽاف  ٻيو: \_\_\_\_\_

14. Are recovered loans reused?

Regularly  Irregularly  No  Do not know.

ڇا واپس/جمع ڪرايل قرض ٻيهر استعمال ڪيا وڃن ٿا؟  
 باقاعديءَ سان  بي قاعديءَ سان  نه  خبر ناهي

15. Have there been mismanagement issues in your community?

Yes  No

ڇا اوهان جي ڪميونٽي/برادري ۾ بدانتظامي جا مسئلا ٿيا آهن؟  
 ها  نه

16. If yes, describe: \_\_\_\_\_

جيڪڏهن ها ته تفصيل لکو: \_\_\_\_\_

17. Biggest threats to CIF? (Select up to 3)

Poor recovery  Favouritism  Poor records  Lack of training  Lack of funds  No bank link  Other:

\_\_\_\_\_

قرض/سي آءِ ايف لاءِ سڀ کان وڏا خطرا ڪهڙا آهن؟ (ڪي به ٽي آپشن ٻڌايو)

خراب وصولي  پسنديدگيءَ/طرفداري  خراب رڪارڊ  تربيت جي کوٽ  فنڊن جي کوٽ  بئنڪ سان رابطو ناهي  ٻيو \_\_\_\_\_

18. Support needed for sustainability. (Top 3)

Audits  Training  Recovery system  Digital records  Community monitoring  Technical support

Larger fund

پائداري لاءِ ڪهڙي مدد جي ضرورت آهي؟ (ڪي به ٽي آپشن ٻڌايو)

آڊٽ ڪرائڻ  تربيت  وصولي جو نظام  ڊجيٽل/ڪمپيوٽر/موبائل ۾ رڪارڊ رکڻ  ڪميونٽي جي نگراني ڪرڻ  فني مدد ڪرڻ  وڌيڪ فنڊ

19 Have you or any member of your household received any of the following support/services under the People's Poverty Reduction Programme (PPRP) from SRSO?

(Please tick all that apply)

ڇا اوهان يا اوهان جي گهر مان ڪنهن کي عوام جي غربت گهٽائڻ جي پروگرام تحت سروسو کان هيٺين ذڪر ڪيل خدمتن مان ڪنهن قسم جي مدد ملي آهي؟

(انهن تي نشان لڳايو جيڪي لاڳو ٿين ٿا)

Component/Service	Received?	If yes, Level of Benefit Received (tick one)
2. Income Generating Grant (IGG) آمدني پيدا ڪرڻ واري آمداد (آءِ جِي جِي)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
4. Vocational/technical skills training (VTP) هنري ۽ فني مهارتن جي تربيت	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> ها <input type="checkbox"/> نه	

5. Low-cost housing/shelter support گهٽ خرچ تي گهر ٺاهڻ جي مدد	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	
6. Benefiting any Community Physical Infrastructure (CPI) scheme (e.g., road, water) or Village Rehabilitation post-disaster ڳوٺ لاءِ اسڪيم جهڙوڪ (روڊ، پاڻي وغيره) يا آفت کانپوءِ ڳوٺ جي بحالي	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	
7. Micro Health Insurance (MHI) coverage ننڍي سطح جي صحت جي انشورنس (ايم ايڇ آءِ)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	
8. Educational support (e.g., second shift school, school re-opening) تعليمي مدد (جهڙوڪ بند پيل اسڪول کولرائڻ يا اهلندڙ اسڪول جي پيءُ شفت شروع ڪرائڻ)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	
9. Enterprise development/value chain support ڪاروبار جي واڌاري لاءِ مدد ڪرڻ	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	
10. Kitchen gardening inputs/support گهر جي سطح تي پاجيون/سبزيون پوکرائڻ جي مدد ڪرڻ	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	
11. Village Rehabilitation (e.g., house & basic infrastructure post-disaster) ڳوٺ جي ٻيهر بحالي لاءِ مدد ڪرڻ (جهڙوڪ آفت کان پوءِ گهر ۽ بنيادي ڍانچي جي بحالي)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	
12. Other specifies ڪا ٻي مدد، تفصيل لکو		

110 Have you or any member of your household received any support or services from the Government or other NGOs (excluding PPRP/SRSO)?

ڇا اوهان يا اوهان جي گهر مان ڪنهن به فرد کي حڪومت يا ٻين اين جي اوز (سرسو/عوام جي غربت گهٽائڻ جي پروگرام کان علاوه) کان ڪا به مدد يا سهولت ملي آهي؟

Service/Support Type	Provided by (Govt/NGO Name)	Received? مدد ملي؟	Level of Benefit Received (tick one)

مردد يا خدمت جو قسم	ڪنهن مردد ڪئي (حڪومت/اين جي او جو نالو)		مليل فائدي جي سطح (ڪنهن به هڪ تي نشان لڳايو)
1. Cash assistance (e.g., BISP, Ehsaas, Zakat)  نقد رقم جي مردد (مثال طور بينظير جا پئسا، احساس پروگرام يا ذڪوات)		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial  <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
2. Ration or food distribution  راشن يا خوراڪ جي ورهاست		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial  <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
3. Health services (e.g., vaccination, medical camp)  صحت جو خدمتون (مثال طور ويڪسين يا مريڊيڪل جي ڪيمپ وغيرا)		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial  <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
4. Education support (e.g., free books, scholarships)  تعليمي مردد (مثال طور مفت ۾ ڪتاب يا تعليمي وضيفو)		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial  <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
5. Livelihood training or vocational skills  روزگار ڪرڻ لاءِ تربيت يا هنري سکيا		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial  <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
6. Shelter/housing support		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial

گهر ٺاهڻ جي مدد			<input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
7. Agricultural or livestock input support چوپائي مرال يا ذريعي بچ ۽ پاڻ جي مدد		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
8. Water/sanitation scheme پاڻي يا نڪاسي جي اسڪيم		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند
9. Other (please specify): ڪو ٻيو وضاحت ڪريو		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> نه <input type="checkbox"/> ها	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Low <input type="checkbox"/> Not Beneficial <input type="checkbox"/> وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> وچولي <input type="checkbox"/> گهٽ <input type="checkbox"/> غير فائديمند

J. Poverty Scorecard

غربت جو اسڪور ڪارڊ

J1. Household Composition (number of household members)

گهراڻي جي ترتيب (گهر جي ڀاتين جو تعداد)

Age/Sex عمر/جنس	Female عورت	Male مرد	Total ڪل
up to one year هڪ سال تائين			
over 1 to 5 1 کان 5 سال تائين			
over 5 to 10 5 کان 10 سال تائين			
over 10 to 18 10 کان 18 سال تائين			
over 18 to 24 18 کان 24 سال تائين			
over 24 to 55 24 کان 55 سال تائين			
over 55 to 65 55 کان 65 سال تائين			
over 65 years 65 سالن کان مٿي			
Total ڪل			

**J2. Work Status (number of household members)**

ڪم ڪرڻ جي صورتحال (ڪم ڪندڙ گهر ڀاتين جو تعداد)

Work status ڪم	over 10 to 18 10 کان 18 سال تائين		over 18 to 55 18 کان 55 سال تائين		over 55 years 55 سال کان مٿي	
	M مرد	F عورت	M مرد	F عورت	M مرد	F عورت
Household Work گهر جو ڪم						
Own Farming پنهنجي ذاتي ٻني بارو ڪرڻ						
Farm Labour ڪنهن ٻني ٻاري تي مزدوري ڪرڻ						
Off-farm Labour مزدوري ڪرڻ						
Service/Job نوڪري ڪرڻ						
Business ڪاروبار						
Other ٻيو						
Not Working (old/unable to) ڪو به ڪم نه (بزرگ/ڪم ڪرڻ کان ڪاڻ آهي)						
Not Working (willingly) ڪم ناهي ڪندو/ڪندي (راضي آهي)						
Unemployed بيروزگار						

**J3. Children in School and adult literacy (number of household members)**

اسڪول ۾ پڙهندڙ ٻار ۽ تعليم بالغان (تعليم حاصل ڪندڙ گهر جي ڀاتين جو تعداد)

	Up to 5 years 5 سالن تائين		over 5 to 10 years 5 کان 10 سالن تائين		over 10 to 16 years 10 کان 16 سالن تائين		over 16 to 18 years 16 کان 18 سالن تائين		Over 18 years 18 سالن کان مٿي	
	M مرد	F عورت	M مرد	F عورت	M مرد	F عورت	M مرد	F عورت	M مرد	F عورت
Not in School/not literate اسڪول ۾ داخل ناهي/پڙهيل ناهي										
Primary school (1-5) پرائمري اسڪول (1 کان 5 درجا)										
Middle school (6-8) مڊل اسڪول (6 کان 8 درجا)										

High school (9-10) (هائ اسڪول (9 کان 10 درجا)										
College (11-14) (ڪاليج (11 کان 14 درجا)										
Higher (15 & over) وڌيڪ تعليم حاصل ڪندڙ (15 درجا ۽ ان کان مٿي)										

#### J4. Poverty Scorecard

#### غربت جو اسڪور ڪارڊ

Q.	Indicators سرگرميون/اشارا	✓ one option from row one and write the corresponding score in row at the score column. سرگرمي مان هڪ آپشن جي چونڊ ڪريو ۽ ان جو اسڪور ڪالم ۾ لکيو.				Score اسڪور
1	How many people in the household are under the age of 18 or over the age of 65? گهر ۾ ڪيترا فرد 18 سال کان گهٽ يا 65 سال کان وڌيڪ عمر جا آهن؟	0-2 <input type="checkbox"/> 15	3-4 <input type="checkbox"/> 10	5-6 <input type="checkbox"/> 5	7 or more ست يا ان کان وڌيڪ <input type="checkbox"/> 0	
2	What is the highest educational level of the head of the household (completed)? گهر جي سربراهه جو سڀ کان اعليٰ تعليمي درجو ڪهڙو آهي (جيڪو مڪمل ٿيل هجي)؟	Never attended school. <input type="checkbox"/> 0 ڪڏهن به اسڪول ناهي ويو	Less than class 1 to class 5 included. <input type="checkbox"/> 1 1 کان 5 درجن تائين	Class 6 to class 10 included. <input type="checkbox"/> 3 6 کان 10 درجن تائين	Class 11, college or beyond <input type="checkbox"/> 10 11 درجا، ڪاليج يا ان کان وڌيڪ	
3	How many children in the household between 5 and 16 years old are currently attending school? گهر ۾ 5 کان 16 سال جي وچ ۾ ڪيترا ٻار آهي جيڪي اسڪول ويندا آهن؟	There are no children between 5 and 16 years old in the household <input type="checkbox"/> 4 گهر ۾ 5 کان 16 سال جي وچ ۾ ڪو ٻار موجود ناهي	All the children between 5 and 16 years old are attending school <input type="checkbox"/> 4 گهر ۾ 5 کان 16 سال جي وچ ۾ سڀ ٻار اسڪول ويندا آهن	Only some of the children between 5 and 16 years old are attending school. <input type="checkbox"/> 3 گهر ۾ 5 کان 16 سال جي وچ ۾ صرف ڪجهه ٻار اسڪول ويندا آهن.	None of the children between 5 and 16 years old are attending school. <input type="checkbox"/> 0 گهر ۾ 5 کان 16 سال جي وچ ۾ ڪو به ٻار اسڪول ناهي ويندو	

4	How many rooms per person does the household owns? (calculate the room per person ratio by dividing the number of rooms by the household members) گهر ۾ في فرد لاءِ ڪيترا ڪمرا آهن؟ (ڪمرا ۽ گهر جي ميمبرن جو تعداد ڄاڻڻ کان پوءِ، ڪمرن جو تعداد ميمبرن سان ورهائي ان جو حساب لڳايو.)	$\geq 0 - \leq 0.2$ <input type="checkbox"/> 0	$> 0.2 - \leq 0.3$ <input type="checkbox"/> 2	$> 0.3 - \leq 0.4$ <input type="checkbox"/> 4	$> 0.4$ <input type="checkbox"/> 12	
5	What kind of toilet is used by the household? گهراڻو ڪهڙي قسم جو باٿروم استعمال ڪندو آهي؟	Flush connected to a public sewerage, to a pit or to an open drain. <input type="checkbox"/> 3 سنو ليٽرين استعمال ڪيو وڃي ٿو جنهن جو نيڪال بند نالين، کليل نالين يا ليٽرين جي پويان ٺهيل ڪڏي ۾ نيڪال جمع ٿي ٿو	Dry raised latrine or dry pit latrine <input type="checkbox"/> 2 باٿروم زمين جي سطح مٿي ٺهيل آهي ۽ ان جو نيڪال کليل ڪڏي ۾ جمع ٿي ٿو	There is no toilet in the household. <input type="checkbox"/> 0 گهر ۾ ڪو به باٿروم ناهي ٺهيل		
6	Does the household own at least one refrigerator, freezer or washing machine? ڇا گهراڻي وٽ گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪ فريج، فريزر يا ڪپڙن ڌوڻڻ جي مشين موجود آهي؟	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> 3	No <input type="checkbox"/> 0			
7	Does the household own at least one air conditioner, air cooler, geyser, or heater? ڇا گهراڻي وٽ گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪ ايئر ڪنڊيشنر (اي سي)، ايئر ڪولر، گيزر (پاڻي گرم ڪرڻ واري مشين) يا هيٽر (ڪمري ۾ گرمائش پيدا ڪرڻ واري مشين) موجود آهي؟	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> 9 ها	No <input type="checkbox"/> 0 نه			
8	Does the household own at least one cooking stove, cooking range, or microwave oven? ڇا گهراڻي وٽ گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪ ڪڪنگ اسٽو (پاڻي پچائڻ وارو جديد چلھو)، ڪڪنگ رينج (ڪاڏي پچائڻ واري مشين) يا مائڪرو ويو اوون (ڪاڏي گرم ڪرڻ واري مشين) موجود آهي؟	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> 5 ها	No <input type="checkbox"/> 0 نه			

9	Does the household own the following engine driven vehicles...? چا گهراڻي وٽ انجن تي هلندڙ گاڏيون موجود آهن؟	At least one car / tractor and at least one motorcycle / scooter <input type="checkbox"/> 24 گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪڙي ڪار/ٽريڪٽر ۽ گهٽ ۾ گهٽ موٽر سائيڪل آهي	At least one car / tractor but no motorcycle / scooter <input type="checkbox"/> 24 گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪڙي ڪاري/ٽريڪٽر آهي پر موٽر سائيڪل ناهي	No car / tractor but at least one motorcycle / scooter <input type="checkbox"/> 7 ڪار يا ٽريڪٽر ناهي پر گهٽ ۾ هڪڙو موٽر سائيڪل آهي	Neither car / tractor NOR motorcycle / scooter <input type="checkbox"/> 0 ڪار، ٽريڪٽر يا موٽر سائيڪل ناهي	
10	Does the household own at least one TV? چا گهراڻي وٽ گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪڙي ٽي وي آهي؟	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> 2 ها		No <input type="checkbox"/> 0 نه		
11	Does the household own the following livestock...? چا گهراڻي وٽ چوپايو مال آهي؟	At least one buffalo / bullock AND at least one cow / goat / sheep <input type="checkbox"/> 6 گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪڙي مڙينهن/ڍڳو ۽ گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪڙي ڳئون/بڪري يا ريڙ آهي	At least one buffalo / bullock BUT NO cow / goat / sheep <input type="checkbox"/> 6 گهٽ ۾ گهٽ مڙينهن/ڍڳو آهي پر ڳئون/بڪري يا ريڙ ناهي	No buffalo / bullock BUT at least one cow / goat / sheep <input type="checkbox"/> 2 مڙينهن يا ڍڳو ناهي پر گهٽ ۾ گهٽ هڪڙي ڳئون/بڪري/ريڙ آهي	Neither buffalo / bullock NOR cow / goat / sheep <input type="checkbox"/> 0 نه مڙينهن آهي نه ٽي ڍڳو/ڳئون/بڪري يا ريڙ آهي	
12	How much cultivable agricultural land does the household own? (converted into acres) گهراڻي وٽ زرعي آبادي لائق ڪيتري زمين آهي؟ (ايڪرن ۾ لکو)	0 <input type="checkbox"/> 0	>0 - <=12.5 <input type="checkbox"/> 4	> 12.5 <input type="checkbox"/> 7		
Total Score ڪ:ل اسڪور						

Annex – 3: FGD and KII guidelines.

## **Study on the Approach and Impact of Community Investment Fund (CIF)**

### **(GOS funded PPRP of SRSO)**

#### **Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guidelines**

Participants: CO/VO/LSO leaders managing the CIF

Group Size: 6–8 participants (preferably from same or neighbouring union councils)

Duration: 60–90 minutes

Facilitator Materials: Notepad, audio recorder (with consent), flip chart/markers

#### **Introduction (5 minutes)**

- Introduce yourself and your organization.
- Explain the purpose of the discussion: understanding the CIF process, its challenges, and successes.
- Clarify that the session is confidential, voluntary, and no names will be shared.
- Seek verbal consent for participation and audio recording (if applicable).

#### **Guiding Questions**

##### **1. CIF Planning and Lending Process**

1. How much is your CIF portfolio in PKR:
2. How are CIF loans planned and allocated at your level (CO/VO/LSO)?
3. What steps are followed from application to disbursement?
4. Who is involved in reviewing and approving applications?
5. What criteria are used to select eligible women?

##### **2. Loan Conditions and Terms**

1. What are the key terms and conditions of CIF loans?
  - a. CIF Amount (size)
  - b. interest/ service charge/ processing fee
  - c. repayment terms
  - d. repeated loans
2. How are these conditions communicated to the beneficiaries?
3. Do all members understand the terms clearly before accepting the loan?

##### **3. Repayment Management**

1. How is the repayment process managed at your level?
2. What systems are in place for recordkeeping and tracking repayments?
3. What happens if a beneficiary defaults or delays repayment?
4. How do you ensure accountability and fairness?

##### **4. Challenges and Problem-Solving**

1. What challenges do you face in managing CIF at your level?

2. Are there issues related to favouritism, lack of transparency, or conflicts?
3. How are such issues handled or resolved?

**5. Observed Results and Successes**

1. What positive changes have you observed in households who accessed CIF?
2. Can you share any success stories from your area?
3. How has CIF affected women's participation in your CO/VO/LSO?

**6. Fund Sustainability and Recommendations**

1. Is the CIF fund still revolving in your area? How is it maintained?
2. Do you feel the current system is sustainable in the long term?
3. What kind of support or improvements would help strengthen CIF management?
4. Would you suggest linking CIF with formal financial institutions in the future?
5. Would you prefer another financial service over CIF? Why or why not?

## **Study on the Approach and Impact of Community Investment Fund (CIF)**

### **(GOS funded PPRP of SRSO)**

#### **Key Informant Interview (KII) Guidelines**

Informants: CO/VO/LSO Leaders, CIF Managers, Field Staff, SRSO Professionals

Duration: 45–60 minutes

Method: In-person or phone/Zoom; audio recording (with consent)

#### Introduction

- Brief the interviewee on the objective of the study.
- Seek permission for notetaking and/or recording.

#### Interview Questions

1. What is your role in CIF-related activities (selection, disbursement, recovery)?
2. How long have you been involved in this role?
3. How are CIF beneficiaries selected?
4. What mechanisms ensure fair and transparent disbursement?
5. From your experience, how are most CIF loans being used?
6. Have you observed improvements in household income or assets among beneficiaries?
7. What challenges do you face in the recovery of CIF loans?
8. Are there cases of default or misuse? How are they addressed?
9. Do VO/LSO leaders have the skills to manage CIF? What support do they need?
10. What trainings or tools have helped in effective CIF management?
11. Do community members view CIF as a community-owned fund?
12. How has women's leadership in CIF management affected trust and performance?
13. In your opinion, is the CIF model sustainable in the long run?
14. What would help in scaling or improving the CIF model?
15. What policy or operational recommendations would you make to improve CIF?



## SINDH RURAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATION (SRSO)

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